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In order to secure Solr traffic from eavesdropping in the provisioned VPC, compliance folks want TLS implemented for traffic between the load-balancer and ECS containers running Solr.
Acceptance Criteria
[ACs should be clearly demoable/verifiable whenever possible. Try specifying them using BDD.]
GIVEN I have access to the VPC where a Solr instance is provisioned
WHEN I check the configuration on the load-balancer
AND use openssl s_client -connect targethost:targetport
THEN I see that the target host terminates TLS on the target port
Background
Traffic between the load-balancer and Solr running in ECS is very low sensitivity for the initial use-case for this brokered service, because data.gov only every stores and queries public data in Solr. If the traffic between the client and the Solr service is sniffed in-transit in the VPC, it's no big deal. However, before using this broker for more sensitive client use-cases in the future, this traffic should be secured with TLS to prevent disclosure.
This work will increase the security of the service by preventing unauthorized capture of traffic to and from the Solr containers. (We are not worried about tampering because of other VPC security features in effect.)
User Story
In order to secure Solr traffic from eavesdropping in the provisioned VPC, compliance folks want TLS implemented for traffic between the load-balancer and ECS containers running Solr.
Acceptance Criteria
[ACs should be clearly demoable/verifiable whenever possible. Try specifying them using BDD.]
WHEN I check the configuration on the load-balancer
AND use
openssl s_client -connect targethost:targetport
THEN I see that the target host terminates TLS on the target port
Background
Traffic between the load-balancer and Solr running in ECS is very low sensitivity for the initial use-case for this brokered service, because data.gov only every stores and queries public data in Solr. If the traffic between the client and the Solr service is sniffed in-transit in the VPC, it's no big deal. However, before using this broker for more sensitive client use-cases in the future, this traffic should be secured with TLS to prevent disclosure.
Security Considerations (required)
This work will increase the security of the service by preventing unauthorized capture of traffic to and from the Solr containers. (We are not worried about tampering because of other VPC security features in effect.)
Sketch
Two approaches have been identified:
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