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Linux ti33x psp 3.2 r5a+gitr09e9651bcf2ee8d86685f2a8075bc6557b1d3b91 #1
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koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
commit afbca95 upstream. The libertas scan thread expects priv->scan_req to be non-NULL. In theory, it should always be set. In practice, we've seen the following oops: [ 8363.067444] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004 [ 8363.067490] pgd = c0004000 [ 8363.078393] [00000004] *pgd=00000000 [ 8363.086711] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT [ 8363.091375] Modules linked in: fuse libertas_sdio libertas psmouse mousedev ov7670 mmp_camera joydev videobuf2_core videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] [ 8363.107490] CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.0.0-gf7ccc69 torvalds#671) [ 8363.112799] PC is at lbs_scan_worker+0x108/0x5a4 [libertas] [ 8363.118326] LR is at 0x0 [ 8363.120836] pc : [<bf03a854>] lr : [<00000000>] psr: 60000113 [ 8363.120845] sp : ee66bf48 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000000 [ 8363.120845] r10: ee2c2088 r9 : c04e2efc r8 : eef97005 [ 8363.132231] r7 : eee0716f r6 : ee2c02c0 r5 : ee2c2088 r4 : eee07160 [ 8363.137419] r3 : 00000000 r2 : a0000113 r1 : 00000001 r0 : eee07160 [ 8363.143896] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 8363.157630] Control: 10c5387d Table: 2e754019 DAC: 00000015 [ 8363.163334] Process kworker/u:1 (pid: 25, stack limit = 0xee66a2f8) While I've not found a smoking gun, there are two places that raised red flags for me. The first is in _internal_start_scan, when we queue up a scan; we first queue the worker, and then set priv->scan_req. There's theoretically a 50mS delay which should be plenty, but doing things that way just seems racy (and not in the good way). The second is in the scan worker thread itself. Depending on the state of priv->scan_channel, we cancel pending scan runs and then requeue a run in 300mS. We then send the scan command down to the hardware, sleep, and if we get scan results for all the desired channels, we set priv->scan_req to NULL. However, it that's happened in less than 300mS, what happens with the pending scan run? This patch addresses both of those concerns. With the patch applied, we have not seen the oops in the past two weeks. Signed-off-by: Andres Salomon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
commit 1b41c83 upstream. When running the Point Grey "flycap" program for their USB 3.0 camera (which was running as a USB 2.0 device for some reason), I trigger this oops whenever I try to open a video stream: Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.715559] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.719153] IP: [<ffffffff8147841e>] free_async+0x1e/0x70 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.720991] PGD 6f833067 PUD 6fc56067 PMD 0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.722815] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.724627] CPU 0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.724636] Modules linked in: ecryptfs encrypted_keys sha1_generic trusted binfmt_misc sha256_generic aesni_intel cryptd aes_x86_64 aes_generic parport_pc dm_crypt ppdev joydev snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwlwifi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm thinkpad_acpi mac80211 snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_timer btusb uvcvideo snd_seq_device bluetooth videodev psmouse snd v4l2_compat_ioctl32 serio_raw tpm_tis cfg80211 tpm tpm_bios nvram soundcore snd_page_alloc lp parport i915 xhci_hcd ahci libahci drm_kms_helper drm sdhci_pci sdhci e1000e i2c_algo_bit video Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.734212] Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.736162] Pid: 2713, comm: FlyCap2 Not tainted 3.2.0-rc5+ torvalds#28 LENOVO 4286CTO/4286CTO Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.738148] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8147841e>] [<ffffffff8147841e>] free_async+0x1e/0x70 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.740134] RSP: 0018:ffff88005715fd78 EFLAGS: 00010296 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.742118] RAX: 00000000fffffff4 RBX: ffff88006fe8f900 RCX: 0000000000004118 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.744116] RDX: 0000000001000000 RSI: 0000000000016390 RDI: 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.746087] RBP: ffff88005715fd88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8146f22e Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.748018] R10: ffff88006e520ac0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88005715fe28 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.749916] R13: ffff88005d31df00 R14: ffff88006fe8f900 R15: 00007f688c995cb8 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.751785] FS: 00007f68a366da40(0000) GS:ffff880100200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.753659] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.755509] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000706bb000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.757334] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.759124] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.760871] Process FlyCap2 (pid: 2713, threadinfo ffff88005715e000, task ffff88006c675b80) Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.762605] Stack: Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.764297] ffff88005715fe28 0000000000000000 ffff88005715fe08 ffffffff81479058 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.766020] 0000000000000000 ffffea0000004000 ffff880000004118 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.767750] ffff880000000001 ffff88006e520ac0 fffffff46fd81180 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.769472] Call Trace: Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.771147] [<ffffffff81479058>] proc_do_submiturb+0x778/0xa00 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.772798] [<ffffffff8147a5fd>] usbdev_do_ioctl+0x24d/0x1200 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.774410] [<ffffffff8147b5de>] usbdev_ioctl+0xe/0x20 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.775975] [<ffffffff81189259>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x99/0x600 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.777534] [<ffffffff81189851>] sys_ioctl+0x91/0xa0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.779088] [<ffffffff816247c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.780634] Code: 51 ff ff ff e9 29 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 48 89 fb 48 8b 7f 18 e8 a6 ea c0 ff 4 8 8b 7b 20 <f0> ff 0f 0f 94 c0 84 c0 74 05 e8 d3 99 c1 ff 48 8b 43 40 48 8b Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.783970] RIP [<ffffffff8147841e>] free_async+0x1e/0x70 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.785630] RSP <ffff88005715fd78> Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.787274] CR2: 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.794728] ---[ end trace 52894d3355f88d19 ]--- markup_oops.pl says the oops is in put_cred: ffffffff81478401: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff81478404: 53 push %rbx ffffffff81478405: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp ffffffff81478409: e8 f2 c0 1a 00 callq ffffffff81624500 <mcount> ffffffff8147840e: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx | %ebx => ffff88006fe8f900 put_pid(as->pid); ffffffff81478411: 48 8b 7f 18 mov 0x18(%rdi),%rdi ffffffff81478415: e8 a6 ea c0 ff callq ffffffff81086ec0 <put_pid> put_cred(as->cred); ffffffff8147841a: 48 8b 7b 20 mov 0x20(%rbx),%rdi | %edi => 0 %ebx = ffff88006fe8f900 */ static inline int atomic_dec_and_test(atomic_t *v) { unsigned char c; asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0; sete %1" *ffffffff8147841e: f0 ff 0f lock decl (%rdi) | %edi = 0 <--- faulting instruction ffffffff81478421: 0f 94 c0 sete %al static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred; validate_creds(cred); if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage)) ffffffff81478424: 84 c0 test %al,%al ffffffff81478426: 74 05 je ffffffff8147842d <free_async+0x2d> __put_cred(cred); ffffffff81478428: e8 d3 99 c1 ff callq ffffffff81091e00 <__put_cred> kfree(as->urb->transfer_buffer); ffffffff8147842d: 48 8b 43 40 mov 0x40(%rbx),%rax ffffffff81478431: 48 8b 78 68 mov 0x68(%rax),%rdi ffffffff81478435: e8 a6 e1 ce ff callq ffffffff811665e0 <kfree> kfree(as->urb->setup_packet); ffffffff8147843a: 48 8b 43 40 mov 0x40(%rbx),%rax ffffffff8147843e: 48 8b b8 90 00 00 00 mov 0x90(%rax),%rdi ffffffff81478445: e8 96 e1 ce ff callq ffffffff811665e0 <kfree> usb_free_urb(as->urb); ffffffff8147844a: 48 8b 7b 40 mov 0x40(%rbx),%rdi ffffffff8147844e: e8 0d 6b ff ff callq ffffffff8146ef60 <usb_free_urb> This bug seems to have been introduced by commit d178bc3 "user namespace: usb: make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)" I'm not sure if this is right fix, but it does stop the oops. Unfortunately, the Point Grey software still refuses to work, but it's a closed source app, so I can't fix it. Signed-off-by: Sarah Sharp <[email protected]> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
…bles the feature to fix an oops commit 1a3a026 upstream. Echo vendor and product number of a non usb-storage device to usb-storage driver's new_id, then plug in the device to host and you will find following oops msg, the root cause is usb_stor_probe1() refers invalid id entry if giving a dynamic id, so just disable the feature. [ 3105.018012] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 3105.018062] CPU 0 [ 3105.018075] Modules linked in: usb_storage usb_libusual bluetooth dm_crypt binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec_analog snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep hp_wmi ppdev sparse_keymap snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_timer snd_seq_device psmouse snd serio_raw tpm_infineon soundcore i915 snd_page_alloc tpm_tis parport_pc tpm tpm_bios drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit video lp parport usbhid hid sg sr_mod sd_mod ehci_hcd uhci_hcd usbcore e1000e usb_common floppy [ 3105.018408] [ 3105.018419] Pid: 189, comm: khubd Tainted: G I 3.2.0-rc7+ torvalds#29 Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq dc7800p Convertible Minitower/0AACh [ 3105.018481] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa045830d>] [<ffffffffa045830d>] usb_stor_probe1+0x2fd/0xc20 [usb_storage] [ 3105.018536] RSP: 0018:ffff880056a3d830 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 3105.018562] RAX: ffff880065f4e648 RBX: ffff88006bb28000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 3105.018597] RDX: ffff88006f23c7b0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000206 [ 3105.018632] RBP: ffff880056a3d900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880067365000 [ 3105.018665] R10: 00000000000002ac R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff6000b41a7340 [ 3105.018698] R13: ffff880065f4ef60 R14: ffff88006bb28b88 R15: ffff88006f23d270 [ 3105.018733] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007a200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3105.018773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 3105.018801] CR2: 00007fc99c8c4650 CR3: 0000000001e05000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 3105.018835] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3105.018870] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3105.018906] Process khubd (pid: 189, threadinfo ffff880056a3c000, task ffff88005677a400) [ 3105.018945] Stack: [ 3105.018959] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880056a3d8d0 0000000000000002 [ 3105.019011] 0000000000000000 ffff880056a3d918 ffff880000000000 0000000000000002 [ 3105.019058] ffff880056a3d8d0 0000000000000012 ffff880056a3d8d0 0000000000000006 [ 3105.019105] Call Trace: [ 3105.019128] [<ffffffffa0458cd4>] storage_probe+0xa4/0xe0 [usb_storage] [ 3105.019173] [<ffffffffa0097822>] usb_probe_interface+0x172/0x330 [usbcore] [ 3105.019211] [<ffffffff815fda67>] driver_probe_device+0x257/0x3b0 [ 3105.019243] [<ffffffff815fdd43>] __device_attach+0x73/0x90 [ 3105.019272] [<ffffffff815fdcd0>] ? __driver_attach+0x110/0x110 [ 3105.019303] [<ffffffff815fb93c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0xf0 [ 3105.019334] [<ffffffff815fd6c7>] device_attach+0xf7/0x120 [ 3105.019364] [<ffffffff815fc905>] bus_probe_device+0x45/0x80 [ 3105.019396] [<ffffffff815f98a6>] device_add+0x876/0x990 [ 3105.019434] [<ffffffffa0094e42>] usb_set_configuration+0x822/0x9e0 [usbcore] [ 3105.019479] [<ffffffffa00a3492>] generic_probe+0x62/0xf0 [usbcore] [ 3105.019518] [<ffffffffa0097a46>] usb_probe_device+0x66/0xb0 [usbcore] [ 3105.019555] [<ffffffff815fda67>] driver_probe_device+0x257/0x3b0 [ 3105.019589] [<ffffffff815fdd43>] __device_attach+0x73/0x90 [ 3105.019617] [<ffffffff815fdcd0>] ? __driver_attach+0x110/0x110 [ 3105.019648] [<ffffffff815fb93c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0xf0 [ 3105.019680] [<ffffffff815fd6c7>] device_attach+0xf7/0x120 [ 3105.019709] [<ffffffff815fc905>] bus_probe_device+0x45/0x80 [ 3105.021040] usb usb6: usb auto-resume [ 3105.021045] usb usb6: wakeup_rh [ 3105.024849] [<ffffffff815f98a6>] device_add+0x876/0x990 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffffa0088987>] usb_new_device+0x1e7/0x2b0 [usbcore] [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffffa008a4d7>] hub_thread+0xb27/0x1ec0 [usbcore] [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff810d5200>] ? wake_up_bit+0x50/0x50 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffffa00899b0>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0xa0/0xa0 [usbcore] [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff810d49b8>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff81939884>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff8192a8c0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x50/0x80 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff8192b1b4>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff810d48e0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x80/0x80 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff81939880>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 [ 3105.025086] Code: 00 48 83 05 cd ad 00 00 01 48 83 05 cd ad 00 00 01 4c 8b ab 30 0c 00 00 48 8b 50 08 48 83 c0 30 48 89 45 a0 4c 89 a3 40 0c 00 00 <41> 0f b6 44 24 10 48 89 55 a8 3c ff 0f 84 b8 04 00 00 48 83 05 [ 3105.025086] RIP [<ffffffffa045830d>] usb_stor_probe1+0x2fd/0xc20 [usb_storage] [ 3105.025086] RSP <ffff880056a3d830> [ 3105.060037] hub 6-0:1.0: hub_resume [ 3105.062616] usb usb5: usb auto-resume [ 3105.064317] ehci_hcd 0000:00:1d.7: resume root hub [ 3105.094809] ---[ end trace a7919e7f17c0a727 ]--- [ 3105.130069] hub 5-0:1.0: hub_resume [ 3105.132131] usb usb4: usb auto-resume [ 3105.132136] usb usb4: wakeup_rh [ 3105.180059] hub 4-0:1.0: hub_resume [ 3106.290052] usb usb6: suspend_rh (auto-stop) [ 3106.290077] usb usb4: suspend_rh (auto-stop) Signed-off-by: Huajun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
commit 342ff28 upstream. Some error paths in mtd_blkdevs were fixed in the following commit: commit 94735ec mtd: mtd_blkdevs: fix error path in blktrans_open But on these error paths, the block device's `dev->open' count is already incremented before we check for errors. This meant that, while the error path was handled correctly on the first time through blktrans_open(), the device is erroneously considered already open on the second time through. This problem can be seen, for instance, when a UBI volume is simultaneously mounted as a UBIFS partition and read through its corresponding gluebi mtdblockX device. This results in blktrans_open() passing its error checks (with `dev->open > 0') without actually having a handle on the device. Here's a summarized log of the actions and results with nandsim: # modprobe nandsim # modprobe mtdblock # modprobe gluebi # modprobe ubifs # ubiattach /dev/ubi_ctrl -m 0 ... # ubimkvol /dev/ubi0 -N test -s 16MiB ... # mount -t ubifs ubi0:test /mnt # ls /dev/mtdblock* /dev/mtdblock0 /dev/mtdblock1 # cat /dev/mtdblock1 > /dev/null cat: can't open '/dev/mtdblock4': Device or resource busy # cat /dev/mtdblock1 > /dev/null CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffff0, epc == 8031536c, ra == 8031f280 Oops[#1]: ... Call Trace: [<8031536c>] ubi_leb_read+0x14/0x164 [<8031f280>] gluebi_read+0xf0/0x148 [<802edba8>] mtdblock_readsect+0x64/0x198 [<802ecfe4>] mtd_blktrans_thread+0x330/0x3f4 [<8005be98>] kthread+0x88/0x90 [<8000bc04>] kernel_thread_helper+0x10/0x18 Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
commit b2ea70a upstream. expkey_parse() oopses when handling a 0 length export. This is easily triggerable from usermode by writing 0 bytes into '/proc/[proc id]/net/rpc/nfsd.fh/channel'. Below is the log: [ 1402.286893] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880077c49fff [ 1402.287632] IP: [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] PGD 2206063 PUD 1fdfd067 PMD 1ffbc067 PTE 8000000077c49160 [ 1402.287632] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1402.287632] CPU 1 [ 1402.287632] Pid: 20198, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.2.0-rc2-sasha-00058-gc65cd37 #6 [ 1402.287632] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b4b99>] [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] RSP: 0018:ffff880077f0fd68 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1402.287632] RAX: ffff880077c49fff RBX: 00000000ffffffea RCX: 0000000001043400 [ 1402.287632] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880077c4a000 RDI: ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] RBP: ffff880077f0fe18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff880000000000 [ 1402.287632] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff880077c4a000 [ 1402.287632] R13: ffffffff82283de0 R14: 0000000001043400 R15: ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] FS: 00007f25fec3f700(0000) GS:ffff88007d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1402.287632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff CR3: 0000000077e1d000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 1402.287632] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1402.287632] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1402.287632] Process trinity (pid: 20198, threadinfo ffff880077f0e000, task ffff880077db17b0) [ 1402.287632] Stack: [ 1402.287632] ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffff880077f0fdb8 ffffffff810b411e [ 1402.287632] ffff880000000000 ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] 0000000001043400 ffffffff82283de0 ffff880077f0fde8 ffffffff81111f63 [ 1402.287632] Call Trace: [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff810b411e>] ? lock_release+0x1af/0x1bc [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f63>] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f1a>] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8bcf2>] cache_do_downcall+0x3e/0x4f [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c950>] cache_write.clone.16+0xbb/0x130 [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9df>] ? cache_write_pipefs+0x1a/0x1a [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9f8>] cache_write_procfs+0x19/0x1b [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8118dc54>] proc_reg_write+0x8e/0xad [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113fe81>] vfs_write+0xaa/0xfd [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8114142d>] ? fget_light+0x35/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113ff8b>] sys_write+0x48/0x6f [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81bbdb92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 1402.287632] Code: c0 c9 c3 55 48 63 d2 48 89 e5 48 8d 44 32 ff 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 bb ea ff ff ff 48 81 ec 88 00 00 00 48 89 b5 58 ff ff ff [ 1402.287632] 38 0a 0f 85 89 02 00 00 c6 00 00 48 8b 3d 44 4a e5 01 48 85 [ 1402.287632] RIP [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] RSP <ffff880077f0fd68> [ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff [ 1402.287632] ---[ end trace 368ef53ff773a5e3 ]--- Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]> Cc: Neil Brown <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
