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Now that the insecure pattern screenlock option has been hidden in the UI, it would be nice to provide an easy way for users to get randomly generated PIN and passphrases directly from Settings and SetupWizard. Equiprobability is a requirement for high-quality entropy so random generation should be heavily suggested.
Relevant informations:
6-8 digit PIN is the ideal PIN length for most people on GrapheneOS-supported devices, thanks to the secure element throttling feature (Titan M allows only one attempt/day after 140 failed attempts). Most users don't have a high threat model to justify for more security (at cost of discomfort), so they'll be fine with trusting the secure element not being exploited by an adversary.
A randomly generated 6 digit PIN code should provide roughly ~20 bits of entropy, where a 8 digit PIN code provides ~26.5, which is equivalent to weak passphrase such as 2 words randomly picked from the diceware wordlist (~25). But we don't gain much in practice from even 12 digit PIN, given that the secure element is trusted.
If they don't want to trust the secure element, they can still choose very strong passphrases. Almost strong passphrases can also be decent given that the hardware-bound key derivation has to be bypassed.
Now that the insecure pattern screenlock option has been hidden in the UI, it would be nice to provide an easy way for users to get randomly generated PIN and passphrases directly from Settings and SetupWizard. Equiprobability is a requirement for high-quality entropy so random generation should be heavily suggested.
Relevant informations:
6-8 digit PIN is the ideal PIN length for most people on GrapheneOS-supported devices, thanks to the secure element throttling feature (Titan M allows only one attempt/day after 140 failed attempts). Most users don't have a high threat model to justify for more security (at cost of discomfort), so they'll be fine with trusting the secure element not being exploited by an adversary.
A randomly generated 6 digit PIN code should provide roughly ~20 bits of entropy, where a 8 digit PIN code provides ~26.5, which is equivalent to weak passphrase such as 2 words randomly picked from the diceware wordlist (~25). But we don't gain much in practice from even 12 digit PIN, given that the secure element is trusted.
If they don't want to trust the secure element, they can still choose very strong passphrases. Almost strong passphrases can also be decent given that the hardware-bound key derivation has to be bypassed.
More information: https://grapheneos.org/faq#security-and-privacy
The UI should be minimal, easy-to-use with sane defaults, while being informative.
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