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bundled binaries: rational, security concerns and observation (.deb) #1582

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chrt223 opened this issue Feb 5, 2025 · 2 comments
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@chrt223
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chrt223 commented Feb 5, 2025

Some observation based on the .deb package provided by https://github.com/retoaccess1/haveno-reto/releases/latest/download/haveno-linux-deb.zip (@retoaccess1 which is the 4th result when searching for "haveno deb")

  • The .deb is bundling/downloading binaries: tor, monero-wallet-rpc, monerod instead of relying on well-proven ones. What's the point of checking a MD5 if it rolls its own unproven trust-system instead of relying of user/distribution/proven supply chains. These binary have/should have their own .deb from verified build.
  •  ~/.local/share/Haveno-reto/monerod indicates having been build from commit 10a1b767b which is suspicious given no such commit exist in the official monero Git repository. (If a malware infected a developer machine, that would be a nice spot to hide)
  • These bundled binaries weight much more than usual (monerod 25MB, monero-wallet-rpc 30MB) instead of ~16 MB for a normal build. Even Tor 0.4.8.13 weight 3.4MB meanwhile Debian's binary is 2.7M.

If this deb is not "official" or even a malware, then it's still a concern for /haveno-dex/ since it'd call for actions regarding official builds (and a more secure binary retrieval/reliance mechanisms)

See also: #1577

@woodser
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woodser commented Feb 5, 2025

The binaries should match this release: https://github.com/haveno-dex/monero/releases/tag/release4

That repository provides the ability to apply customizations not yet released in monero-project, which has been necessary in the past (less so now).

As far as I know, the binary builds should be determinstic using the cross-compiling instructions, so the binaries should be reproducible from the same commit hash?

@boldsuck
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boldsuck commented Feb 5, 2025

The Tor binaries are downloaded directly from the Tor Browser project.
https://github.com/haveno-dex/tor-binary

If this deb is not "official" or even a malware, then it's still a concern for /haveno-dex/ since it'd call for actions regarding official builds (and a more secure binary retrieval/reliance mechanisms)

Yes, this deb is not "official". There is no official Haveno-dex mainnet.
Haveno-dex develops the software (for test- stagenet), retoacces1 operates a mainnet with this software.

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