commit 687875f upstream. Fix the following NULL ptr dereference caused by cat /sys/devices/system/memory/memory0/removable Pid: 13979, comm: sed Not tainted 3.0.13-0.5-default #1 IBM BladeCenter LS21 -[7971PAM]-/Server Blade RIP: __count_immobile_pages+0x4/0x100 Process sed (pid: 13979, threadinfo ffff880221c36000, task ffff88022e788480) Call Trace: is_pageblock_removable_nolock+0x34/0x40 is_mem_section_removable+0x74/0xf0 show_mem_removable+0x41/0x70 sysfs_read_file+0xfe/0x1c0 vfs_read+0xc7/0x130 sys_read+0x53/0xa0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b We are crashing because we are trying to dereference NULL zone which came from pfn=0 (struct page ffffea0000000000). According to the boot log this page is marked reserved: e820 update range: 0000000000000000 - 0000000000010000 (usable) ==> (reserved) and early_node_map confirms that: early_node_map[3] active PFN ranges 1: 0x00000010 -> 0x0000009c 1: 0x00000100 -> 0x000bffa3 1: 0x00100000 -> 0x00240000 The problem is that memory_present works in PAGE_SECTION_MASK aligned blocks so the reserved range sneaks into the the section as well. This also means that free_area_init_node will not take care of those reserved pages and they stay uninitialized. When we try to read the removable status we walk through all available sections and hope that the zone is valid for all pages in the section. But this is not true in this case as the zone and nid are not initialized. We have only one node in this particular case and it is marked as node=1 (rather than 0) and that made the problem visible because page_to_nid will return 0 and there are no zones on the node. Let's check that the zone is valid and that the given pfn falls into its boundaries and mark the section not removable. This might cause some false positives, probably, but we do not have any sane way to find out whether the page is reserved by the platform or it is just not used for whatever other reasons. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72ec #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 #6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a #7 [d72d3d1] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb #8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8de #9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb0] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 525895b upstream. Due to a race it was possible for a fence to be destroyed while another thread was trying to synchronise with it. If this happened in the fallback non-semaphore path, it lead to the following oops due to fence->channel being NULL. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<fa9632ce>] nouveau_fence_update+0xe/0xe0 [nouveau] *pde = a649c067 SMP Modules linked in: fuse nouveau(O) ttm(O) drm_kms_helper(O) drm(O) mxm_wmi video wmi netconsole configfs lockd bnep bluetooth rfkill ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_cobinfmt_misc uinput ata_generic pata_acpi pata_aet2c_algo_bit i2c_core [last unloaded: wmi] Pid: 2255, comm: gnome-shell Tainted: G O 3.2.0-0.rc5.git0.1.fc17.i686 #1 System manufacturer System Product Name/M2A-VM EIP: 0060:[<fa9632ce>] EFLAGS: 00010296 CPU: 1 EIP is at nouveau_fence_update+0xe/0xe0 [nouveau] EAX: 00000000 EBX: ddfc6dd0 ECX: dd111580 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00003e80 EDI: dd111580 EBP: dd121d00 ESP: dd121ce8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process gnome-shell (pid: 2255, ti=dd120000 task=dd111580 task.ti=dd120000) Stack: 7dc86c76 00000000 00003e80 ddfc6dd0 00003e80 dd111580 dd121d0c fa96371f 00000000 dd121d3c fa963773 dd111580 01000246 000ec53d 00000000 ddfc6dd0 00001f40 00000000 ddfc6dd0 00000010 dc7df840 dd121d6c fa9639a0 00000000 Call Trace: [<fa96371f>] __nouveau_fence_signalled+0x1f/0x30 [nouveau] [<fa963773>] __nouveau_fence_wait+0x43/0xd0 [nouveau] [<fa9639a0>] nouveau_fence_sync+0x1a0/0x1c0 [nouveau] [<fa964046>] validate_list+0x176/0x300 [nouveau] [<f7d9c9c0>] ? ttm_bo_mem_put+0x30/0x30 [ttm] [<fa964b8a>] nouveau_gem_ioctl_pushbuf+0x48a/0xfd0 [nouveau] [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<f7c93d98>] drm_ioctl+0x388/0x490 [drm] [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<fa964700>] ? nouveau_gem_ioctl_new+0x150/0x150 [nouveau] [<c0635c7b>] ? file_has_perm+0xcb/0xe0 [<f7c93a10>] ? drm_copy_field+0x80/0x80 [drm] [<c0564f56>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x86/0x5b0 [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<c0635f22>] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x62/0x130 [<c0554f30>] ? fget_light+0x30/0x340 [<c05654ef>] sys_ioctl+0x6f/0x80 [<c099e3a4>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…ation commit dc90860 upstream. When isolating pages for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone while the free scanner starts at the end of the zone. Migration avoids entering a new zone by never going beyond the free scanned. Unfortunately, in very rare cases nodes can overlap. When this happens, migration isolates pages without the LRU lock held, corrupting lists which will trigger errors in reclaim or during page free such as in the following oops BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: [<ffffffff810f795c>] free_pcppages_bulk+0xcc/0x450 PGD 1dda554067 PUD 1e1cb58067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU 37 Pid: 17088, comm: memcg_process_s Tainted: G X RIP: free_pcppages_bulk+0xcc/0x450 Process memcg_process_s (pid: 17088, threadinfo ffff881c2926e000, task ffff881c2926c0c0) Call Trace: free_hot_cold_page+0x17e/0x1f0 __pagevec_free+0x90/0xb0 release_pages+0x22a/0x260 pagevec_lru_move_fn+0xf3/0x110 putback_lru_page+0x66/0xe0 unmap_and_move+0x156/0x180 migrate_pages+0x9e/0x1b0 compact_zone+0x1f3/0x2f0 compact_zone_order+0xa2/0xe0 try_to_compact_pages+0xdf/0x110 __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xee/0x1c0 __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x370/0x830 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1b1/0x1c0 alloc_pages_vma+0x9b/0x160 do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x160/0x270 do_page_fault+0x207/0x4c0 page_fault+0x25/0x30 The "X" in the taint flag means that external modules were loaded but but is unrelated to the bug triggering. The real problem was because the PFN layout looks like this Zone PFN ranges: DMA 0x00000010 -> 0x00001000 DMA32 0x00001000 -> 0x00100000 Normal 0x00100000 -> 0x01e80000 Movable zone start PFN for each node early_node_map[14] active PFN ranges 0: 0x00000010 -> 0x0000009b 0: 0x00000100 -> 0x0007a1ec 0: 0x0007a354 -> 0x0007a379 0: 0x0007f7ff -> 0x0007f800 0: 0x00100000 -> 0x00680000 1: 0x00680000 -> 0x00e80000 0: 0x00e80000 -> 0x01080000 1: 0x01080000 -> 0x01280000 0: 0x01280000 -> 0x01480000 1: 0x01480000 -> 0x01680000 0: 0x01680000 -> 0x01880000 1: 0x01880000 -> 0x01a80000 0: 0x01a80000 -> 0x01c80000 1: 0x01c80000 -> 0x01e80000 The fix is straight-forward. isolate_migratepages() has to make a similar check to isolate_freepage to ensure that it never isolates pages from a zone it does not hold the LRU lock for. This was discovered in a 3.0-based kernel but it affects 3.1.x, 3.2.x and current mainline. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 07445f6 upstream. all works need to be initialized before ieee80211_register_hw to prevent mac80211 call backs such as drv_start, drv_config getting started. otherwise we would queue/cancel works before initializing them and it leads to kernel panic. this issue can be recreated with the following script in Chrome laptops with AR928X cards, with background scan running (or) Network manager is running while true do sudo modprobe -v ath9k sleep 3 sudo modprobe -r ath9k sleep 3 done EIP: [<81040a47>] __cancel_work_timer+0xb8/0xe1 SS:ESP 0068:f6be9d70 ---[ end trace 4f86d6139a9900ef ]--- Registered led device: ath9k-phy0 ieee80211 phy0: Atheros AR9280 Rev:2 mem=0xf88a0000, irq=16 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Pid: 456, comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G D 3.0.13 #1 Call Trace: [<81379e21>] panic+0x53/0x14a [<81004a30>] oops_end+0x73/0x81 [<81004b53>] die+0x4c/0x55 [<81002710>] do_trap+0x7c/0x83 [<81002855>] ? do_bounds+0x58/0x58 [<810028cc>] do_invalid_op+0x77/0x81 [<81040a47>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0xb8/0xe1 [<810489ec>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x81/0x11f [<8103f809>] ? wait_on_work+0xe2/0xf7 [<8137f807>] error_code+0x67/0x6c [<810300d8>] ? wait_consider_task+0x4ba/0x84c [<81040a47>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0xb8/0xe1 [<810380c9>] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x5f/0x67 [<81040a91>] cancel_work_sync+0xf/0x11 [<f88d7b7c>] ath_set_channel+0x62/0x25c [ath9k] [<f88d67d1>] ? ath9k_tx_last_beacon+0x26a/0x85c [ath9k] [<f88d8899>] ath_radio_disable+0x3f1/0x68e [ath9k] [<f90d0edb>] ieee80211_hw_config+0x111/0x116 [mac80211] [<f90dd95c>] __ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x919/0xa37 [mac80211] [<f90dda76>] __ieee80211_recalc_idle+0xa33/0xa37 [mac80211] [<812dbed8>] __dev_open+0x82/0xab Cc: Gary Morain <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Stewart <[email protected]> Cc: Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rajkumar Manoharan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit f9c2a0d upstream. Current PIO mode makes a kernel crash with CONFIG_HIGHMEM. Highmem pages have a NULL from sg_virt(sg). This patch fixes the following problem. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = c0004000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 817 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.0.15-01423-gdbf465f torvalds#589) PC is at dw_mci_pull_data32+0x4c/0x9c LR is at dw_mci_read_data_pio+0x54/0x1f0 pc : [<c0358824>] lr : [<c035988c>] psr: 20000193 sp : c0619d48 ip : c0619d70 fp : c0619d6c r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000002 r8 : 00001000 r7 : 00000200 r6 : 00000000 r5 : e1dd3100 r4 : 00000000 r3 : 65622023 r2 : 0000007f r1 : eeb96000 r0 : e1dd3100 Flags: nzCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment xkernel Control: 10c5387d Table: 61e2004a DAC: 00000015 Process swapper (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xc06182f0) Stack: (0xc0619d48 to 0xc061a000) 9d40: e1dd3100 e1a4f000 00000000 e1dd3100 e1a4f000 00000200 9d60: c0619da4 c0619d70 c035988c c03587e4 c0619d9c e18158f4 e1dd3100 e1dd3100 9d80: 00000020 00000000 00000000 00000020 c06e8a84 00000000 c0619e04 c0619da8 9da0: c0359b24 c0359844 e18158f4 e1dd3164 e1dd3168 e1dd3150 3d02fc79 e1dd3154 9dc0: e1dd3178 00000000 00000020 00000000 e1dd3150 00000000 c10dd7e8 e1a84900 9de0: c061e7cc 00000000 00000000 0000008d c06e8a84 c061e780 c0619e4c c0619e08 9e00: c00c4738 c0359a34 3d02fc79 00000000 c0619e4c c05a1698 c05a1670 c05a165c 9e20: c04de8b0 c061e780 c061e7cc e1a84900 ffffed68 0000008d c0618000 00000000 9e40: c0619e6c c0619e50 c00c48b4 c00c46c8 c061e780 c00423ac c061e7cc ffffed68 9e60: c0619e8c c0619e70 c00c7358 c00c487c 0000008d ffffee38 c0618000 ffffed68 9e80: c0619ea4 c0619e90 c00c4258 c00c72b0 c00423ac ffffee38 c0619ecc c0619ea8 9ea0: c004241c c00c4234 ffffffff f8810000 0000006d 00000002 00000001 7fffffff 9ec0: c0619f44 c0619ed0 c0048bc0 c00423c4 220ae7a9 00000000 386f0d30 0005d3a4 9ee0: c00423ac c10dd0b8 c06f2cd8 c0618000 c0594778 c003a674 7fffffff c0619f44 9f00: 386f0d30 c0619f18 c00a6f94 c005be3c 80000013 ffffffff 386f0d30 0005d3a4 9f20: 386f0d30 0005d2d1 c10dd0a8 c10dd0b8 c06f2cd8 c0618000 c0619f74 c0619f48 9f40: c0345858 c005be00 c00a2440 c0618000 c0618000 c00410d8 c06c1944 c00410fc 9f60: c0594778 c003a674 c0619f9c c0619f78 c004a7e8 c03457b4 c0618000 c06c18f8 9f80: 00000000 c0039c70 c06c18d4 c003a674 c0619fb4 c0619fa0 c04ceafc c004a714 9fa0: c06287b4 c06c18f8 c0619ff4 c0619fb8 c0008b68 c04cea68 c0008578 00000000 9fc0: 00000000 c003a674 00000000 10c5387d c0628658 c003aa78 c062f1c4 4000406a 9fe0: 413fc090 00000000 00000000 c0619ff8 40008044 c0008858 00000000 00000000 Backtrace: [<c03587d8>] (dw_mci_pull_data32+0x0/0x9c) from [<c035988c>] (dw_mci_read_data_pio+0x54/0x1f0) r6:00000200 r5:e1a4f000 r4:e1dd3100 [<c0359838>] (dw_mci_read_data_pio+0x0/0x1f0) from [<c0359b24>] (dw_mci_interrupt+0xfc/0x4a4) [<c0359a28>] (dw_mci_interrupt+0x0/0x4a4) from [<c00c4738>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0x1b4) [<c00c46bc>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x0/0x1b4) from [<c00c48b4>] (handle_irq_event+0x44/0x64) [<c00c4870>] (handle_irq_event+0x0/0x64) from [<c00c7358>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb4/0x124) r7:ffffed68 r6:c061e7cc r5:c00423ac r4:c061e780 [<c00c72a4>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x0/0x124) from [<c00c4258>] (generic_handle_irq+0x30/0x38) r7:ffffed68 r6:c0618000 r5:ffffee38 r4:0000008d [<c00c4228>] (generic_handle_irq+0x0/0x38) from [<c004241c>] (asm_do_IRQ+0x64/0xe0) r5:ffffee38 r4:c00423ac [<c00423b8>] (asm_do_IRQ+0x0/0xe0) from [<c0048bc0>] (__irq_svc+0x80/0x14c) Exception stack(0xc0619ed0 to 0xc0619f18) Signed-off-by: Seungwon Jeon <[email protected]> Acked-by: Will Newton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chris Ball <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit b57e6b5 upstream. read_lock(&tpt_trig->trig.leddev_list_lock) is accessed via the path ieee80211_open (->) ieee80211_do_open (->) ieee80211_mod_tpt_led_trig (->) ieee80211_start_tpt_led_trig (->) tpt_trig_timer before initializing it. the intilization of this read/write lock happens via the path ieee80211_led_init (->) led_trigger_register, but we are doing 'ieee80211_led_init' after 'ieeee80211_if_add' where we register netdev_ops. so we access leddev_list_lock before initializing it and causes the following bug in chrome laptops with AR928X cards with the following script while true do sudo modprobe -v ath9k sleep 3 sudo modprobe -r ath9k sleep 3 done BUG: rwlock bad magic on CPU#1, wpa_supplicant/358, f5b9eccc Pid: 358, comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 3.0.13 #1 Call Trace: [<8137b9df>] rwlock_bug+0x3d/0x47 [<81179830>] do_raw_read_lock+0x19/0x29 [<8137f063>] _raw_read_lock+0xd/0xf [<f9081957>] tpt_trig_timer+0xc3/0x145 [mac80211] [<f9081f3a>] ieee80211_mod_tpt_led_trig+0x152/0x174 [mac80211] [<f9076a3f>] ieee80211_do_open+0x11e/0x42e [mac80211] [<f9075390>] ? ieee80211_check_concurrent_iface+0x26/0x13c [mac80211] [<f9076d97>] ieee80211_open+0x48/0x4c [mac80211] [<812dbed8>] __dev_open+0x82/0xab [<812dc0c9>] __dev_change_flags+0x9c/0x113 [<812dc1ae>] dev_change_flags+0x18/0x44 [<8132144f>] devinet_ioctl+0x243/0x51a [<81321ba9>] inet_ioctl+0x93/0xac [<812cc951>] sock_ioctl+0x1c6/0x1ea [<812cc78b>] ? might_fault+0x20/0x20 [<810b1ebb>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x46e/0x4a2 [<810a6ebb>] ? fget_light+0x2f/0x70 [<812ce549>] ? sys_recvmsg+0x3e/0x48 [<810b1f35>] sys_ioctl+0x46/0x69 [<8137fa77>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x2 Cc: Gary Morain <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Stewart <[email protected]> Cc: Abhijit Pradhan <[email protected]> Cc: Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan <[email protected]> Cc: Rajkumar Manoharan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 19, 2012
commit 4041071 upstream. When a PMIC is not found, this driver is unable to obtain its 'vdds_dsi_reg' regulator. Even through its initialization function fails, other code still calls its enable function, which fails to check whether it has this regulator before asking for it to be enabled. This fixes the oops, however a better fix would be to sort out the upper layers to prevent them calling into a module which failed to initialize. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000038 pgd = c0004000 [00000038] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.3.0-rc2+ torvalds#228) PC is at regulator_enable+0x10/0x70 LR is at omapdss_dpi_display_enable+0x54/0x15c pc : [<c01b9a08>] lr : [<c01af994>] psr: 60000013 sp : c181fd90 ip : c181fdb0 fp : c181fdac r10: c042eff0 r9 : 00000060 r8 : c044a164 r7 : c042c0e4 r6 : c042bd60 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c042bd60 r3 : c084de48 r2 : c181e000 r1 : c042bd60 r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel Control: 10c5387d Table: 80004019 DAC: 00000015 Process swapper (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xc181e2e8) Stack: (0xc181fd90 to 0xc1820000) fd80: c001754c c042bd60 00000000 c042bd60 fda0: c181fdcc c181fdb0 c01af994 c01b9a04 c0016104 c042bd60 c042bd60 c044a338 fdc0: c181fdec c181fdd0 c01b5ed0 c01af94c c042bd60 c042bd60 c1aa8000 c1aa8a0c fde0: c181fe04 c181fdf0 c01b5f54 c01b5ea8 c02fc18c c042bd60 c181fe3c c181fe08 fe00: c01b2a18 c01b5f48 c01aed14 c02fc160 c01df8ec 00000002 c042bd60 00000003 fe20: c042bd60 c1aa8000 c1aa8a0c c042eff8 c181fe84 c181fe40 c01b3874 c01b29fc fe40: c042eff8 00000000 c042f000 c0449db8 c044ed78 00000000 c181fe74 c042eff8 fe60: c042eff8 c0449db8 c0449db8 c044ed78 00000000 00000000 c181fe94 c181fe88 fe80: c01e452c c01b35e8 c181feb4 c181fe98 c01e2fdc c01e4518 c042eff8 c0449db8 fea0: c0449db8 c181fef0 c181fecc c181feb8 c01e3104 c01e2f48 c042eff8 c042f02c fec0: c181feec c181fed0 c01e3190 c01e30c0 c01e311c 00000000 c01e311c c0449db8 fee0: c181ff14 c181fef0 c01e1998 c01e3128 c18330a8 c1892290 c04165e8 c0449db8 ff00: c0449db8 c1ab60c0 c181ff24 c181ff18 c01e2e28 c01e194c c181ff54 c181ff28 ff20: c01e2218 c01e2e14 c039afed c181ff38 c04165e8 c041660c c0449db8 00000013 ff40: 00000000 c03ffdb8 c181ff7c c181ff58 c01e384c c01e217c c181ff7c c04165e8 ff60: c041660c c003a37c 00000013 00000000 c181ff8c c181ff80 c01e488c c01e3790 ff80: c181ff9c c181ff90 c03ffdcc c01e484c c181ffdc c181ffa0 c0008798 c03ffdc4 ffa0: c181ffc4 c181ffb0 c0056440 c0187810 c003a37c c04165e8 c041660c c003a37c ffc0: 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 c181fff4 c181ffe0 c03ea284 c0008708 ffe0: 00000000 c03ea208 00000000 c181fff8 c003a37c c03ea214 1073cec0 01f7ee08 Backtrace: [<c01b99f8>] (regulator_enable+0x0/0x70) from [<c01af994>] (omapdss_dpi_display_enable+0x54/0x15c) r6:c042bd60 r5:00000000 r4:c042bd60 [<c01af940>] (omapdss_dpi_display_enable+0x0/0x15c) from [<c01b5ed0>] (generic_dpi_panel_power_on+0x34/0x78) r6:c044a338 r5:c042bd60 r4:c042bd60 [<c01b5e9c>] (generic_dpi_panel_power_on+0x0/0x78) from [<c01b5f54>] (generic_dpi_panel_enable+0x18/0x28) r7:c1aa8a0c r6:c1aa8000 r5:c042bd60 r4:c042bd60 [<c01b5f3c>] (generic_dpi_panel_enable+0x0/0x28) from [<c01b2a18>] (omapfb_init_display+0x28/0x150) r4:c042bd60 [<c01b29f0>] (omapfb_init_display+0x0/0x150) from [<c01b3874>] (omapfb_probe+0x298/0x318) r8:c042eff8 r7:c1aa8a0c r6:c1aa8000 r5:c042bd60 r4:00000003 [<c01b35dc>] (omapfb_probe+0x0/0x318) from [<c01e452c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x24) [<c01e450c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x0/0x24) from [<c01e2fdc>] (really_probe+0xa0/0x178) [<c01e2f3c>] (really_probe+0x0/0x178) from [<c01e3104>] (driver_probe_device+0x50/0x68) r7:c181fef0 r6:c0449db8 r5:c0449db8 r4:c042eff8 [<c01e30b4>] (driver_probe_device+0x0/0x68) from [<c01e3190>] (__driver_attach+0x74/0x98) r5:c042f02c r4:c042eff8 [<c01e311c>] (__driver_attach+0x0/0x98) from [<c01e1998>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x58/0x98) r6:c0449db8 r5:c01e311c r4:00000000 [<c01e1940>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x0/0x98) from [<c01e2e28>] (driver_attach+0x20/0x28) r7:c1ab60c0 r6:c0449db8 r5:c0449db8 r4:c04165e8 [<c01e2e08>] (driver_attach+0x0/0x28) from [<c01e2218>] (bus_add_driver+0xa8/0x22c) [<c01e2170>] (bus_add_driver+0x0/0x22c) from [<c01e384c>] (driver_register+0xc8/0x154) [<c01e3784>] (driver_register+0x0/0x154) from [<c01e488c>] (platform_driver_register+0x4c/0x60) r8:00000000 r7:00000013 r6:c003a37c r5:c041660c r4:c04165e8 [<c01e4840>] (platform_driver_register+0x0/0x60) from [<c03ffdcc>] (omapfb_init+0x14/0x34) [<c03ffdb8>] (omapfb_init+0x0/0x34) from [<c0008798>] (do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x164) [<c00086fc>] (do_one_initcall+0x0/0x164) from [<c03ea284>] (kernel_init+0x7c/0x120) [<c03ea208>] (kernel_init+0x0/0x120) from [<c003a37c>] (do_exit+0x0/0x2d8) r5:c03ea208 r4:00000000 Code: e1a0c00d e92dd870 e24cb004 e24dd004 (e5906038) ---[ end trace 9e2474c2e193b223 ]--- Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Cc: Igor Grinberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 19, 2012
commit 1212268 upstream. The following BUG is hit on the first read that is submitted to a dm flakey test device while the device is "down" if the corrupt_bio_byte feature wasn't requested when the device's table was loaded. Example DM table that will hit this BUG: 0 2097152 flakey 8:0 2048 0 30 This bug was introduced by commit a399879 (dm flakey: add corrupt_bio_byte feature) in v3.1-rc1. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8801cfce3fff IP: [<ffffffffa008c233>] corrupt_bio_data+0x6e/0xae [dm_flakey] PGD 1606063 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP ... Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa008c2b5>] flakey_end_io+0x42/0x48 [dm_flakey] [<ffffffffa00dca98>] clone_endio+0x54/0xb6 [dm_mod] [<ffffffff81130587>] bio_endio+0x2d/0x2f [<ffffffff811c819a>] req_bio_endio+0x96/0x9f [<ffffffff811c94b9>] blk_update_request+0x1dc/0x3a9 [<ffffffff812f5ee2>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x21/0x23 [<ffffffff811c96a6>] blk_update_bidi_request+0x20/0x6e [<ffffffff811c9713>] blk_end_bidi_request+0x1f/0x5d [<ffffffff811c978d>] blk_end_request+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff8128f450>] scsi_io_completion+0x1e5/0x4b1 [<ffffffff812882a9>] scsi_finish_command+0xec/0xf5 [<ffffffff8128f830>] scsi_softirq_done+0xff/0x108 [<ffffffff811ce284>] blk_done_softirq+0x84/0x98 [<ffffffff81048d19>] __do_softirq+0xe3/0x1d5 [<ffffffff8138f83f>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x62/0x69 [<ffffffff810997cf>] ? handle_irq_event+0x4c/0x61 [<ffffffff8139833c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [<ffffffff81003b37>] do_softirq+0x4b/0xa3 [<ffffffff81048a39>] irq_exit+0x53/0xca [<ffffffff81398acd>] do_IRQ+0x9d/0xb4 [<ffffffff81390333>] common_interrupt+0x73/0x73 ... Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 22, 2012
commit afbca95 upstream. The libertas scan thread expects priv->scan_req to be non-NULL. In theory, it should always be set. In practice, we've seen the following oops: [ 8363.067444] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004 [ 8363.067490] pgd = c0004000 [ 8363.078393] [00000004] *pgd=00000000 [ 8363.086711] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT [ 8363.091375] Modules linked in: fuse libertas_sdio libertas psmouse mousedev ov7670 mmp_camera joydev videobuf2_core videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] [ 8363.107490] CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.0.0-gf7ccc69 torvalds#671) [ 8363.112799] PC is at lbs_scan_worker+0x108/0x5a4 [libertas] [ 8363.118326] LR is at 0x0 [ 8363.120836] pc : [<bf03a854>] lr : [<00000000>] psr: 60000113 [ 8363.120845] sp : ee66bf48 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000000 [ 8363.120845] r10: ee2c2088 r9 : c04e2efc r8 : eef97005 [ 8363.132231] r7 : eee0716f r6 : ee2c02c0 r5 : ee2c2088 r4 : eee07160 [ 8363.137419] r3 : 00000000 r2 : a0000113 r1 : 00000001 r0 : eee07160 [ 8363.143896] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 8363.157630] Control: 10c5387d Table: 2e754019 DAC: 00000015 [ 8363.163334] Process kworker/u:1 (pid: 25, stack limit = 0xee66a2f8) While I've not found a smoking gun, there are two places that raised red flags for me. The first is in _internal_start_scan, when we queue up a scan; we first queue the worker, and then set priv->scan_req. There's theoretically a 50mS delay which should be plenty, but doing things that way just seems racy (and not in the good way). The second is in the scan worker thread itself. Depending on the state of priv->scan_channel, we cancel pending scan runs and then requeue a run in 300mS. We then send the scan command down to the hardware, sleep, and if we get scan results for all the desired channels, we set priv->scan_req to NULL. However, it that's happened in less than 300mS, what happens with the pending scan run? This patch addresses both of those concerns. With the patch applied, we have not seen the oops in the past two weeks. Signed-off-by: Andres Salomon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
koenkooi
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Mar 22, 2012
commit 1b41c83 upstream. When running the Point Grey "flycap" program for their USB 3.0 camera (which was running as a USB 2.0 device for some reason), I trigger this oops whenever I try to open a video stream: Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.715559] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.719153] IP: [<ffffffff8147841e>] free_async+0x1e/0x70 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.720991] PGD 6f833067 PUD 6fc56067 PMD 0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.722815] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.724627] CPU 0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.724636] Modules linked in: ecryptfs encrypted_keys sha1_generic trusted binfmt_misc sha256_generic aesni_intel cryptd aes_x86_64 aes_generic parport_pc dm_crypt ppdev joydev snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwlwifi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm thinkpad_acpi mac80211 snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_timer btusb uvcvideo snd_seq_device bluetooth videodev psmouse snd v4l2_compat_ioctl32 serio_raw tpm_tis cfg80211 tpm tpm_bios nvram soundcore snd_page_alloc lp parport i915 xhci_hcd ahci libahci drm_kms_helper drm sdhci_pci sdhci e1000e i2c_algo_bit video Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.734212] Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.736162] Pid: 2713, comm: FlyCap2 Not tainted 3.2.0-rc5+ torvalds#28 LENOVO 4286CTO/4286CTO Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.738148] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8147841e>] [<ffffffff8147841e>] free_async+0x1e/0x70 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.740134] RSP: 0018:ffff88005715fd78 EFLAGS: 00010296 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.742118] RAX: 00000000fffffff4 RBX: ffff88006fe8f900 RCX: 0000000000004118 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.744116] RDX: 0000000001000000 RSI: 0000000000016390 RDI: 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.746087] RBP: ffff88005715fd88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8146f22e Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.748018] R10: ffff88006e520ac0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88005715fe28 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.749916] R13: ffff88005d31df00 R14: ffff88006fe8f900 R15: 00007f688c995cb8 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.751785] FS: 00007f68a366da40(0000) GS:ffff880100200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.753659] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.755509] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000706bb000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.757334] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.759124] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.760871] Process FlyCap2 (pid: 2713, threadinfo ffff88005715e000, task ffff88006c675b80) Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.762605] Stack: Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.764297] ffff88005715fe28 0000000000000000 ffff88005715fe08 ffffffff81479058 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.766020] 0000000000000000 ffffea0000004000 ffff880000004118 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.767750] ffff880000000001 ffff88006e520ac0 fffffff46fd81180 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.769472] Call Trace: Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.771147] [<ffffffff81479058>] proc_do_submiturb+0x778/0xa00 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.772798] [<ffffffff8147a5fd>] usbdev_do_ioctl+0x24d/0x1200 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.774410] [<ffffffff8147b5de>] usbdev_ioctl+0xe/0x20 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.775975] [<ffffffff81189259>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x99/0x600 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.777534] [<ffffffff81189851>] sys_ioctl+0x91/0xa0 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.779088] [<ffffffff816247c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.780634] Code: 51 ff ff ff e9 29 ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 48 89 fb 48 8b 7f 18 e8 a6 ea c0 ff 4 8 8b 7b 20 <f0> ff 0f 0f 94 c0 84 c0 74 05 e8 d3 99 c1 ff 48 8b 43 40 48 8b Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.783970] RIP [<ffffffff8147841e>] free_async+0x1e/0x70 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.785630] RSP <ffff88005715fd78> Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.787274] CR2: 0000000000000000 Dec 15 16:48:34 puck kernel: [ 1798.794728] ---[ end trace 52894d3355f88d19 ]--- markup_oops.pl says the oops is in put_cred: ffffffff81478401: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff81478404: 53 push %rbx ffffffff81478405: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp ffffffff81478409: e8 f2 c0 1a 00 callq ffffffff81624500 <mcount> ffffffff8147840e: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx | %ebx => ffff88006fe8f900 put_pid(as->pid); ffffffff81478411: 48 8b 7f 18 mov 0x18(%rdi),%rdi ffffffff81478415: e8 a6 ea c0 ff callq ffffffff81086ec0 <put_pid> put_cred(as->cred); ffffffff8147841a: 48 8b 7b 20 mov 0x20(%rbx),%rdi | %edi => 0 %ebx = ffff88006fe8f900 */ static inline int atomic_dec_and_test(atomic_t *v) { unsigned char c; asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0; sete %1" *ffffffff8147841e: f0 ff 0f lock decl (%rdi) | %edi = 0 <--- faulting instruction ffffffff81478421: 0f 94 c0 sete %al static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred; validate_creds(cred); if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage)) ffffffff81478424: 84 c0 test %al,%al ffffffff81478426: 74 05 je ffffffff8147842d <free_async+0x2d> __put_cred(cred); ffffffff81478428: e8 d3 99 c1 ff callq ffffffff81091e00 <__put_cred> kfree(as->urb->transfer_buffer); ffffffff8147842d: 48 8b 43 40 mov 0x40(%rbx),%rax ffffffff81478431: 48 8b 78 68 mov 0x68(%rax),%rdi ffffffff81478435: e8 a6 e1 ce ff callq ffffffff811665e0 <kfree> kfree(as->urb->setup_packet); ffffffff8147843a: 48 8b 43 40 mov 0x40(%rbx),%rax ffffffff8147843e: 48 8b b8 90 00 00 00 mov 0x90(%rax),%rdi ffffffff81478445: e8 96 e1 ce ff callq ffffffff811665e0 <kfree> usb_free_urb(as->urb); ffffffff8147844a: 48 8b 7b 40 mov 0x40(%rbx),%rdi ffffffff8147844e: e8 0d 6b ff ff callq ffffffff8146ef60 <usb_free_urb> This bug seems to have been introduced by commit d178bc3 "user namespace: usb: make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)" I'm not sure if this is right fix, but it does stop the oops. Unfortunately, the Point Grey software still refuses to work, but it's a closed source app, so I can't fix it. Signed-off-by: Sarah Sharp <[email protected]> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 22, 2012
…bles the feature to fix an oops commit 1a3a026 upstream. Echo vendor and product number of a non usb-storage device to usb-storage driver's new_id, then plug in the device to host and you will find following oops msg, the root cause is usb_stor_probe1() refers invalid id entry if giving a dynamic id, so just disable the feature. [ 3105.018012] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 3105.018062] CPU 0 [ 3105.018075] Modules linked in: usb_storage usb_libusual bluetooth dm_crypt binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec_analog snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep hp_wmi ppdev sparse_keymap snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_timer snd_seq_device psmouse snd serio_raw tpm_infineon soundcore i915 snd_page_alloc tpm_tis parport_pc tpm tpm_bios drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit video lp parport usbhid hid sg sr_mod sd_mod ehci_hcd uhci_hcd usbcore e1000e usb_common floppy [ 3105.018408] [ 3105.018419] Pid: 189, comm: khubd Tainted: G I 3.2.0-rc7+ torvalds#29 Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq dc7800p Convertible Minitower/0AACh [ 3105.018481] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa045830d>] [<ffffffffa045830d>] usb_stor_probe1+0x2fd/0xc20 [usb_storage] [ 3105.018536] RSP: 0018:ffff880056a3d830 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 3105.018562] RAX: ffff880065f4e648 RBX: ffff88006bb28000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 3105.018597] RDX: ffff88006f23c7b0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000206 [ 3105.018632] RBP: ffff880056a3d900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880067365000 [ 3105.018665] R10: 00000000000002ac R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff6000b41a7340 [ 3105.018698] R13: ffff880065f4ef60 R14: ffff88006bb28b88 R15: ffff88006f23d270 [ 3105.018733] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007a200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3105.018773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 3105.018801] CR2: 00007fc99c8c4650 CR3: 0000000001e05000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 3105.018835] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3105.018870] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3105.018906] Process khubd (pid: 189, threadinfo ffff880056a3c000, task ffff88005677a400) [ 3105.018945] Stack: [ 3105.018959] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880056a3d8d0 0000000000000002 [ 3105.019011] 0000000000000000 ffff880056a3d918 ffff880000000000 0000000000000002 [ 3105.019058] ffff880056a3d8d0 0000000000000012 ffff880056a3d8d0 0000000000000006 [ 3105.019105] Call Trace: [ 3105.019128] [<ffffffffa0458cd4>] storage_probe+0xa4/0xe0 [usb_storage] [ 3105.019173] [<ffffffffa0097822>] usb_probe_interface+0x172/0x330 [usbcore] [ 3105.019211] [<ffffffff815fda67>] driver_probe_device+0x257/0x3b0 [ 3105.019243] [<ffffffff815fdd43>] __device_attach+0x73/0x90 [ 3105.019272] [<ffffffff815fdcd0>] ? __driver_attach+0x110/0x110 [ 3105.019303] [<ffffffff815fb93c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0xf0 [ 3105.019334] [<ffffffff815fd6c7>] device_attach+0xf7/0x120 [ 3105.019364] [<ffffffff815fc905>] bus_probe_device+0x45/0x80 [ 3105.019396] [<ffffffff815f98a6>] device_add+0x876/0x990 [ 3105.019434] [<ffffffffa0094e42>] usb_set_configuration+0x822/0x9e0 [usbcore] [ 3105.019479] [<ffffffffa00a3492>] generic_probe+0x62/0xf0 [usbcore] [ 3105.019518] [<ffffffffa0097a46>] usb_probe_device+0x66/0xb0 [usbcore] [ 3105.019555] [<ffffffff815fda67>] driver_probe_device+0x257/0x3b0 [ 3105.019589] [<ffffffff815fdd43>] __device_attach+0x73/0x90 [ 3105.019617] [<ffffffff815fdcd0>] ? __driver_attach+0x110/0x110 [ 3105.019648] [<ffffffff815fb93c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0xf0 [ 3105.019680] [<ffffffff815fd6c7>] device_attach+0xf7/0x120 [ 3105.019709] [<ffffffff815fc905>] bus_probe_device+0x45/0x80 [ 3105.021040] usb usb6: usb auto-resume [ 3105.021045] usb usb6: wakeup_rh [ 3105.024849] [<ffffffff815f98a6>] device_add+0x876/0x990 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffffa0088987>] usb_new_device+0x1e7/0x2b0 [usbcore] [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffffa008a4d7>] hub_thread+0xb27/0x1ec0 [usbcore] [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff810d5200>] ? wake_up_bit+0x50/0x50 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffffa00899b0>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0xa0/0xa0 [usbcore] [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff810d49b8>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff81939884>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff8192a8c0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x50/0x80 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff8192b1b4>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff810d48e0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x80/0x80 [ 3105.025086] [<ffffffff81939880>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 [ 3105.025086] Code: 00 48 83 05 cd ad 00 00 01 48 83 05 cd ad 00 00 01 4c 8b ab 30 0c 00 00 48 8b 50 08 48 83 c0 30 48 89 45 a0 4c 89 a3 40 0c 00 00 <41> 0f b6 44 24 10 48 89 55 a8 3c ff 0f 84 b8 04 00 00 48 83 05 [ 3105.025086] RIP [<ffffffffa045830d>] usb_stor_probe1+0x2fd/0xc20 [usb_storage] [ 3105.025086] RSP <ffff880056a3d830> [ 3105.060037] hub 6-0:1.0: hub_resume [ 3105.062616] usb usb5: usb auto-resume [ 3105.064317] ehci_hcd 0000:00:1d.7: resume root hub [ 3105.094809] ---[ end trace a7919e7f17c0a727 ]--- [ 3105.130069] hub 5-0:1.0: hub_resume [ 3105.132131] usb usb4: usb auto-resume [ 3105.132136] usb usb4: wakeup_rh [ 3105.180059] hub 4-0:1.0: hub_resume [ 3106.290052] usb usb6: suspend_rh (auto-stop) [ 3106.290077] usb usb4: suspend_rh (auto-stop) Signed-off-by: Huajun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 22, 2012
commit 342ff28 upstream. Some error paths in mtd_blkdevs were fixed in the following commit: commit 94735ec mtd: mtd_blkdevs: fix error path in blktrans_open But on these error paths, the block device's `dev->open' count is already incremented before we check for errors. This meant that, while the error path was handled correctly on the first time through blktrans_open(), the device is erroneously considered already open on the second time through. This problem can be seen, for instance, when a UBI volume is simultaneously mounted as a UBIFS partition and read through its corresponding gluebi mtdblockX device. This results in blktrans_open() passing its error checks (with `dev->open > 0') without actually having a handle on the device. Here's a summarized log of the actions and results with nandsim: # modprobe nandsim # modprobe mtdblock # modprobe gluebi # modprobe ubifs # ubiattach /dev/ubi_ctrl -m 0 ... # ubimkvol /dev/ubi0 -N test -s 16MiB ... # mount -t ubifs ubi0:test /mnt # ls /dev/mtdblock* /dev/mtdblock0 /dev/mtdblock1 # cat /dev/mtdblock1 > /dev/null cat: can't open '/dev/mtdblock4': Device or resource busy # cat /dev/mtdblock1 > /dev/null CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffff0, epc == 8031536c, ra == 8031f280 Oops[#1]: ... Call Trace: [<8031536c>] ubi_leb_read+0x14/0x164 [<8031f280>] gluebi_read+0xf0/0x148 [<802edba8>] mtdblock_readsect+0x64/0x198 [<802ecfe4>] mtd_blktrans_thread+0x330/0x3f4 [<8005be98>] kthread+0x88/0x90 [<8000bc04>] kernel_thread_helper+0x10/0x18 Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 22, 2012
commit b2ea70a upstream. expkey_parse() oopses when handling a 0 length export. This is easily triggerable from usermode by writing 0 bytes into '/proc/[proc id]/net/rpc/nfsd.fh/channel'. Below is the log: [ 1402.286893] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880077c49fff [ 1402.287632] IP: [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] PGD 2206063 PUD 1fdfd067 PMD 1ffbc067 PTE 8000000077c49160 [ 1402.287632] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1402.287632] CPU 1 [ 1402.287632] Pid: 20198, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.2.0-rc2-sasha-00058-gc65cd37 #6 [ 1402.287632] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b4b99>] [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] RSP: 0018:ffff880077f0fd68 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1402.287632] RAX: ffff880077c49fff RBX: 00000000ffffffea RCX: 0000000001043400 [ 1402.287632] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880077c4a000 RDI: ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] RBP: ffff880077f0fe18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff880000000000 [ 1402.287632] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff880077c4a000 [ 1402.287632] R13: ffffffff82283de0 R14: 0000000001043400 R15: ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] FS: 00007f25fec3f700(0000) GS:ffff88007d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1402.287632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff CR3: 0000000077e1d000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 1402.287632] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1402.287632] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1402.287632] Process trinity (pid: 20198, threadinfo ffff880077f0e000, task ffff880077db17b0) [ 1402.287632] Stack: [ 1402.287632] ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffff880077f0fdb8 ffffffff810b411e [ 1402.287632] ffff880000000000 ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] 0000000001043400 ffffffff82283de0 ffff880077f0fde8 ffffffff81111f63 [ 1402.287632] Call Trace: [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff810b411e>] ? lock_release+0x1af/0x1bc [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f63>] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f1a>] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8bcf2>] cache_do_downcall+0x3e/0x4f [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c950>] cache_write.clone.16+0xbb/0x130 [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9df>] ? cache_write_pipefs+0x1a/0x1a [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9f8>] cache_write_procfs+0x19/0x1b [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8118dc54>] proc_reg_write+0x8e/0xad [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113fe81>] vfs_write+0xaa/0xfd [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8114142d>] ? fget_light+0x35/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113ff8b>] sys_write+0x48/0x6f [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81bbdb92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 1402.287632] Code: c0 c9 c3 55 48 63 d2 48 89 e5 48 8d 44 32 ff 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 bb ea ff ff ff 48 81 ec 88 00 00 00 48 89 b5 58 ff ff ff [ 1402.287632] 38 0a 0f 85 89 02 00 00 c6 00 00 48 8b 3d 44 4a e5 01 48 85 [ 1402.287632] RIP [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] RSP <ffff880077f0fd68> [ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff [ 1402.287632] ---[ end trace 368ef53ff773a5e3 ]--- Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]> Cc: Neil Brown <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 22, 2012
