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PKI: Should not allow the root certificate to be 'revoked'. #4884
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Seems like a good idea to not allow revoking itself. You could always generate a new trusted CRL from elsewhere and add the root CA to it; but really if you were at a point where you wanted to revoke the root you're in kind of a bad failure mode anyways because due to soft-fail CRL mechanisms it may take up to 6 days or so for clients to even notice, so what you'd want to do is just update systems' CA bundles ASAP to not include the bad root. |
Fixed by #5134 |
Hi @jefferai , Now if for some reason we have to Revoke the intermediate cert it can be easily done by /pki/revoke API but for Root CA it is not possible. I even tried to DELETE the ROOT CA and tried to create a new one but Vault does not delete the old ROOT CA and creates a new one and both are valid. I want to invalidate the old ROOT CA so that all intermediate certificates signed by it are also invalidated. Thanks, |
I am facing the same issue. Did you find something out ? |
I am also trying to get rid of the CA certificate, and because this bug is (justifiably) fixed, I've no idea how I'm supposed to properly delete it. |
Hello, It seems you can delete them using CLI:
|
Describe the bug
The Vault PKI secret backend allows you to revoke its own root CA with a call to
pki/revoke
.Once done, your Root CA is added to the CRL, and it's impossible to undo.
Because the CRL is signed by the now-revoked CA certificate, the CRL is now paradoxically invalid.
I don't know what the correct behaviour here is supposed to be in PKI terms, but revoking the Root CA seems to permanently invalidate either the CA (if the CRL is treated as valid) or the CRL itself (since it surely can't be trusted to invalidate its own signing certificate).
I looked online for opinions:
My un-informed opinion is that it should be impossible to add the Root CA's serial number to the CRL signed by that very Root CA.
To Reproduce
Expected behavior
pki/certs
, is it there for a reason? I thought only certs you issued would show up there.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: