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Detect static securecookies to trivialize more rules #16029

Merged
merged 10 commits into from
Aug 22, 2018
83 changes: 82 additions & 1 deletion utils/trivialize-rules/trivialize-rules.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -99,8 +99,11 @@ files.fork().zipAll([ sources.fork(), rules ]).map(([name, source, ruleset]) =>
const fail = createTag('FAIL', chalk.red, console.error);

let targets = ruleset.target.map(target => target.$.host);
let securecookies = ruleset.securecookie ? ruleset.securecookie.map(sc => sc.$) : new Array();
let rules = ruleset.rule.map(rule => rule.$);

let shouldRemoveSecurecookies = false;

if (rules.length === 1 && isTrivial(rules[0])) {
return;
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -181,11 +184,89 @@ files.fork().zipAll([ sources.fork(), rules ]).map(([name, source, ruleset]) =>

domains = Array.from(domains);

// It is assumed that if all securecookies are static,
// they can be safely ignored.
//
// A securecookie is called to be static either it is a trivial securecookie
// or ALL of the following conditions are satisfied:
//
// 1. securecookie.host match cookie.host from the beginning ^ to the end $.
// Otherwise, it might match subdomains/ partial patterns, thus a non-trivial
// securecookie.
//
// 2. securecookie.host will not throw an error when passed to explodeRegExp().
// Otherwise, it might match patterns too complicated for our interests.
//
// 3. Each exploded securecookie.host should be included in ruleset.target/
// exploded target. Otherwise, this ruleset is likely problematic itself. It
// is dangerous for a rewrite.
function isStaticCookie(securecookie) {
if (securecookie.host === '.+' && securecookie.name === '.+') {
return true;
}

if (!securecookie.host.startsWith('^') || !securecookie.host.endsWith('$')) {
return false;
}

let localDomains = new Set();
let unsupportedDomains = new Set();

try {
explodeRegExp(securecookie.host, domain => {
if (domain.startsWith('.')) {
domain = domain.slice(1);
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Is this sufficient munging to ensure it matches the target domains?
If not, at worst it will not match and result in a false result, which isn't terrible but not desirable.

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@cschanaj cschanaj Jul 12, 2018

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@Hainish this should be good enough. As mentioned in #16029 (comment), securecookie.host only match cookie.domain if there is a rule covers cookie.domain. Given the target are trivial, cookie.domain cannot be anything other than domain.example.com and .domain.example.com for a securecookie rule to works. With condition (1) effective, securecookie.host should explode to either one of them. Otherwise, the securecookie will never be applied (dangling rules?) under the current implementation.

With the above logic in mind, I have also add 4bbd731 to remove some of these securecookie rules that will never be effective.

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IMHO, it would be great to have #15998 and #16000 merged before running this against the master.

}
localDomains.add(domain);
});
} catch (e) {
if (!(e instanceof UnsupportedRegExp)) {
throw e;
}
warn`Unsupported regexp part ${e.message} while traversing securecookie : ${JSON.stringify(securecookie)}`;
return false;
}

for (const domain of localDomains) {
if (domains.indexOf(domain) === -1) {
warn`Ruleset does not cover target ${domain} for securecookie : ${JSON.stringify(securecookie)}`;
unsupportedDomains.add(domain);
}
}

// For cookies to be covered, there must be at least one rule covering the
// same domain. This is guaranteed by safeToSecureCookie(cookie) in rules.js
//
// Since securecookie.host will only match cookie.domain if there there is
// a rule covers cookie.domain. Given the target are trivial, cookie.domain
// cannot be anything other than domain.example.com and .domain.example.com
// (possibly with more leading dots) for a securecookie rule ever to take
// place.
//
// With condition (1) effective, securecookie.host should explode to either
// one of the aforementioned patterns. Otherwise, the securecookie rules
// will never be applied. Such dangling securecookie rules can be removed
// safely.
if (unsupportedDomains.size > 0) {
if (unsupportedDomains.size === localDomains.size) {
shouldRemoveSecurecookies = true;
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@bcyphers bcyphers Aug 6, 2018

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If any one of the securecookies is unsupported, this will cause all of them to be removed. I don't think that's the intended behavior.

For example, for the following XML, the script will trivialize the file and remove all securecookies:

<target host="a.foo.com" />
<supercookie host="a.foo.com" />
<supercookie host="b.foo.com" />
...

But if the two securecookie entries are combined into one (<securecookie host="^(a|b)\.foo\.com$" />), the script will refuse to trivialize the XML.

It seems like we should remove one securecookie entry at a time, not drop them all at once. If that's risky (not sure why it would be), we can just refuse to trivialize any XML with unsupported securecookie domains.

return true;
}
return false;
}

return true;
}

if (domains.slice().sort().join('\n') !== targets.sort().join('\n')) {
if (ruleset.securecookie) {
if (securecookies.length > 0 && !securecookies.every(isStaticCookie)) {
return;
}

if (shouldRemoveSecurecookies) {
source = replaceXML(source, 'securecookie', []);
}

source = replaceXML(source, 'target', domains.map(domain => `<target host="${domain}" />`));
}

Expand Down