commit 687875f upstream. Fix the following NULL ptr dereference caused by cat /sys/devices/system/memory/memory0/removable Pid: 13979, comm: sed Not tainted 3.0.13-0.5-default #1 IBM BladeCenter LS21 -[7971PAM]-/Server Blade RIP: __count_immobile_pages+0x4/0x100 Process sed (pid: 13979, threadinfo ffff880221c36000, task ffff88022e788480) Call Trace: is_pageblock_removable_nolock+0x34/0x40 is_mem_section_removable+0x74/0xf0 show_mem_removable+0x41/0x70 sysfs_read_file+0xfe/0x1c0 vfs_read+0xc7/0x130 sys_read+0x53/0xa0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b We are crashing because we are trying to dereference NULL zone which came from pfn=0 (struct page ffffea0000000000). According to the boot log this page is marked reserved: e820 update range: 0000000000000000 - 0000000000010000 (usable) ==> (reserved) and early_node_map confirms that: early_node_map[3] active PFN ranges 1: 0x00000010 -> 0x0000009c 1: 0x00000100 -> 0x000bffa3 1: 0x00100000 -> 0x00240000 The problem is that memory_present works in PAGE_SECTION_MASK aligned blocks so the reserved range sneaks into the the section as well. This also means that free_area_init_node will not take care of those reserved pages and they stay uninitialized. When we try to read the removable status we walk through all available sections and hope that the zone is valid for all pages in the section. But this is not true in this case as the zone and nid are not initialized. We have only one node in this particular case and it is marked as node=1 (rather than 0) and that made the problem visible because page_to_nid will return 0 and there are no zones on the node. Let's check that the zone is valid and that the given pfn falls into its boundaries and mark the section not removable. This might cause some false positives, probably, but we do not have any sane way to find out whether the page is reserved by the platform or it is just not used for whatever other reasons. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72ec #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 #6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a #7 [d72d3d1] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb #8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8de #9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb0] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 525895b upstream. Due to a race it was possible for a fence to be destroyed while another thread was trying to synchronise with it. If this happened in the fallback non-semaphore path, it lead to the following oops due to fence->channel being NULL. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<fa9632ce>] nouveau_fence_update+0xe/0xe0 [nouveau] *pde = a649c067 SMP Modules linked in: fuse nouveau(O) ttm(O) drm_kms_helper(O) drm(O) mxm_wmi video wmi netconsole configfs lockd bnep bluetooth rfkill ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_cobinfmt_misc uinput ata_generic pata_acpi pata_aet2c_algo_bit i2c_core [last unloaded: wmi] Pid: 2255, comm: gnome-shell Tainted: G O 3.2.0-0.rc5.git0.1.fc17.i686 #1 System manufacturer System Product Name/M2A-VM EIP: 0060:[<fa9632ce>] EFLAGS: 00010296 CPU: 1 EIP is at nouveau_fence_update+0xe/0xe0 [nouveau] EAX: 00000000 EBX: ddfc6dd0 ECX: dd111580 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00003e80 EDI: dd111580 EBP: dd121d00 ESP: dd121ce8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process gnome-shell (pid: 2255, ti=dd120000 task=dd111580 task.ti=dd120000) Stack: 7dc86c76 00000000 00003e80 ddfc6dd0 00003e80 dd111580 dd121d0c fa96371f 00000000 dd121d3c fa963773 dd111580 01000246 000ec53d 00000000 ddfc6dd0 00001f40 00000000 ddfc6dd0 00000010 dc7df840 dd121d6c fa9639a0 00000000 Call Trace: [<fa96371f>] __nouveau_fence_signalled+0x1f/0x30 [nouveau] [<fa963773>] __nouveau_fence_wait+0x43/0xd0 [nouveau] [<fa9639a0>] nouveau_fence_sync+0x1a0/0x1c0 [nouveau] [<fa964046>] validate_list+0x176/0x300 [nouveau] [<f7d9c9c0>] ? ttm_bo_mem_put+0x30/0x30 [ttm] [<fa964b8a>] nouveau_gem_ioctl_pushbuf+0x48a/0xfd0 [nouveau] [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<f7c93d98>] drm_ioctl+0x388/0x490 [drm] [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<fa964700>] ? nouveau_gem_ioctl_new+0x150/0x150 [nouveau] [<c0635c7b>] ? file_has_perm+0xcb/0xe0 [<f7c93a10>] ? drm_copy_field+0x80/0x80 [drm] [<c0564f56>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x86/0x5b0 [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<c0635f22>] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x62/0x130 [<c0554f30>] ? fget_light+0x30/0x340 [<c05654ef>] sys_ioctl+0x6f/0x80 [<c099e3a4>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 [<c0406481>] ? die+0x31/0x80 Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 22, 2012
…ation commit dc90860 upstream. When isolating pages for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone while the free scanner starts at the end of the zone. Migration avoids entering a new zone by never going beyond the free scanned. Unfortunately, in very rare cases nodes can overlap. When this happens, migration isolates pages without the LRU lock held, corrupting lists which will trigger errors in reclaim or during page free such as in the following oops BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: [<ffffffff810f795c>] free_pcppages_bulk+0xcc/0x450 PGD 1dda554067 PUD 1e1cb58067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU 37 Pid: 17088, comm: memcg_process_s Tainted: G X RIP: free_pcppages_bulk+0xcc/0x450 Process memcg_process_s (pid: 17088, threadinfo ffff881c2926e000, task ffff881c2926c0c0) Call Trace: free_hot_cold_page+0x17e/0x1f0 __pagevec_free+0x90/0xb0 release_pages+0x22a/0x260 pagevec_lru_move_fn+0xf3/0x110 putback_lru_page+0x66/0xe0 unmap_and_move+0x156/0x180 migrate_pages+0x9e/0x1b0 compact_zone+0x1f3/0x2f0 compact_zone_order+0xa2/0xe0 try_to_compact_pages+0xdf/0x110 __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xee/0x1c0 __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x370/0x830 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1b1/0x1c0 alloc_pages_vma+0x9b/0x160 do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x160/0x270 do_page_fault+0x207/0x4c0 page_fault+0x25/0x30 The "X" in the taint flag means that external modules were loaded but but is unrelated to the bug triggering. The real problem was because the PFN layout looks like this Zone PFN ranges: DMA 0x00000010 -> 0x00001000 DMA32 0x00001000 -> 0x00100000 Normal 0x00100000 -> 0x01e80000 Movable zone start PFN for each node early_node_map[14] active PFN ranges 0: 0x00000010 -> 0x0000009b 0: 0x00000100 -> 0x0007a1ec 0: 0x0007a354 -> 0x0007a379 0: 0x0007f7ff -> 0x0007f800 0: 0x00100000 -> 0x00680000 1: 0x00680000 -> 0x00e80000 0: 0x00e80000 -> 0x01080000 1: 0x01080000 -> 0x01280000 0: 0x01280000 -> 0x01480000 1: 0x01480000 -> 0x01680000 0: 0x01680000 -> 0x01880000 1: 0x01880000 -> 0x01a80000 0: 0x01a80000 -> 0x01c80000 1: 0x01c80000 -> 0x01e80000 The fix is straight-forward. isolate_migratepages() has to make a similar check to isolate_freepage to ensure that it never isolates pages from a zone it does not hold the LRU lock for. This was discovered in a 3.0-based kernel but it affects 3.1.x, 3.2.x and current mainline. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit db9bc2d upstream. During error capture, we need to take a reference to the vma from before the reset in order to catpure the contents of the vma later. Currently we are using both an active reference and a kref, but due to nature of the i915_vma reference handling, that kref is on the vma->obj and not the vma itself. This means the vma may be destroyed as soon as it is idle, that is in between the i915_active_release(&vma->active) and the i915_vma_put(vma): <3> [197.866181] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in intel_engine_coredump_add_vma+0x36c/0x4a0 [i915] <3> [197.866339] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881258cb800 by task gem_exec_captur/1041 <3> [197.866467] <4> [197.866512] CPU: 2 PID: 1041 Comm: gem_exec_captur Not tainted 5.9.0-g5e4234f97efba-kasan_200+ #1 <4> [197.866521] Hardware name: Intel Corp. Broxton P/Apollolake RVP1A, BIOS APLKRVPA.X64.0150.B11.1608081044 08/08/2016 <4> [197.866530] Call Trace: <4> [197.866549] dump_stack+0x99/0xd0 <4> [197.866760] ? intel_engine_coredump_add_vma+0x36c/0x4a0 [i915] <4> [197.866783] print_address_description.constprop.8+0x3e/0x60 <4> [197.866797] ? kmsg_dump_rewind_nolock+0xd4/0xd4 <4> [197.866819] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0x120 <4> [197.867037] ? intel_engine_coredump_add_vma+0x36c/0x4a0 [i915] <4> [197.867249] ? intel_engine_coredump_add_vma+0x36c/0x4a0 [i915] <4> [197.867270] kasan_report.cold.10+0x1f/0x37 <4> [197.867492] ? intel_engine_coredump_add_vma+0x36c/0x4a0 [i915] <4> [197.867710] intel_engine_coredump_add_vma+0x36c/0x4a0 [i915] <4> [197.867949] i915_gpu_coredump.part.29+0x150/0x7b0 [i915] <4> [197.868186] i915_capture_error_state+0x5e/0xc0 [i915] <4> [197.868396] intel_gt_handle_error+0x6eb/0xa20 [i915] <4> [197.868624] ? intel_gt_reset_global+0x370/0x370 [i915] <4> [197.868644] ? check_flags+0x50/0x50 <4> [197.868662] ? __lock_acquire+0xd59/0x6b00 <4> [197.868678] ? register_lock_class+0x1ad0/0x1ad0 <4> [197.868944] i915_wedged_set+0xcf/0x1b0 [i915] <4> [197.869147] ? i915_wedged_get+0x90/0x90 [i915] <4> [197.869371] ? i915_wedged_get+0x90/0x90 [i915] <4> [197.869398] simple_attr_write+0x153/0x1c0 <4> [197.869428] full_proxy_write+0xee/0x180 <4> [197.869442] ? __sb_start_write+0x1f3/0x310 <4> [197.869465] vfs_write+0x1a3/0x640 <4> [197.869492] ksys_write+0xec/0x1c0 <4> [197.869507] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xa0/0xa0 <4> [197.869525] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x32b/0x4e0 <4> [197.869541] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 <4> [197.869566] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 <4> [197.869579] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 <4> [197.869590] RIP: 0033:0x7fd8b7aee281 <4> [197.869604] Code: c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 05 59 8d 20 00 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 8b 05 8a d1 20 00 85 c0 75 16 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 49 89 d4 53 <4> [197.869613] RSP: 002b:00007ffea3b72008 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 <4> [197.869625] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd8b7aee281 <4> [197.869633] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007fd8b81a82e7 RDI: 000000000000000d <4> [197.869641] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000034 <4> [197.869650] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fd8b81a82e7 <4> [197.869658] R13: 000000000000000d R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 <3> [197.869707] <3> [197.869757] Allocated by task 1041: <4> [197.869833] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 <4> [197.869843] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.5+0xc1/0xd0 <4> [197.869853] kmem_cache_alloc+0x106/0x8e0 <4> [197.870059] i915_vma_instance+0x212/0x1930 [i915] <4> [197.870270] eb_lookup_vmas+0xe06/0x1d10 [i915] <4> [197.870475] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x131d/0x4080 [i915] <4> [197.870682] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x103/0x5d0 [i915] <4> [197.870701] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1d2/0x270 <4> [197.870710] drm_ioctl+0x40d/0x85c <4> [197.870721] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x10d/0x170 <4> [197.870731] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 <4> [197.870740] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 <3> [197.870748] <3> [197.870798] Freed by task 22: <4> [197.870865] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 <4> [197.870875] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 <4> [197.870884] kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 <4> [197.870894] __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160 <4> [197.870903] kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x710 <4> [197.871109] i915_vma_parked+0x618/0x800 [i915] <4> [197.871307] __gt_park+0xdb/0x1e0 [i915] <4> [197.871501] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0xb1/0x190 [i915] <4> [197.871516] process_one_work+0x8dc/0x15d0 <4> [197.871525] worker_thread+0x82/0xb30 <4> [197.871535] kthread+0x36d/0x440 <4> [197.871545] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 <3> [197.871553] <3> [197.871602] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881258cb740 which belongs to the cache i915_vma of size 968 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/2553 Fixes: 2850748 ("drm/i915: Pull i915_vma_pin under the vm->mutex") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.5+ Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 178536b) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 403dc16 ] In my test setup, I had a SAMA5D27 device configured with ip forwarding, and second device with usb ethernet (r8152) sending ICMP packets. If the packet was larger than about 220 bytes, the SAMA5 device would "oops" with the following trace: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1863! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: xt_MASQUERADE ppp_async ppp_generic slhc iptable_nat xt_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 can_raw can bridge stp llc ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 sd_mod cdc_ether usbnet usb_storage r8152 scsi_mod mii o ption usb_wwan usbserial micrel macb at91_sama5d2_adc phylink gpio_sama5d2_piobu m_can_platform m_can industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf of_mdio can_dev fixed_phy sdhci_of_at91 sdhci_pltfm libphy sdhci mmc_core ohci_at91 ehci_atmel o hci_hcd iio_rescale industrialio sch_fq_codel spidev prox2_hal(O) CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G O 5.9.1-prox2+ #1 Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5 PC is at skb_put+0x3c/0x50 LR is at macb_start_xmit+0x134/0xad0 [macb] pc : [<c05258cc>] lr : [<bf0ea5b8>] psr: 20070113 sp : c0d01a60 ip : c07232c0 fp : c4250000 r10: c0d03cc8 r9 : 00000000 r8 : c0d038c0 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000008 r5 : c59b66c0 r4 : 0000002a r3 : 8f659eff r2 : c59e9eea r1 : 00000001 r0 : c59b66c0 Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c53c7d Table: 2640c059 DAC: 00000051 Process swapper (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x75002d81) <snipped stack> [<c05258cc>] (skb_put) from [<bf0ea5b8>] (macb_start_xmit+0x134/0xad0 [macb]) [<bf0ea5b8>] (macb_start_xmit [macb]) from [<c053e504>] (dev_hard_start_xmit+0x90/0x11c) [<c053e504>] (dev_hard_start_xmit) from [<c0571180>] (sch_direct_xmit+0x124/0x260) [<c0571180>] (sch_direct_xmit) from [<c053eae4>] (__dev_queue_xmit+0x4b0/0x6d0) [<c053eae4>] (__dev_queue_xmit) from [<c05a5650>] (ip_finish_output2+0x350/0x580) [<c05a5650>] (ip_finish_output2) from [<c05a7e24>] (ip_output+0xb4/0x13c) [<c05a7e24>] (ip_output) from [<c05a39d0>] (ip_forward+0x474/0x500) [<c05a39d0>] (ip_forward) from [<c05a13d8>] (ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3c/0x50) [<c05a13d8>] (ip_sublist_rcv_finish) from [<c05a19b8>] (ip_sublist_rcv+0x11c/0x188) [<c05a19b8>] (ip_sublist_rcv) from [<c05a2494>] (ip_list_rcv+0xf8/0x124) [<c05a2494>] (ip_list_rcv) from [<c05403c4>] (__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1a0/0x20c) [<c05403c4>] (__netif_receive_skb_list_core) from [<c05405c4>] (netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x194/0x230) [<c05405c4>] (netif_receive_skb_list_internal) from [<c0540684>] (gro_normal_list.part.0+0x14/0x28) [<c0540684>] (gro_normal_list.part.0) from [<c0541280>] (napi_complete_done+0x16c/0x210) [<c0541280>] (napi_complete_done) from [<bf14c1c0>] (r8152_poll+0x684/0x708 [r8152]) [<bf14c1c0>] (r8152_poll [r8152]) from [<c0541424>] (net_rx_action+0x100/0x328) [<c0541424>] (net_rx_action) from [<c01012ec>] (__do_softirq+0xec/0x274) [<c01012ec>] (__do_softirq) from [<c012d6d4>] (irq_exit+0xcc/0xd0) [<c012d6d4>] (irq_exit) from [<c0160960>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x58/0xa4) [<c0160960>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0100b0c>] (__irq_svc+0x6c/0x90) Exception stack(0xc0d01ef0 to 0xc0d01f38) 1ee0: 00000000 0000003d 0c31f383 c0d0fa00 1f00: c0d2eb80 00000000 c0d2e630 4dad8c49 4da967b0 0000003d 0000003d 00000000 1f20: fffffff5 c0d01f40 c04e0f8 c04e0f8c 30070013 ffffffff [<c0100b0c>] (__irq_svc) from [<c04e0f8c>] (cpuidle_enter_state+0x7c/0x378) [<c04e0f8c>] (cpuidle_enter_state) from [<c04e12c4>] (cpuidle_enter+0x28/0x38) [<c04e12c4>] (cpuidle_enter) from [<c014f710>] (do_idle+0x194/0x214) [<c014f710>] (do_idle) from [<c014fa50>] (cpu_startup_entry+0xc/0x14) [<c014fa50>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00dc8>] (start_kernel+0x46c/0x4a0) Code: e580c054 8a000002 e1a00002 e8bd8070 (e7f001f2) ---[ end trace 146c8a334115490c ]--- The solution was to force nonlinear buffers to be cloned. This was previously reported by Klaus Doth (https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg556937.html) but never formally submitted as a patch. This is the third revision, hopefully the formatting is correct this time! Suggested-by: Klaus Doth <[email protected]> Fixes: 653e92a ("net: macb: add support for padding and fcs computation") Signed-off-by: Mark Deneen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 6097df4 upstream. If calling find_domain() for a device which hasn't been probed by the iommu core, below kernel NULL pointer dereference issue happens. [ 362.736947] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038 [ 362.743953] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 362.749115] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 362.754278] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 362.756843] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 362.760528] CPU: 0 PID: 844 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-intel-next+ #1 [ 362.767428] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3384.A02.1909200816 09/20/2019 [ 362.781109] RIP: 0010:find_domain+0xd/0x40 [ 362.785234] Code: 48 81 fb 60 28 d9 b2 75 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 e0 02 00 00 55 <48> 8b 40 38 48 89 e5 48 83 f8 fe 0f 94 c1 48 85 ff 0f 94 c2 08 d1 [ 362.804041] RSP: 0018:ffffb09cc1f0bd38 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 362.809292] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff905b98e4fac8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 362.816452] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff905b98e4fac8 RDI: ffff905b9ccd40d0 [ 362.823617] RBP: ffffb09cc1f0bda0 R08: ffffb09cc1f0bd48 R09: 000000000000000f [ 362.830778] R10: ffffffffb266c080 R11: ffff905b9042602d R12: ffff905b98e4fac8 [ 362.837944] R13: ffffb09cc1f0bd48 R14: ffff905b9ccd40d0 R15: ffff905b98e4fac8 [ 362.845108] FS: 00007f8485460740(0000) GS:ffff905b9fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 362.853227] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 362.858996] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000004627a6003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 362.866161] PKRU: fffffffc [ 362.868890] Call Trace: [ 