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KERI and IPLD #7

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SmithSamuelM opened this issue Jan 21, 2020 · 5 comments
Open

KERI and IPLD #7

SmithSamuelM opened this issue Jan 21, 2020 · 5 comments

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@SmithSamuelM
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I want to explore a common incepting (multi-format like) approach to self-certifying identifiers that are based on a hash (signature) of the incepting information that is compatible with IPID.

We you be open to a discussion on this. I couldn't find you email.

@SmithSamuelM
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IPID/IPLD and KERI are going to the same place but with different starting points. On want to make them recognize each other. I think it would be good for us to talk at length on how to do this.

@SmithSamuelM
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Looks like this link only has two slides. https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/QmXFhzGYF27zvjNxbJNcfn226ZkJpRg2sQGRgK7JKdCKje/#/1

@SmithSamuelM
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I have been using the term "ambient verifiability" to mean attestations are verifiable by anyone, anywhere, at anytime. This implies end verifiability to the root-of-trust. Verifiability in this context means signatures not hashes (although a signature is a hash but not merely a hash). So a self-certifying identifier has a cryptographic root-of-trust only the controller of that identifier is a verifiable source of truth. So an end-verifiable statement has a signature that can be verified as belonging to the authoritative source of truth. In an ephemeral self-certifying identifier, there is no possibility of transfer of control to a different public/private key pair so the incepting statement for the identifier is enough to verify to the root-of-trust that is that originating self-certifying public/private key pai. A persistent identifier allows transfers of control. So end verifiability of the root-of-trust requires verifying the chain of transfers of control from the incepting public/private key pair to the current authoritative one. This is a signed chain which is also but not merely a content addressable chain. Signature are hashes so any signature can be used as a content address. The difference is the signature is tied a root of trust and therefore satisfies end verifiability. So a DAG of transfers of control statement has ambient verifiability.

@SmithSamuelM
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ambient verifiability is similar to the concept you espoused for IPLD in that it doesn't need anything else.

@SmithSamuelM
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@jonnycrunch Tagging you so you see my request to connect.

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