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The .deb is bundling/downloading binaries: tor, monero-wallet-rpc, monerod instead of relying on well-proven ones. What's the point of checking a MD5 if it rolls its own unproven trust-system instead of relying of user/distribution/proven supply chains. These binary have/should have their own .deb from verified build.
~/.local/share/Haveno-reto/monerod indicates having been build from commit 10a1b767b which is suspicious given no such commit exist in the official monero Git repository. (If a malware infected a developer machine, that would be a nice spot to hide)
These bundled binaries weight much more than usual (monerod 25MB, monero-wallet-rpc 30MB) instead of ~16 MB for a normal build. Even Tor 0.4.8.13 weight 3.4MB meanwhile Debian's binary is 2.7M.
If this deb is not "official" or even a malware, then it's still a concern for /haveno-dex/ since it'd call for actions regarding official builds (and a more secure binary retrieval/reliance mechanisms)
That repository provides the ability to apply customizations not yet released in monero-project, which has been necessary in the past (less so now).
As far as I know, the binary builds should be determinstic using the cross-compiling instructions, so the binaries should be reproducible from the same commit hash?
If this deb is not "official" or even a malware, then it's still a concern for /haveno-dex/ since it'd call for actions regarding official builds (and a more secure binary retrieval/reliance mechanisms)
Yes, this deb is not "official". There is no official Haveno-dex mainnet.
Haveno-dex develops the software (for test- stagenet), retoacces1 operates a mainnet with this software.
Some observation based on the .deb package provided by https://github.com/retoaccess1/haveno-reto/releases/latest/download/haveno-linux-deb.zip (@retoaccess1 which is the 4th result when searching for "haveno deb")
tor
,monero-wallet-rpc
,monerod
instead of relying on well-proven ones. What's the point of checking a MD5 if it rolls its own unproven trust-system instead of relying of user/distribution/proven supply chains. These binary have/should have their own .deb from verified build.~/.local/share/Haveno-reto/monerod
indicates having been build from commit 10a1b767b which is suspicious given no such commit exist in the official monero Git repository. (If a malware infected a developer machine, that would be a nice spot to hide)If this deb is not "official" or even a malware, then it's still a concern for /haveno-dex/ since it'd call for actions regarding official builds (and a more secure binary retrieval/reliance mechanisms)
See also: #1577
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