362.871363] ? show_device_domain_translation+0x32/0x100 [ 362.876700] ? bind_store+0x110/0x110 [ 362.880387] ? klist_next+0x91/0x120 [ 362.883987] ? domain_translation_struct_show+0x50/0x50 [ 362.889237] bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xc0 [ 362.893121] domain_translation_struct_show+0x36/0x50 [ 362.898204] seq_read+0x135/0x410 [ 362.901545] ? handle_mm_fault+0xeb8/0x1750 [ 362.905755] full_proxy_read+0x5c/0x90 [ 362.909526] vfs_read+0xa6/0x190 [ 362.912782] ksys_read+0x61/0xe0 [ 362.916037] __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 [ 362.919725] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 [ 362.923329] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 362.928405] RIP: 0033:0x7f84855c5e95 Filter out those devices to avoid such error. Fixes: e2726da ("iommu/vt-d: debugfs: Add support to show page table internals") Reported-and-tested-by: Xu Pengfei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]#v5.6+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 69a8eed upstream. spi_nor_parse_sfdp() modifies the passed structure so that it points to itself (params.erase_map.regions to params.erase_map.uniform_region). This makes it impossible to copy the local struct anywhere else. Therefore only use memcpy() in backup-restore scenario. The bug may show up like below: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000b377f8 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 3500 Comm: flashcp Tainted: G O 5.4.53-... #1 ... RIP: 0010:spi_nor_erase+0x8e/0x5c0 Code: 64 24 18 89 db 4d 8b b5 d0 04 00 00 4c 89 64 24 18 4c 89 64 24 20 eb 12 a8 10 0f 85 59 02 00 00 49 83 c6 10 0f 84 4f 02 00 00 <49> 8b 06 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 c0 48 89 d1 49 03 4e 08 48 39 cb 73 d8 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000217fc48 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000740000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000740000 RDX: ffff8884550c9980 RSI: ffff88844f9c0bc0 RDI: ffff88844ede7bb8 RBP: 0000000000740000 R08: ffffffff815bfbe0 R09: ffff88844f9c0bc0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000217fc60 R13: ffff88844ede7818 R14: ffffc90000b377f8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4699780500(0000) GS:ffff88846ff00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc90000b377f8 CR3: 00000004538ee000 CR4: 0000000000340fe0 Call Trace: part_erase+0x27/0x50 mtdchar_ioctl+0x831/0xba0 ? filemap_map_pages+0x186/0x3d0 ? do_filp_open+0xad/0x110 ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30 ? cp_new_stat+0x150/0x180 mtdchar_unlocked_ioctl+0x2a/0x40 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x630 ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x3c/0x60 ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x200 ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x50/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f46996b6817 Cc: [email protected] Fixes: c468721 ("mtd: spi-nor: Move erase_map to 'struct spi_nor_flash_parameter'") Co-developed-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <[email protected]> Tested-by: Baurzhan Ismagulov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 5223cc6 ] When enabling qgroups we walk the tree_root and then add a qgroup item for every root that we have. This creates a lock dependency on the tree_root and qgroup_root, which results in the following lockdep splat (with tree locks using rwsem), eg. in tests btrfs/017 or btrfs/022: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-default+ #1299 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/24552 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9142dfc5f630 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9142dfc5d0b0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_item+0x6e/0x140 [btrfs] btrfs_create_tree+0x1cb/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0xcd/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x91/0xc30 validate_chain+0x491/0x750 __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] add_qgroup_item.part.0+0x72/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x3bb/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-quota-00); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-quota-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by btrfs/24552: #0: ffff9142df431478 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x22/0xa0 #1: ffff9142f9b10cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0x7b/0xe0 [btrfs] #2: ffff9142f9b11a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0x790 [btrfs] #3: ffff9142df431698 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x406/0x510 [btrfs] #4: ffff9142dfc5d0b0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 24552 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.9.0-default+ #1299 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x77/0x97 check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 check_prev_add+0x91/0xc30 validate_chain+0x491/0x750 __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xc4/0x140 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_root_node+0xd9/0x200 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] add_qgroup_item.part.0+0x72/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x3bb/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fix this by dropping the path whenever we find a root item, add the qgroup item, and then re-lookup the root item we found and continue processing roots. Reported-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 49d11be ] I got the following lockdep splat with tree locks converted to rwsem patches on btrfs/104: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0+ torvalds#102 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs-cleaner/903 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8e7fab6ffe30 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 but task is already holding lock: ffff8e7fab628a88 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_find_all_roots+0x41/0x80 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x40/0x130 caching_thread+0x53/0x5a0 btrfs_work_helper+0xfa/0x520 process_one_work+0x238/0x540 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #2 (&caching_ctl->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 btrfs_cache_block_group+0x1e0/0x510 find_free_extent+0xb6e/0x12f0 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb1/0x330 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11d/0x580 btrfs_cow_block+0x10c/0x220 commit_cowonly_roots+0x47/0x2e0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x595/0xbd0 sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1df/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x40/0x130 find_free_extent+0x2ed/0x12f0 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb1/0x330 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11d/0x580 btrfs_cow_block+0x10c/0x220 commit_cowonly_roots+0x47/0x2e0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x595/0xbd0 sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1df/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1167/0x2150 lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3d0 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x614/0x9d0 btrfs_find_root+0x35/0x1b0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x120 btrfs_get_root_ref+0x14b/0x600 find_parent_nodes+0x3e6/0x1b30 btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xb4/0x130 btrfs_find_all_roots+0x60/0x80 btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_post+0x27/0x40 btrfs_add_delayed_data_ref+0x3fd/0x460 btrfs_free_extent+0x42/0x100 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x1d7/0x2f0 walk_up_proc+0x11c/0x400 walk_up_tree+0xf0/0x180 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x1c7/0x780 btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xfb/0x110 cleaner_kthread+0xd4/0x140 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-root-00 --> &caching_ctl->mutex --> &fs_info->commit_root_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->commit_root_sem); lock(&caching_ctl->mutex); lock(&fs_info->commit_root_sem); lock(btrfs-root-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by btrfs-cleaner/903: #0: ffff8e7fab628838 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cleaner_kthread+0x6e/0x140 #1: ffff8e7faadac640 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5c0 #2: ffff8e7fab628a88 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_find_all_roots+0x41/0x80 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 903 Comm: btrfs-cleaner Not tainted 5.9.0+ torvalds#102 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 __lock_acquire+0x1167/0x2150 ? __bfs+0x42/0x210 lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3d0 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x614/0x9d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 btrfs_find_root+0x35/0x1b0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x120 btrfs_get_root_ref+0x14b/0x600 find_parent_nodes+0x3e6/0x1b30 btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xb4/0x130 btrfs_find_all_roots+0x60/0x80 btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_post+0x27/0x40 btrfs_add_delayed_data_ref+0x3fd/0x460 btrfs_free_extent+0x42/0x100 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x1d7/0x2f0 walk_up_proc+0x11c/0x400 walk_up_tree+0xf0/0x180 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x1c7/0x780 ? btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0x73/0x110 btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xfb/0x110 cleaner_kthread+0xd4/0x140 ? btrfs_alloc_root+0x50/0x50 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 BTRFS info (device sdb): disk space caching is enabled BTRFS info (device sdb): has skinny extents This happens because qgroups does a backref lookup when we create a delayed ref. From here it may have to look up a root from an indirect ref, which does a normal lookup on the tree_root, which takes the read lock on the tree_root nodes. To fix this we need to add a variant for looking up roots that searches the commit root of the tree_root. Then when we do the backref search using the commit root we are sure to not take any locks on the tree_root nodes. This gets rid of the lockdep splat when running btrfs/104. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3c3751f ] When target side trace in turned on and flush command is issued from the host it results in the following Oops. [ 856.789724] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000068 [ 856.790686] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 856.791262] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 856.791863] PGD 6d7110067 P4D 6d7110067 PUD 66f0ad067 PMD 0 [ 856.792527] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 856.792950] CPU: 15 PID: 7034 Comm: nvme Tainted: G OE 5.9.0nvme-5.9+ torvalds#71 [ 856.793790] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e3214 [ 856.794956] RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_nvmet_req_init+0x13e/0x170 [nvmet] [ 856.795734] Code: 41 5c 41 5d c3 31 d2 31 f6 e8 4e 9b b8 e0 e9 0e ff ff ff 49 8b 55 00 48 8b 38 8b 0 [ 856.797740] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001be3a60 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 856.798375] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8887e7d2c01c RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 856.799234] RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000057e70ea2 RDI: ffff8887e7d2c034 [ 856.800088] RBP: ffff88869f710578 R08: ffff888807500d40 R09: 00000000fffffffe [ 856.800951] R10: 0000000064c66670 R11: 00000000ef955201 R12: ffff8887e7d2c034 [ 856.801807] R13: ffff88869f7105c8 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: ffff88869f710440 [ 856.802667] FS: 00007f6a22bd8780(0000) GS:ffff888813a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 856.803635] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 856.804367] CR2: 0000000000000068 CR3: 00000006d73e0000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ 856.805283] Call Trace: [ 856.805613] nvmet_req_init+0x27c/0x480 [nvmet] [ 856.806200] nvme_loop_queue_rq+0xcb/0x1d0 [nvme_loop] [ 856.806862] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x123/0x7b0 [ 856.807459] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 856.808025] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xc7/0x170 [ 856.808708] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x30/0x60 [ 856.809372] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x70/0x100 [ 856.809935] __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x156/0x170 [ 856.810574] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x86/0xe0 [ 856.811104] blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0xef/0x160 [ 856.811733] blk_execute_rq+0x69/0xc0 [ 856.812212] ? blk_mq_rq_ctx_init+0xd0/0x230 [ 856.812784] nvme_execute_passthru_rq+0x57/0x130 [nvme_core] [ 856.813461] nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xeb/0x300 [nvme_core] [ 856.814099] nvme_user_cmd.isra.82+0x11e/0x1a0 [nvme_core] [ 856.814752] blkdev_ioctl+0x1dc/0x2c0 [ 856.815197] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 [ 856.815606] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 [ 856.816074] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 856.816533] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 856.817168] RIP: 0033:0x7f6a222ed107 [ 856.817617] Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 05 81 cd 2c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 8 [ 856.819901] RSP: 002b:00007ffca848f058 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 856.820846] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f6a222ed107 [ 856.821726] RDX: 00007ffca848f060 RSI: 00000000c0484e43 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 856.822603] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000000000000003f R09: 0000000000000005 [ 856.823478] R10: 00007ffca848ece0 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffca84912d3 [ 856.824359] R13: 00007ffca848f4d0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 000000000067e900 [ 856.825236] Modules linked in: nvme_loop(OE) nvmet(OE) nvme_fabrics(OE) null_blk nvme(OE) nvme_corel Move the nvmet_req_init() tracepoint after we parse the command in nvmet_req_init() so that we can get rid of the duplicate nvmet_find_namespace() call. Rename __assign_disk_name() -> __assign_req_name(). Now that we call tracepoint after parsing the command simplify the newly added __assign_req_name() which fixes this bug. Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit d9a57c8 upstream. The atomic check hooks must look up the encoder to be used with a connector from the connector's atomic state, and not assume that it's the connector's current attached encoder. The latter one can change under the atomic check func, or can be unset yet as in the case of MST connectors. This fixes [ 7.940719] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 7.944407] CPU: 2 PID: 143 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 5.6.0-1023-oem torvalds#23-Ubuntu [ 7.952102] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Latitude 7320/, BIOS 88.87.11 09/07/2020 [ 7.959278] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] [ 7.965511] RIP: 0010:intel_psr_atomic_check+0x37/0xa0 [i915] [ 7.971327] Code: 80 2d 06 00 00 20 74 42 80 b8 34 71 00 00 00 74 39 48 8b 72 08 48 85 f6 74 30 80 b8 f8 71 00 00 00 74 27 4c 8b 87 80 04 00 00 <41> 8b 78 78 83 ff 08 77 19 31 c9 83 ff 05 77 19 48 81 c1 20 01 00 [ 7.977541] input: PS/2 Generic Mouse as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input5 [ 7.990154] RSP: 0018:ffffb864c073fac8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 7.990155] RAX: ffff8c5d55ce0000 RBX: ffff8c5d54519000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 7.990155] RDX: ffff8c5d55cb30c0 RSI: ffff8c5d89a0c800 RDI: ffff8c5d55fcf800 [ 7.990156] RBP: ffffb864c073fac8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8c5d55d9f3a0 [ 7.990156] R10: ffff8c5d55cb30c0 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: ffff8c5d55fcf800 [ 7.990156] R13: ffff8c5d55cb30c0 R14: ffff8c5d56989cc0 R15: ffff8c5d56989cc0 [ 7.990158] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c5d8e480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8.047193] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8.052970] CR2: 0000000000000078 CR3: 0000000856500005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 [ 8.060137] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8.062867] Call Trace: [ 8.065361] intel_digital_connector_atomic_check+0x53/0x130 [i915] [ 8.071703] intel_dp_mst_atomic_check+0x5b/0x200 [i915] [ 8.077074] drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset+0x1db/0x790 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.083942] intel_atomic_check+0x92/0xc50 [i915] [ 8.088705] ? drm_plane_check_pixel_format+0x4f/0xb0 [drm] [ 8.094345] ? drm_atomic_plane_check+0x7a/0x3a0 [drm] [ 8.099548] drm_atomic_check_only+0x2b1/0x450 [drm] [ 8.104573] drm_atomic_commit+0x18/0x50 [drm] [ 8.109070] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x1c9/0x200 [drm] [ 8.115056] drm_client_modeset_commit_force+0x55/0x160 [drm] [ 8.120866] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x54/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.128415] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x34/0x50 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.134225] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.0+0xb4/0xe0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.141150] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event+0x1c/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.147481] intel_fbdev_output_poll_changed+0x6f/0xa0 [i915] [ 8.153287] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x2c/0x40 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.159709] output_poll_execute+0x1aa/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.165506] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3b0 [ 8.169561] worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 [ 8.173249] kthread+0x104/0x140 [ 8.176515] ? process_one_work+0x3b0/0x3b0 [ 8.180726] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 8.184416] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/2361 References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/2486 Reported-by: William Tseng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Cooper Chiou <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Gupta <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 00e5deb) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Dec 17, 2020
[ Upstream commit 9fe9efd ] This is a copy of commit 5c5f1ba ("ASoC: Intel: kbl_rt5663_rt5514_max98927: Fix kabylake_ssp_fixup function") applied to the kbl_rt5663_max98927 board file. Original explanation of the change: kabylake_ssp_fixup function uses snd_soc_dpcm to identify the codecs DAIs. The HW parameters are changed based on the codec DAI of the stream. The earlier approach to get snd_soc_dpcm was using container_of() macro on snd_pcm_hw_params. The structures have been modified over time and snd_soc_dpcm does not have snd_pcm_hw_params as a reference but as a copy. This causes the current driver to crash when used. This patch changes the way snd_soc_dpcm is extracted. snd_soc_pcm_runtime holds 2 dpcm instances (one for playback and one for capture). 2 codecs on the SSP are dmic (capture) and speakers (playback). Based on the stream direction, snd_soc_dpcm is extracted from snd_soc_pcm_runtime. Fixes a boot crash on a HP Chromebook x2: [ 16.582225] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000050 [ 16.582231] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 16.582233] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 16.582234] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.582238] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 16.582241] CPU: 0 PID: 1980 Comm: cras Tainted: G C 5.4.58 #1 [ 16.582243] Hardware name: HP Soraka/Soraka, BIOS Google_Soraka.10431.75.0 08/30/2018 [ 16.582247] RIP: 0010:kabylake_ssp_fixup+0x19/0xbb [snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_max98927] [ 16.582250] Code: c6 6f c5 80 c0 44 89 f2 31 c0 e8 3e c9 4c d6 eb de 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 53 48 89 f3 48 8b 46 c8 48 8b 4e d0 <48> 8b 49 10 4c 8b 78 10 4c 8b 31 4c 89 f7 48 c7 c6 4b c2 80 c0 e8 [ 16.582252] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7e81e0b958 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 16.582254] RAX: ffffffff96f13e0d RBX: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 RCX: 0000000000000040 [ 16.582256] RDX: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 RSI: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 RDI: ffffa3b208558028 [ 16.582258] RBP: ffffaf7e81e0b970 R08: ffffa3b203b54160 R09: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 [ 16.582259] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc080b345 R12: ffffa3b209fb6e00 [ 16.582261] R13: ffffa3b1b1a47838 R14: ffffa3b1e6197f28 R15: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 [ 16.582263] FS: 00007eb3f25aaf80(0000) GS:ffffa3b236a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 16.582265] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 16.582267] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000246bc8006 CR4: 00000000003606f0 [ 16.582269] Call Trace: [ 16.582275] snd_soc_link_be_hw_params_fixup+0x21/0x68 [ 16.582278] snd_soc_dai_hw_params+0x25/0x94 [ 16.582282] soc_pcm_hw_params+0x2d8/0x583 [ 16.582288] dpcm_be_dai_hw_params+0x172/0x29e [ 16.582291] dpcm_fe_dai_hw_params+0x9f/0x12f [ 16.582295] snd_pcm_hw_params+0x137/0x41c [ 16.582298] snd_pcm_hw_params_user+0x3c/0x71 [ 16.582301] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x2c6/0x565 [ 16.582304] snd_pcm_ioctl+0x32/0x36 [ 16.582307] do_vfs_ioctl+0x506/0x783 [ 16.582311] ksys_ioctl+0x58/0x83 [ 16.582313] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x1e [ 16.582316] do_syscall_64+0x54/0x7e [ 16.582319] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 16.582322] RIP: 0033:0x7eb3f1886157 [ 16.582324] Code: 8a 66 90 48 8b 05 11 dd 2b 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 dc 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.582326] RSP: 002b:00007ffff7559818 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 16.582329] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005acc9188b140 RCX: 00007eb3f1886157 [ 16.582330] RDX: 00007ffff7559940 RSI: 00000000c2604111 RDI: 000000000000001e [ 16.582332] RBP: 00007ffff7559840 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 16.582333] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000bb80 [ 16.582335] R13: 00005acc91702e80 R14: 00007ffff7559940 R15: 00005acc91702e80 [ 16.582337] Modules linked in: rfcomm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg uinput hid_google_hammer snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_max98927 snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_soc_dmic snd_soc_skl_ssp_clk snd_soc_skl snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_ext_core snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ipu3_cio2 ipu3_imgu(C) videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops snd_soc_rt5663 snd_soc_max98927 snd_soc_rl6231 ov5670 ov13858 acpi_als v4l2_fwnode dw9714 fuse xt_MASQUERADE iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_sensors cros_ec_sensors_core cros_ec_sensors_ring industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio cros_ec_sensorhub cdc_ether usbnet btusb btrtl btintel btbcm bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc lzo_rle lzo_compress iwlmvm zram iwl7000_mac80211 r8152 mii iwlwifi cfg80211 joydev [ 16.584243] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 [ 16.584246] CR2: 0000000000000050 [ 16.584248] ---[ end trace c8511d090c11edff ]--- Suggested-by: Łukasz Majczak <[email protected]> Fixes: 2e5894d ("ASoC: pcm: Add support for DAI multicodec") Signed-off-by: Tomasz Figa <[email protected]> Acked-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit f4c7914 ] The cleanup for the yfs_store_opaque_acl2_operation calls the wrong function to destroy the ACL content buffer. It's an afs_acl struct, not a yfs_acl struct - and the free function for latter may pass invalid pointers to kfree(). Fix this by using the afs_acl_put() function. The yfs_acl_put() function is then no longer used and can be removed. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x7ebde00000000: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI ... RIP: 0010:compound_head+0x0/0x11 ... Call Trace: virt_to_cache+0x8/0x51 kfree+0x5d/0x79 yfs_free_opaque_acl+0x16/0x29 afs_put_operation+0x60/0x114 __vfs_setxattr+0x67/0x72 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x66/0xe9 vfs_setxattr+0x67/0xce setxattr+0x14e/0x184 __do_sys_fsetxattr+0x66/0x8f do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x3a entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: e49c7b2 ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept") Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…lone() [ Upstream commit 286228d ] All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned up. This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler, can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered. To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB. The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount. We can easily reproduce this with following example: testj1939 -B -r can0: & cansend can0 1823ff40#0123 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<c010f570>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f90c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c010f8ec>] (show_stack) from [<c0c3e1a4>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0) [<c0c3e118>] (dump_stack) from [<c0127fec>] (__warn+0xe0/0x108) [<c0127f0c>] (__warn) from [<c01283c8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc) [<c0128324>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0539c0c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174) [<c0539b04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0ad2cac>] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210) [<c0ad2aa0>] (j1939_can_recv) from [<c0ac9dc8>] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268) [<c0ac9d14>] (can_rcv_filter) from [<c0aca2cc>] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4) [<c0aca21c>] (can_receive) from [<c0aca348>] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98) [<c0aca300>] (can_rcv) from [<c09b1fdc>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88) [<c09b1f78>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [<c09b2070>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94) [<c09b2038>] (__netif_receive_skb) from [<c09b2130>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8) [<c09b20cc>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<c09b21f8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c) [<c09b21c4>] (netif_receive_skb) from [<c0791278>] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4) Fixes: 0ae89be ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 8ffd778 ] Mimic the pre-existing ACPI and Device Tree event log behavior by not creating the binary_bios_measurements file when the EFI TPM event log is empty. This fixes the following NULL pointer dereference that can occur when reading /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements after the kernel received an empty event log from the firmware: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 3932 Comm: fwupdtpmevlog Not tainted 5.9.0-00003-g629990edad62 torvalds#17 Hardware name: LENOVO 20LCS03L00/20LCS03L00, BIOS N27ET38W (1.24 ) 11/28/2019 RIP: 0010:tpm2_bios_measurements_start+0x3a/0x550 Code: 54 53 48 83 ec 68 48 8b 57 70 48 8b 1e 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 48 8b 82 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 8a c8 06 00 00 <44> 8b 60 1c 48 89 4d a0 4c 89 e2 49 83 c4 20 48 83 fb 00 75 2a 49 RSP: 0018:ffffa9c901203db0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff8ba1eb99c000 RSI: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 RDI: ffff8ba1e4ce8258 RBP: ffffa9c901203e40 R08: ffffa9c901203dd8 R09: ffff8ba1ec443300 R10: ffffa9c901203e50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 R13: ffffa9c901203ef0 R14: ffffa9c901203ef0 R15: ffff8ba1e4ce8258 FS: 00007f6595460880(0000) GS:ffff8ba1ef880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000002c CR3: 00000007d8d18003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? __kmalloc_node+0x113/0x320 ? kvmalloc_node+0x31/0x80 seq_read+0x94/0x420 vfs_read+0xa7/0x190 ksys_read+0xa7/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 In this situation, the bios_event_log pointer in the tpm_bios_log struct was not NULL but was equal to the ZERO_SIZE_PTR (0x10) value. This was due to the following kmemdup() in tpm_read_log_efi(): int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { ... /* malloc EventLog space */ log->bios_event_log = kmemdup(log_tbl->log, log_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!log->bios_event_log) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } ... } When log_size is zero, due to an empty event log from firmware, ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kmemdup(). Upon a read of the binary_bios_measurements file, the tpm2_bios_measurements_start() function does not perform a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check on the bios_event_log pointer before dereferencing it. Rather than add a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check in functions that make use of the bios_event_log pointer, simply avoid creating the binary_bios_measurements_file as is done in other event log retrieval backends. Explicitly ignore all of the events in the final event log when the main event log is empty. The list of events in the final event log cannot be accurately parsed without referring to the first event in the main event log (the event log header) so the final event log is useless in such a situation. Fixes: 58cc1e4 ("tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Kenneth R. Crudup <[email protected]> Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Cc: Thiébaud Weksteen <[email protected]> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…plate [ Upstream commit 9fa2e7a ] Setting both CONFIG_KPROBES=y and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y on ARM leads to a panic in memcpy() when injecting a kprobe despite the fixes found in commit e46daee ("ARM: 8806/1: kprobes: Fix false positive with FORTIFY_SOURCE") and commit 0ac569b ("ARM: 8834/1: Fix: kprobes: optimized kprobes illegal instruction"). arch/arm/include/asm/kprobes.h effectively declares the target type of the optprobe_template_entry assembly label as a u32 which leads memcpy()'s __builtin_object_size() call to determine that the pointed-to object is of size four. However, the symbol is used as a handle for the optimised probe assembly template that is at least 96 bytes in size. The symbol's use despite its type blows up the memcpy() in ARM's arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe() with a false-positive fortify_panic() when it should instead copy the optimised probe template into place: ``` $ sudo perf probe -a aspeed_g6_pinctrl_probe [ 158.457252] detected buffer overflow in memcpy [ 158.458069] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 158.458283] kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1153! [ 158.458436] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM [ 158.458768] Modules linked in: [ 158.459043] CPU: 1 PID: 99 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.9.0-rc7-00038-gc53ebf8167e9 torvalds#158 [ 158.459296] Hardware name: Generic DT based system [ 158.459529] PC is at fortify_panic+0x18/0x20 [ 158.459658] LR is at __irq_work_queue_local+0x3c/0x74 [ 158.459831] pc : [<8047451c>] lr : [<8020ecd4>] psr: 60000013 [ 158.460032] sp : be2d1d5 ip : be2d1c58 fp : be2d1d5c [ 158.460174] r10: 00000006 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00000060 [ 158.460348] r7 : 8011e434 r6 : b9e0b800 r5 : 7f000000 r4 : b9fe4f0c [ 158.460557] r3 : 80c04cc8 r2 : 00000000 r1 : be7c03cc r0 : 00000022 [ 158.460801] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 158.461037] Control: 10c5387d Table: b9cd806a DAC: 00000051 [ 158.461251] Process perf (pid: 99, stack limit = 0x81c71a69) [ 158.461472] Stack: (0xbe2d1d50 to 0xbe2d2000) [ 158.461757] 1d40: be2d1d84 be2d1d60 8011e724 80474510 [ 158.462104] 1d60: b9e0b800 b9fe4f0c 00000000 b9fe4f14 80c8ec80 be235000 be2d1d9c be2d1d88 [ 158.462436] 1d80: 801cee44 8011e57c b9fe4f0c 00000000 be2d1dc4 be2d1da0 801d0ad0 801cedec [ 158.462742] 1da0: 00000000 00000000 b9fe4f00 ffffffea 00000000 be235000 be2d1de4 be2d1dc8 [ 158.463087] 1dc0: 80204604 801d0738 00000000 00000000 b9fe4004 ffffffea be2d1e94 be2d1de8 [ 158.463428] 1de0: 80205434 80204570 00385c00 00000000 00000000 00000000 be2d1e14 be2d1e08 [ 158.463880] 1e00: 802ba014 b9fe4f00 b9e718c0 b9fe4f84 b9e71ec8 be2d1e24 00000000 00385c00 [ 158.464365] 1e20: 00000000 626f7270 00000065 802b905c be2d1e94 0000002e 00000000 802b9914 [ 158.464829] 1e40: be2d1e84 be2d1e50 802b9914 8028ff78 804629d0 b9e71ec0 0000002e b9e71ec0 [ 158.465141] 1e60: be2d1ea8 80c04cc8 00000cc0 b9e713c4 00000002 80205834 80205834 0000002e [ 158.465488] 1e80: be235000 be235000 be2d1ea4 be2d1e98 80205854 80204e94 be2d1ecc be2d1ea8 [ 158.465806] 1ea0: 801ee4a0 80205840 00000002 80c04cc8 00000000 0000002e 0000002e 00000000 [ 158.466110] 1ec0: be2d1f0c be2d1ed0 801ee5c8 801ee428 00000000 be2d000 006b1fd0 00000051 [ 158.466398] 1ee0: 00000000 b9eedf00 0000002e 80204410 006b1fd0 be2d1f60 00000000 00000004 [ 158.466763] 1f00: be2d1f24 be2d1f10 8020442c 801ee4c4 80205834 802c613c be2d1f5c be2d1f28 [ 158.467102] 1f20: 802c60ac 8020441c be2d1fac be2d1f38 8010c764 802e9888 be2d1f5c b9eedf00 [ 158.467447] 1f40: b9eedf00 006b1fd0 0000002e 00000000 be2d1f94 be2d1f60 802c634c 802c5fec [ 158.467812] 1f60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 80c04cc8 006b1fd0 00000003 76f7a610 00000004 [ 158.468155] 1f80: 80100284 be2d000 be2d1fa4 be2d1f98 802c63ec 802c62e8 00000000 be2d1fa8 [ 158.468508] 1fa0: 80100080 802c63e0 006b1fd0 00000003 00000003 006b1fd0 0000002e 00000000 [ 158.468858] 1fc0: 006b1fd0 00000003 76f7a610 00000004 006b1fb0 0026d348 00000017 7ef2738c [ 158.469202] 1fe0: 76f3431c 7ef272d8 0014ec50 76f34338 60000010 00000003 00000000 00000000 [ 158.469461] Backtrace: [ 158.469683] [<80474504>] (fortify_panic) from [<8011e724>] (arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe+0x1b4/0x1f8) [ 158.470021] [<8011e570>] (arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe) from [<801cee44>] (alloc_aggr_kprobe+0x64/0x70) [ 158.470287] r9:be235000 r8:80c8ec80 r7:b9fe4f14 r6:00000000 r5:b9fe4f0c r4:b9e0b800 [ 158.470478] [<801cede0>] (alloc_aggr_kprobe) from [<801d0ad0>] (register_kprobe+0x3a4/0x5a0) [ 158.470685] r5:00000000 r4:b9fe4f0c [ 158.470790] [<801d072c>] (register_kprobe) from [<80204604>] (__register_trace_kprobe+0xa0/0xa4) [ 158.471001] r9:be235000 r8:00000000 r7:ffffffea r6:b9fe4f00 r5:00000000 r4:00000000 [ 158.471188] [<80204564>] (__register_trace_kprobe) from [<80205434>] (trace_kprobe_create+0x5ac/0x9ac) [ 158.471408] r7:ffffffea r6:b9fe4004 r5:00000000 r4:00000000 [ 158.471553] [<80204e88>] (trace_kprobe_create) from [<80205854>] (create_or_delete_trace_kprobe+0x20/0x3c) [ 158.471766] r10:be235000 r9:be235000 r8:0000002e r7:80205834 r6:80205834 r5:00000002 [ 158.471949] r4:b9e713c4 [ 158.472027] [<80205834>] (create_or_delete_trace_kprobe) from [<801ee4a0>] (trace_run_command+0x84/0x9c) [ 158.472255] [<801ee41c>] (trace_run_command) from [<801ee5c8>] (trace_parse_run_command+0x110/0x1f8) [ 158.472471] r6:00000000 r5:0000002e r4:0000002e [ 158.472594] [<801ee4b8>] (trace_parse_run_command) from [<8020442c>] (probes_write+0x1c/0x28) [ 158.472800] r10:00000004 r9:00000000 r8:be2d1f60 r7:006b1fd0 r6:80204410 r5:0000002e [ 158.472968] r4:b9eedf00 [ 158.473046] [<80204410>] (probes_write) from [<802c60ac>] (vfs_write+0xcc/0x1e8) [ 158.473226] [<802c5fe0>] (vfs_write) from [<802c634c>] (ksys_write+0x70/0xf8) [ 158.473400] r8:00000000 r7:0000002e r6:006b1fd0 r5:b9eedf00 r4:b9eedf00 [ 158.473567] [<802c62dc>] (ksys_write) from [<802c63ec>] (sys_write+0x18/0x1c) [ 158.473745] r9:be2d0000 r8:80100284 r7:00000004 r6:76f7a610 r5:00000003 r4:006b1fd0 [ 158.473932] [<802c63d4>] (sys_write) from [<80100080>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 158.474126] Exception stack(0xbe2d1fa8 to 0xbe2d1ff0) [ 158.474305] 1fa0: 006b1fd0 00000003 00000003 006b1fd0 0000002e 00000000 [ 158.474573] 1fc0: 006b1fd0 00000003 76f7a610 00000004 006b1fb0 0026d348 00000017 7ef2738c [ 158.474811] 1fe0: 76f3431c 7ef272d8 0014ec50 76f34338 [ 158.475171] Code: e24cb004 e1a01000 e59f0004 ebf40dd3 (e7f001f2) [ 158.475847] ---[ end trace 55a5b31c08a29f00 ]--- [ 158.476088] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 158.476375] CPU0: stopping [ 158.476709] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 5.9.0-rc7-00038-gc53ebf8167e9 torvalds#158 [ 158.477176] Hardware name: Generic DT based system [ 158.477411] Backtrace: [ 158.477604] [<8010dd28>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010dfd4>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [ 158.477990] r7:00000000 r6:60000193 r5:00000000 r4:80c2f634 [ 158.478323] [<8010dfb4>] (show_stack) from [<8046390c>] (dump_stack+0xcc/0xe8) [ 158.478686] [<80463840>] (dump_stack) from [<80110750>] (handle_IPI+0x334/0x3a0) [ 158.479063] r7:00000000 r6:00000004 r5:80b65cc8 r4:80c78278 [ 158.479352] [<8011041c>] (handle_IPI) from [<801013f8>] (gic_handle_irq+0x88/0x94) [ 158.479757] r10:10c5387d r9:80c01ed8 r8:00000000 r7:c0802000 r6:80c0537c r5:000003ff [ 158.480146] r4:c080200c r3:fffffff4 [ 158.480364] [<80101370>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80100b6c>] (__irq_svc+0x6c/0x90) [ 158.480748] Exception stack(0x80c01ed8 to 0x80c01f20) [ 158.481031] 1ec0: 000128bc 00000000 [ 158.481499] 1ee0: be7b8174 8011d3a0 80c00000 00000000 80c04cec 80c04d28 80c5d7c2 80a026d4 [ 158.482091] 1f00: 10c5387d 80c01f34 80c01f38 80c01f28 80109554 80109558 60000013 ffffffff [ 158.482621] r9:80c00000 r8:80c5d7c2 r7:80c01f0c r6:ffffffff r5:60000013 r4:80109558 [ 158.482983] [<80109518>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<80818780>] (default_idle_call+0x38/0x120) [ 158.483360] [<80818748>] (default_idle_call) from [<801585a8>] (do_idle+0xd4/0x158) [ 158.483945] r5:00000000 r4:80c00000 [ 158.484237] [<801584d4>] (do_idle) from [<801588f4>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x2c) [ 158.484784] r9:80c78000 r8:00000000 r7:80c78000 r6:80c78040 r5:80c04cc0 r4:000000d6 [ 158.485328] [<801588cc>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<80810a78>] (rest_init+0x9c/0xbc) [ 158.485930] [<808109dc>] (rest_init) from [<80b00ae4>] (arch_call_rest_init+0x18/0x1c) [ 158.486503] r5:80c04cc0 r4:00000001 [ 158.486857] [<80b00acc>] (arch_call_rest_init) from [<80b00fcc>] (start_kernel+0x46c/0x548) [ 158.487589] [<80b00b60>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0) ``` Fixes: e46daee ("ARM: 8806/1: kprobes: Fix false positive with FORTIFY_SOURCE") Fixes: 0ac569b ("ARM: 8834/1: Fix: kprobes: optimized kprobes illegal instruction") Suggested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <[email protected]> Tested-by: Luka Oreskovic <[email protected]> Tested-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Luka Oreskovic <[email protected]> Cc: Juraj Vijtiuk <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 092561f upstream. Commit 8fd0e2a ("uio: free uio id after uio file node is freed") triggered KASAN use-after-free failure at deletion of TCM-user backstores [1]. In uio_unregister_device(), struct uio_device *idev is passed to uio_free_minor() to refer idev->minor. However, before uio_free_minor() call, idev is already freed by uio_device_release() during call to device_unregister(). To avoid reference to idev->minor after idev free, keep idev->minor value in a local variable. Also modify uio_free_minor() argument to receive the value. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888105196508 by task targetcli/49158 CPU: 3 PID: 49158 Comm: targetcli Not tainted 5.10.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xae/0xe5 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x210 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190 kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7c ? kobject_put+0x80/0x410 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190 uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190 tcmu_destroy_device+0x1c4/0x280 [target_core_user] ? tcmu_release+0x90/0x90 [target_core_user] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xd6/0x5d0 target_free_device+0xf3/0x2e0 [target_core_mod] config_item_cleanup+0xea/0x210 configfs_rmdir+0x651/0x860 ? detach_groups.isra.0+0x380/0x380 vfs_rmdir.part.0+0xec/0x3a0 ? __lookup_hash+0x20/0x150 do_rmdir+0x252/0x320 ? do_file_open_root+0x420/0x420 ? strncpy_from_user+0xbc/0x2f0 ? getname_flags.part.0+0x8e/0x450 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f9e2bfc91fb Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 9d ec 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d ec 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdd2baafe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e2beb44a0 RCX: 00007f9e2bfc91fb RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f9e1c20be90 RBP: 00007ffdd2bab000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9e2bdf2440 R10: 00007ffdd2baaf37 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffff9c R13: 000055f9abb7e390 R14: 000055f9abcf9558 R15: 00007f9e2be7a780 Allocated by task 34735: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 __uio_register_device+0xeb/0xd40 tcmu_configure_device+0x5a0/0xbc0 [target_core_user] target_configure_device+0x12f/0x760 [target_core_mod] target_dev_enable_store+0x32/0x50 [target_core_mod] configfs_write_file+0x2bb/0x450 vfs_write+0x1ce/0x610 ksys_write+0xe9/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 49158: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0x110/0x150 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x5a/0x170 kfree+0xc6/0x560 device_release+0x9b/0x210 kobject_put+0x13e/0x410 uio_unregister_device+0xf9/0x190 tcmu_destroy_device+0x1c4/0x280 [target_core_user] target_free_device+0xf3/0x2e0 [target_core_mod] config_item_cleanup+0xea/0x210 configfs_rmdir+0x651/0x860 vfs_rmdir.part.0+0xec/0x3a0 do_rmdir+0x252/0x320 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888105196000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1288 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff888105196000, ffff888105196800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000098e6ca81 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x105190 head:0000000098e6ca81 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100043040 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff ffff88810eb55c01 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page->mem_cgroup:ffff88810eb55c01 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888105196400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888105196480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888105196500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888105196580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888105196600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 8fd0e2a ("uio: free uio id after uio file node is freed") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 22e4663 upstream. While doing memory hot-unplug operation on a PowerPC VM running 1024 CPUs with 11TB of ram, I hit the following panic: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000007 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000456048 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#2] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS= 2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp CPU: 160 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G D 5.9.0 #1 NIP: c000000000456048 LR: c000000000455fd4 CTR: c00000000047b350 REGS: c00006028d1b77a0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G D (5.9.0) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24004228 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000000f1b0 DAR: 0000000000000007 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c000000000455fd4 c00006028d1b7a30 c000000001bec800 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000dc0 0000000000000000 00000000000374ef c00007c53df99320 GPR08: 000007c53c980000 0000000000000000 000007c53c980000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000004400 c00000001e8e4400 0000000000000000 0000000000000f6a GPR16: 0000000000000000 c000000001c25930 c000000001d62528 00000000000000c1 GPR20: c000000001d62538 c00006be469e9000 0000000fffffffe0 c0000000003c0ff8 GPR24: 0000000000000018 0000000000000000 0000000000000dc0 0000000000000000 GPR28: c00007c513755700 c000000001c236a4 c00007bc4001f800 0000000000000001 NIP [c000000000456048] __kmalloc_node+0x108/0x790 LR [c000000000455fd4] __kmalloc_node+0x94/0x790 Call Trace: kvmalloc_node+0x58/0x110 mem_cgroup_css_online+0x10c/0x270 online_css+0x48/0xd0 cgroup_apply_control_enable+0x2c4/0x470 cgroup_mkdir+0x408/0x5f0 kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x90/0x100 vfs_mkdir+0x138/0x250 do_mkdirat+0x154/0x1c0 system_call_exception+0xf8/0x200 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c Instruction dump: e93e0000 e90d0030 39290008 7cc9402a e94d0030 e93e0000 7ce95214 7f89502a 2fbc0000 419e0018 41920230 e9270010 <89290007> 7f994800 419e0220 7ee6bb78 This pointing to the following code: mm/slub.c:2851 if (unlikely(!object || !node_match(page, node))) { c000000000456038: 00 00 bc 2f cmpdi cr7,r28,0 c00000000045603c: 18 00 9e 41 beq cr7,c000000000456054 <__kmalloc_node+0x114> node_match(): mm/slub.c:2491 if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && page_to_nid(page) != node) c000000000456040: 30 02 92 41 beq cr4,c000000000456270 <__kmalloc_node+0x330> page_to_nid(): include/linux/mm.h:1294 c000000000456044: 10 00 27 e9 ld r9,16(r7) c000000000456048: 07 00 29 89 lbz r9,7(r9) <<<< r9 = NULL node_match(): mm/slub.c:2491 c00000000045604c: 00 48 99 7f cmpw cr7,r25,r9 c000000000456050: 20 02 9e 41 beq cr7,c000000000456270 <__kmalloc_node+0x330> The panic occurred in slab_alloc_node() when checking for the page's node: object = c->freelist; page = c->page; if (unlikely(!object || !node_match(page, node))) { object = __slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, node, addr, c); stat(s, ALLOC_SLOWPATH); The issue is that object is not NULL while page is NULL which is odd but may happen if the cache flush happened after loading object but before loading page. Thus checking for the page pointer is required too. The cache flush is done through an inter processor interrupt when a piece of memory is off-lined. That interrupt is triggered when a memory hot-unplug operation is initiated and offline_pages() is calling the slub's MEM_GOING_OFFLINE callback slab_mem_going_offline_callback() which is calling flush_cpu_slab(). If that interrupt is caught between the reading of c->freelist and the reading of c->page, this could lead to such a situation. That situation is expected and the later call to this_cpu_cmpxchg_double() will detect the change to c->freelist and redo the whole operation. In commit 6159d0f ("mm/slub.c: page is always non-NULL in node_match()") check on the page pointer has been removed assuming that page is always valid when it is called. It happens that this is not true in that particular case, so check for page before calling node_match() here. Fixes: 6159d0f ("mm/slub.c: page is always non-NULL in node_match()") Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Wei Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]> Cc: Scott Cheloha <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit df5b0ab upstream. Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following error on reboot and shutdown: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm torvalds#110 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60 Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da <48> 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0 RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 Fixes: 1b3a5d0 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel") Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Fabian Frederick <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]> Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]> Cc: Robin Holt <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit e35df62 ] When running this chip on arm imx6, we intermittently observe the following kernel warning in the log, especially when the system is under high load: [ 50.119484] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 50.124377] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 303 at kernel/softirq.c:169 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x184 [ 50.132925] IRQs not enabled as expected [ 50.159250] CPU: 0 PID: 303 Comm: rngd Not tainted 5.7.8 #1 [ 50.164837] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) [ 50.171395] [<c0111a38>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010be28>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 50.179162] [<c010be28>] (show_stack) from [<c05b9dec>] (dump_stack+0xac/0xd8) [ 50.186408] [<c05b9dec>] (dump_stack) from [<c0122e40>] (__warn+0xd0/0x10c) [ 50.193391] [<c0122e40>] (__warn) from [<c0123238>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x98/0xc4) [ 50.200892] [<c0123238>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c012b010>] (__local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x184) [ 50.209860] [<c012b010>] (__local_bh_enable_ip) from [<bf09ecbc>] (destroy_conntrack+0x48/0xd8 [nf_conntrack]) [ 50.220038] [<bf09ecbc>] (destroy_conntrack [nf_conntrack]) from [<c0ac9b58>] (nf_conntrack_destroy+0x94/0x168) [ 50.230160] [<c0ac9b58>] (nf_conntrack_destroy) from [<c0a4aaa0>] (skb_release_head_state+0xa0/0xd0) [ 50.239314] [<c0a4aaa0>] (skb_release_head_state) from [<c0a4aadc>] (skb_release_all+0xc/0x24) [ 50.247946] [<c0a4aadc>] (skb_release_all) from [<c0a4b4cc>] (consume_skb+0x74/0x17c) [ 50.255796] [<c0a4b4cc>] (consume_skb) from [<c081a2dc>] (lan743x_tx_release_desc+0x120/0x124) [ 50.264428] [<c081a2dc>] (lan743x_tx_release_desc) from [<c081a98c>] (lan743x_tx_napi_poll+0x5c/0x18c) [ 50.273755] [<c081a98c>] (lan743x_tx_napi_poll) from [<c0a6b050>] (net_rx_action+0x118/0x4a4) [ 50.282306] [<c0a6b050>] (net_rx_action) from [<c0101364>] (__do_softirq+0x13c/0x53c) [ 50.290157] [<c0101364>] (__do_softirq) from [<c012b29c>] (irq_exit+0x150/0x17c) [ 50.297575] [<c012b29c>] (irq_exit) from [<c0196a08>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x60/0xb0) [ 50.305423] [<c0196a08>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c05d44fc>] (gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x90) [ 50.313790] [<c05d44fc>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100ed4>] (__irq_usr+0x54/0x80) [ 50.321287] Exception stack(0xecd99fb0 to 0xecd99ff8) [ 50.326355] 9fa0: 1cf1aa74 00000001 00000001 00000000 [ 50.334547] 9fc0: 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00004097 b6d17d14 [ 50.342738] 9fe0: 00000001 b6d17c60 00000000 b6e71f94 800b0010 ffffffff [ 50.349364] irq event stamp: 2525027 [ 50.352955] hardirqs last enabled at (2525026): [<c0a6afec>] net_rx_action+0xb4/0x4a4 [ 50.360892] hardirqs last disabled at (2525027): [<c0d6d2fc>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x50 [ 50.369517] softirqs last enabled at (2524660): [<c01015b4>] __do_softirq+0x38c/0x53c [ 50.377446] softirqs last disabled at (2524693): [<c012b29c>] irq_exit+0x150/0x17c [ 50.385027] ---[ end trace c0b571db4bc8087d ]--- The driver is calling dev_kfree_skb() from code inside a spinlock, where h/w interrupts are disabled. This is forbidden, as documented in include/linux/netdevice.h. The correct function to use dev_kfree_skb_irq(), or dev_kfree_skb_any(). Fix by using the correct dev_kfree_skb_xxx() functions: in lan743x_tx_release_desc(): called by lan743x_tx_release_completed_descriptors() called by in lan743x_tx_napi_poll() which holds a spinlock called by lan743x_tx_release_all_descriptors() called by lan743x_tx_close() which can-sleep conclusion: use dev_kfree_skb_any() in lan743x_tx_xmit_frame(): which holds a spinlock conclusion: use dev_kfree_skb_irq() in lan743x_tx_close(): which can-sleep conclusion: use dev_kfree_skb() in lan743x_rx_release_ring_element(): called by lan743x_rx_close() which can-sleep called by lan743x_rx_open() which can-sleep conclusion: use dev_kfree_skb() Fixes: 23f0703 ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver") Signed-off-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3d51794 ] When removing the driver we would hit BUG_ON(!list_empty(&dev->ptype_specific)) in net/core/dev.c due to still having the NC-SI packet handler registered. # echo 1e660000.ethernet > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/ftgmac100/unbind ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:10254! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM CPU: 0 PID: 115 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3-next-20201111-00007-g02e0365710c4 torvalds#46 Hardware name: Generic DT based system PC is at netdev_run_todo+0x314/0x394 LR is at cpumask_next+0x20/0x24 pc : [<806f5830>] lr : [<80863cb0>] psr: 80000153 sp : 855bbd58 ip : 00000001 fp : 855bbdac r10: 80c03d00 r9 : 80c06228 r8 : 81158c54 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 80c05dec r5 : 80c05d18 r4 : 813b9280 r3 : 813b9054 r2 : 8122c470 r1 : 00000002 r0 : 00000002 Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 00c5387d Table: 85514008 DAC: 00000051 Process sh (pid: 115, stack limit = 0x7cb5703d) ... Backtrace: [<806f551c>] (netdev_run_todo) from [<80707eec>] (rtnl_unlock+0x18/0x1c) r10:00000051 r9:854ed710 r8:81158c54 r7:80c76bb0 r6:81158c10 r5:8115b410 r4:813b9000 [<80707ed4>] (rtnl_unlock) from [<806f5db8>] (unregister_netdev+0x2c/0x30) [<806f5d8c>] (unregister_netdev) from [<805a8180>] (ftgmac100_remove+0x20/0xa8) r5:8115b410 r4:813b9000 [<805a8160>] (ftgmac100_remove) from [<805355e4>] (platform_drv_remove+0x34/0x4c) Fixes: bd466c3 ("net/faraday: Support NCSI mode") Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 1922a46 ] If a user unbinds and re-binds a NC-SI aware driver the kernel will attempt to register the netlink interface at runtime. The structure is marked __ro_after_init so registration fails spectacularly at this point. # echo 1e660000.ethernet > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/ftgmac100/unbind # echo 1e660000.ethernet > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/ftgmac100/bind ftgmac100 1e660000.ethernet: Read MAC address 52:54:00:12:34:56 from chip ftgmac100 1e660000.ethernet: Using NCSI interface 8<--- cut here --- Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 80a8f858 pgd = 8c768dd6 [80a8f858] *pgd=80a0841e(bad) Internal error: Oops: 80d [#1] SMP ARM CPU: 0 PID: 116 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3-next-20201111-00003-gdd25b227ec1e torvalds#51 Hardware name: Generic DT based system PC is at genl_register_family+0x1f8/0x6d4 LR is at 0xff26ffff pc : [<8073f930>] lr : [<ff26ffff>] psr: 20000153 sp : 8553bc80 ip : 81406244 fp : 8553bd04 r10: 8085d12c r9 : 80a8f73c r8 : 85739000 r7 : 00000017 r6 : 80a8f860 r5 : 80c8ab98 r4 : 80a8f858 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 81406130 r0 : 00000017 Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 00c5387d Table: 85524008 DAC: 00000051 Process sh (pid: 116, stack limit = 0x1f1988d6) ... Backtrace: [<8073f738>] (genl_register_family) from [<80860ac0>] (ncsi_init_netlink+0x20/0x48) r10:8085d12c r9:80c8fb0c r8:85739000 r7:00000000 r6:81218000 r5:85739000 r4:8121c000 [<80860aa0>] (ncsi_init_netlink) from [<8085d740>] (ncsi_register_dev+0x1b0/0x210) r5:8121c400 r4:8121c000 [<8085d590>] (ncsi_register_dev) from [<805a8060>] (ftgmac100_probe+0x6e0/0x778) r10:00000004 r9:80950228 r8:8115bc10 r7:8115ab00 r6:9eae2c24 r5:813b6f88 r4:85739000 [<805a7980>] (ftgmac100_probe) from [<805355ec>] (platform_drv_probe+0x58/0xa8) r9:80c76bb0 r8:00000000 r7:80cd4974 r6:80c76bb0 r5:8115bc10 r4:00000000 [<80535594>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<80532d58>] (really_probe+0x204/0x514) r7:80cd4974 r6:00000000 r5:80cd4868 r4:8115bc10 Jakub pointed out that ncsi_register_dev is obviously broken, because there is only one family so it would never work if there was more than one ncsi netdev. Fix the crash by registering the netlink family once on boot, and drop the code to unregister it. Fixes: 955dc68 ("net/ncsi: Add generic netlink family") Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit d412275 upstream. Speakup has only one speakup_tty variable to store the tty it is managing. This makes sense since its codebase currently assumes that there is only one user who controls the screen reading. That however means that we have to forbid using the line discipline several times, otherwise the second closure would try to free a NULL ldisc_data, leading to general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI RIP: 0010:spk_ttyio_ldisc_close+0x2c/0x60 Call Trace: tty_ldisc_release+0xa2/0x340 tty_release_struct+0x17/0xd0 tty_release+0x9d9/0xcc0 __fput+0x231/0x740 task_work_run+0x12c/0x1a0 do_exit+0x9b5/0x2230 ? release_task+0x1240/0x1240 ? __do_page_fault+0x562/0xa30 do_group_exit+0xd5/0x2a0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x35/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x89/0x2b0 ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: 秦世松 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shisong Qin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110183541.fzgnlwhjpgqzjeth@function Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 481535c upstream. fast_second_level_miss handler for the TLBTEMP area has an assumption that page table directory entry for the TLBTEMP address range is 0. For it to be true the TLBTEMP area must be aligned to 4MB boundary and not share its 4MB region with anything that may use a page table. This is not true currently: TLBTEMP shares space with vmalloc space which results in the following kinds of runtime errors when fast_second_level_miss loads page table directory entry for the vmalloc space instead of fixing up the TLBTEMP area: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address c7ff0e00 pc = d0009275, ra = 90009478 Oops: sig: 9 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 1 PID: 61 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3-next-20201110-00007-g1fe4962fa983-dirty #58 Workqueue: xprtiod xs_stream_data_receive_workfn a00: 90009478 d11e1dc0 c7ff0e00 00000020 c7ff0000 00000001 7f8b8107 00000000 a08: 900c5992 d11e1d9 d0cc88b8 5506e97c 00000000 5506e97c d06c8074 d11e1d9 pc: d0009275, ps: 00060310, depc: 00000014, excvaddr: c7ff0e00 lbeg: d0009275, lend: d0009287 lcount: 00000003, sar: 00000010 Call Trace: xs_stream_data_receive_workfn+0x43c/0x770 process_one_work+0x1a1/0x324 worker_thread+0x1cc/0x3c0 kthread+0x10d/0x124 ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0x18 Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 4349a83 upstream. Both btrfs and fuse have reported faults caused by seeing a retry entry instead of the page they were looking for. This was caused by a missing check in the iterator. As can be seen in the below panic log, the accessing 0x402 causes a panic. In the xarray.h, 0x402 means RETRY_ENTRY. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000402 CPU: 14 PID: 306003 Comm: as Not tainted 5.9.0-1-amd64 #1 Debian 5.9.1-1 Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR665/7D2VCTO1WW, BIOS D8E106Q-1.01 05/30/2020 RIP: 0010:fuse_readahead+0x152/0x470 [fuse] Code: 41 8b 57 18 4c 8d 54 10 ff 4c 89 d6 48 8d 7c 24 10 e8 d2 e3 28 f9 48 85 c0 0f 84 fe 00 00 00 44 89 f2 49 89 04 d4 44 8d 72 01 <48> 8b 10 41 8b 4f 1c 48 c1 ea 10 83 e2 01 80 fa 01 19 d2 81 e2 01 RSP: 0018:ffffad99ceaebc50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000402 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff94c5af90bd98 RDI: ffffad99ceaebc60 RBP: ffff94ddc1749a00 R08: 0000000000000402 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff94de6c429ce0 R13: ffff94de6c4d3700 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffad99ceaebd68 FS: 00007f228c5c7040(0000) GS:ffff94de8ed80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000402 CR3: 0000001dbd9b4000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: read_pages+0x83/0x270 page_cache_readahead_unbounded+0x197/0x230 generic_file_buffered_read+0x57a/0xa20 new_sync_read+0x112/0x1a0 vfs_read+0xf8/0x180 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 042124c ("mm: add new readahead_control API") Reported-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Reported-by: Wonhyuk Yang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 3d05cad upstream. Lockdep reported the following splat when running test btrfs/190 from fstests: [ 9482.126098] ====================================================== [ 9482.126184] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 9482.126281] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted [ 9482.126365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 9482.126456] mount/24187 is trying to acquire lock: [ 9482.126534] ffffa0c869a7dac0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.126647] but task is already holding lock: [ 9482.126777] ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.126886] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 9482.127078] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 9482.127213] -> #1 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}: [ 9482.127366] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.127436] down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 [ 9482.127528] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.127613] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x41/0x130 [btrfs] [ 9482.127702] btrfs_search_slot+0x514/0xc30 [btrfs] [ 9482.127788] update_qgroup_status_item+0x72/0x140 [btrfs] [ 9482.127877] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xde/0x680 [btrfs] [ 9482.127964] btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs] [ 9482.128039] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0 [ 9482.128110] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 [ 9482.128181] kthread+0x153/0x170 [ 9482.128256] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 9482.128327] -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 9482.128464] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 9482.128551] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 9482.128623] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.130029] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 9482.130590] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.131577] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs] [ 9482.132175] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs] [ 9482.132756] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] [ 9482.133325] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.133866] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.134392] fc_mount+0xe/0x40 [ 9482.134908] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 [ 9482.135428] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] [ 9482.135942] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.136444] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.136949] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70 [ 9482.137438] do_mount+0x75/0x90 [ 9482.137923] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 [ 9482.138400] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 9482.138873] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 9482.139346] other info that might help us debug this: [ 9482.140735] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 9482.141594] CPU0 CPU1 [ 9482.142011] ---- ---- [ 9482.142411] lock(btrfs-quota-00); [ 9482.142806] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); [ 9482.143216] lock(btrfs-quota-00); [ 9482.143629] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); [ 9482.144056] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 9482.145242] 2 locks held by mount/24187: [ 9482.145637] #0: ffffa0c8411c40e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb9/0x400 [ 9482.146061] #1: ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.146509] stack backtrace: [ 9482.147350] CPU: 1 PID: 24187 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 [ 9482.147788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 9482.148709] Call Trace: [ 9482.149169] dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 [ 9482.149628] check_noncircular+0xff/0x110 [ 9482.150090] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 9482.150561] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 9482.151017] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [ 9482.151470] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 9482.151941] ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.152402] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.152887] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.153354] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 9482.153826] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.154301] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.154768] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.155226] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.155690] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs] [ 9482.156160] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs] [ 9482.156643] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] [ 9482.157108] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [ 9482.157567] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0 [ 9482.158030] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.158489] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.158947] fc_mount+0xe/0x40 [ 9482.159403] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 [ 9482.159875] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] [ 9482.160335] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [ 9482.160805] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0 [ 9482.161260] ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.161714] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.162166] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.162616] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70 [ 9482.163070] do_mount+0x75/0x90 [ 9482.163525] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 [ 9482.163986] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 9482.164437] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 9482.164902] RIP: 0033:0x7f51e907caaa This happens because at btrfs_read_qgroup_config() we can call qgroup_rescan_init() while holding a read lock on a quota btree leaf, acquired by the previous call to btrfs_search_slot_for_read(), and qgroup_rescan_init() acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock. A qgroup rescan worker does the opposite: it acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock, at btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(), and then tries to update the qgroup status item in the quota btree through the call to update_qgroup_status_item(). This inversion of locking order between the qgroup_rescan_lock mutex and quota btree locks causes the splat. Fix this simply by releasing and freeing the path before calling qgroup_rescan_init() at btrfs_read_qgroup_config(). CC: [email protected] # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 75b4962 upstream. When accessing the ESB page of a source interrupt, the fault handler will retrieve the page address from the XIVE interrupt 'xive_irq_data' structure. If the associated KVM XIVE interrupt is not valid, that is not allocated at the HW level for some reason, the fault handler will dereference a NULL pointer leading to the oops below : WARNING: CPU: 40 PID: 59101 at arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c:259 xive_native_esb_fault+0xe4/0x240 [kvm] CPU: 40 PID: 59101 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-240.el8.ppc64le #1 NIP: c00800000e949fac LR: c00000000044b164 CTR: c00800000e949ec8 REGS: c000001f69617840 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W --------- - - (4.18.0-240.el8.ppc64le) MSR: 9000000000029033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 4404428 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000044b160 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000044b164 c000001f69617ac0 c00800000e96e000 c000001f69617c10 GPR04: 05faa2b21e000080 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 ffffffffffffffff GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 GPR12: c00800000e949ec8 c000001ffffd3400 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000001f5c065160 c000000001c76f90 GPR24: c000001f06f20000 c000001f5c065100 0000000000000008 c000001f0eb98c78 GPR28: c000001dcab40000 c000001dcab403d8 c000001f69617c10 0000000000000011 NIP [c00800000e949fac] xive_native_esb_fault+0xe4/0x240 [kvm] LR [c00000000044b164] __do_fault+0x64/0x220 Call Trace: [c000001f69617ac0] [0000000137a5dc20] 0x137a5dc20 (unreliable) [c000001f69617b50] [c00000000044b164] __do_fault+0x64/0x220 [c000001f69617b90] [c000000000453838] do_fault+0x218/0x930 [c000001f69617bf0] [c000000000456f50] __handle_mm_fault+0x350/0xdf0 [c000001f69617cd0] [c000000000457b1c] handle_mm_fault+0x12c/0x310 [c000001f69617d10] [c00000000007ef44] __do_page_fault+0x264/0xbb0 [c000001f69617df0] [c00000000007f8c8] do_page_fault+0x38/0xd0 [c000001f69617e30] [c00000000000a714] handle_page_fault+0x18/0x38 Instruction dump: 40c2fff0 7c2004ac 2fa90000 409e0118 73e90001 41820080 e8bd0008 7c2004ac 7ca90074 39400000 915c0000 7929d182 <0b090000> 2fa50000 419e0080 e89e0018 ---[ end trace 66c6ff034c53f64f ]--- xive-kvm: xive_native_esb_fault: accessing invalid ESB page for source 8 ! Fix that by checking the validity of the KVM XIVE interrupt structure. Fixes: 6520ca6 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Add a mapping for the source ESB pages") Cc: [email protected] # v5.2+ Reported-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <[email protected]> Tested-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit e773ca7 ] Actually, burst size is equal to '1 << desc->rqcfg.brst_size'. we should use burst size, not desc->rqcfg.brst_size. dma memcpy performance on Rockchip RV1126 @ 1512MHz A7, 1056MHz LPDDR3, 200MHz DMA: dmatest: /# echo dma0chan0 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/channel /# echo 4194304 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/test_buf_size /# echo 8 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/iterations /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/norandom /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/verbose /# echo 1 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/run dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #1: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #2: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #3: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #4: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #5: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #6: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #7: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #8: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 Before: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 48 iops 200338 KB/s (0) After this patch: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 179 iops 734873 KB/s (0) After this patch and increase dma clk to 400MHz: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 259 iops 1062929 KB/s (0) Signed-off-by: Sugar Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit eb9c4dd ] If, for some reason, the xusb PHY fails to probe, it leaves a dangling pointer attached to the platform device structure. This would normally be harmless, but the Tegra XHCI driver then goes and extract that pointer from the PHY device. Things go downhill from there: 8.752082] [004d554e5145533c] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 8.752085] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 8.752088] Modules linked in: max77620_regulator(E+) xhci_tegra(E+) sdhci_tegra(E+) xhci_hcd(E) sdhci_pltfm(E) cqhci(E) fixed(E) usbcore(E) scsi_mod(E) sdhci(E) host1x(E+) [ 8.752103] CPU: 4 PID: 158 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G S W E 5.9.0-rc7-00298-gf6337624c4fe #1980 [ 8.752105] Hardware name: NVIDIA Jetson TX2 Developer Kit (DT) [ 8.752108] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 8.752115] pc : kobject_put+0x1c/0x21c [ 8.752120] lr : put_device+0x20/0x30 [ 8.752121] sp : ffffffc012eb3840 [ 8.752122] x29: ffffffc012eb3840 x28: ffffffc010e82638 [ 8.752125] x27: ffffffc008d56440 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 8.752128] x25: ffffff81eb508200 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 8.752130] x23: ffffff81eb538800 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 8.752132] x21: 00000000fffffdfb x20: ffffff81eb538810 [ 8.752134] x19: 3d4d554e51455300 x18: 0000000000000020 [ 8.752136] x17: ffffffc008d00270 x16: ffffffc008d00c94 [ 8.752138] x15: 0000000000000004 x14: ffffff81ebd4ae90 [ 8.752140] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff81eb86a4e8 [ 8.752142] x11: ffffff81eb86a480 x10: ffffff81eb862fea [ 8.752144] x9 : ffffffc01055fb28 x8 : ffffff81eb86a4a8 [ 8.752146] x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 8.752148] x5 : ffffff81dff8bc38 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 8.752150] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000001 [ 8.752152] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : 3d4d554e51455300 [ 8.752155] Call trace: [ 8.752157] kobject_put+0x1c/0x21c [ 8.752160] put_device+0x20/0x30 [ 8.752164] tegra_xusb_padctl_put+0x24/0x3c [ 8.752170] tegra_xusb_probe+0x8b0/0xd10 [xhci_tegra] [ 8.752174] platform_drv_probe+0x60/0xb4 [ 8.752176] really_probe+0xf0/0x504 [ 8.752179] driver_probe_device+0x100/0x170 [ 8.752181] device_driver_attach+0xcc/0xd4 [ 8.752183] __driver_attach+0xb0/0x17c [ 8.752185] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xd4 [ 8.752187] driver_attach+0x30/0x3c [ 8.752189] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x250 [ 8.752191] driver_register+0x84/0x140 [ 8.752193] __platform_driver_register+0x54/0x60 [ 8.752197] tegra_xusb_init+0x40/0x1000 [xhci_tegra] [ 8.752201] do_one_initcall+0x54/0x2d0 [ 8.752205] do_init_module+0x68/0x29c [ 8.752207] load_module+0x2178/0x26c0 [ 8.752209] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb0/0x120 [ 8.752211] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x40 [ 8.752215] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x80/0x240 [ 8.752218] do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa0 [ 8.752220] el0_svc+0x18/0x50 [ 8.752223] el0_sync_handler+0x90/0x318 [ 8.752225] el0_sync+0x158/0x180 [ 8.752230] Code: a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 aa0003f3 (3940f000) [ 8.752232] ---[ end trace 90f6c89d62d85ff5 ]--- Reset the pointer on probe failure fixes the issue. Fixes: 53d2a71 ("phy: Add Tegra XUSB pad controller support") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 6f23277 ] [BUG] When running the following script, btrfs will trigger an ASSERT(): #/bin/bash mkfs.btrfs -f $dev mount $dev $mnt xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1G" $mnt/file sync btrfs quota enable $mnt btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt # Manually set the limit below current usage btrfs qgroup limit 512M $mnt $mnt # Crash happens touch $mnt/file The dmesg looks like this: assertion failed: refcount_read(&trans->use_count) == 1, in fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2022 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3230! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x1a [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction.cold+0x11/0x5d [btrfs] try_flush_qgroup+0x67/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta+0x3a/0x60 [btrfs] btrfs_delayed_update_inode+0xaa/0x350 [btrfs] btrfs_update_inode+0x9d/0x110 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xd0 [btrfs] touch_atime+0xb5/0x100 iterate_dir+0xf1/0x1b0 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x110 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fb5afe588db [CAUSE] In try_flush_qgroup(), we assume we don't hold a transaction handle at all. This is true for data reservation and mostly true for metadata. Since data space reservation always happens before we start a transaction, and for most metadata operation we reserve space in start_transaction(). But there is an exception, btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata(). It holds a transaction handle, while still trying to reserve extra metadata space. When we hit EDQUOT inside btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata(), we will join current transaction and commit, while we still have transaction handle from qgroup code. [FIX] Let's check current->journal before we join the transaction. If current->journal is unset or BTRFS_SEND_TRANS_STUB, it means we are not holding a transaction, thus are able to join and then commit transaction. If current->journal is a valid transaction handle, we avoid committing transaction and just end it This is less effective than committing current transaction, as it won't free metadata reserved space, but we may still free some data space before new data writes. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1178634 Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT") Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit cef3970 ] Stefan Agner reported a bug when using zsram on 32-bit Arm machines with RAM above the 4GB address boundary: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = a27bd01c [00000000] *pgd=236a0003, *pmd=1ffa64003 Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: mdio_bcm_unimac(+) brcmfmac cfg80211 brcmutil raspberrypi_hwmon hci_uart crc32_arm_ce bcm2711_thermal phy_generic genet CPU: 0 PID: 123 Comm: mkfs.ext4 Not tainted 5.9.6 #1 Hardware name: BCM2711 PC is at zs_map_object+0x94/0x338 LR is at zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64 pc : [<c0602b38>] lr : [<c0bda6a0>] psr: 60000013 sp : e376bbe0 ip : 00000000 fp : c1e2921c r10: 00000002 r9 : c1dda730 r8 : 00000000 r7 : e8ff7a00 r6 : 00000000 r5 : 02f9ffa0 r4 : e3710000 r3 : 000fdffe r2 : c1e0ce80 r1 : ebf979a0 r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 30c5383d Table: 235c2a80 DAC: fffffffd Process mkfs.ext4 (pid: 123, stack limit = 0x495a22e6) Stack: (0xe376bbe0 to 0xe376c000) As it turns out, zsram needs to know the maximum memory size, which is defined in MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS when CONFIG_SPARSEMEM is set, or in MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS on the x86 architecture. The same problem will be hit on all 32-bit architectures that have a physical address space larger than 4GB and happen to not enable sparsemem and include asm/sparsemem.h from asm/pgtable.h. After the initial discussion, I suggested just always defining MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS whenever CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT is set, or provoking a build error otherwise. This addresses all configurations that can currently have this runtime bug, but leaves all other configurations unchanged. I looked up the possible number of bits in source code and datasheets, here is what I found: - on ARC, CONFIG_ARC_HAS_PAE40 controls whether 32 or 40 bits are used - on ARM, CONFIG_LPAE enables 40 bit addressing, without it we never support more than 32 bits, even though supersections in theory allow up to 40 bits as well. - on MIPS, some MIPS32r1 or later chips support 36 bits, and MIPS32r5 XPA supports up to 60 bits in theory, but 40 bits are more than anyone will ever ship - On PowerPC, there are three different implementations of 36 bit addressing, but 32-bit is used without CONFIG_PTE_64BIT - On RISC-V, the normal page table format can support 34 bit addressing. There is no highmem support on RISC-V, so anything above 2GB is unused, but it might be useful to eventually support CONFIG_ZRAM for high pages. Fixes: 61989a8 ("staging: zsmalloc: zsmalloc memory allocation library") Fixes: 02390b8 ("mm/zsmalloc: Prepare to variable MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS") Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Agner <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stefan Agner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/bdfa44bf1c570b05d6c70898e2bbb0acf234ecdf.1604762181.git.stefan@agner.ch/ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a0faaa2 ] adapter->tx_scrq and adapter->rx_scrq could be NULL if the previous reset did not complete after freeing sub crqs. Check for NULL before dereferencing them. Snippet of call trace: ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Releasing sub-CRQ ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Releasing CRQ ... ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Got Control IP offload Response ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Re-setting tx_scrq[0] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000003dea7cc Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables xsk_diag tcp_diag udp_diag raw_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag tun bridge stp llc rfkill sunrpc pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio binfmt_misc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmvnic ibmveth scsi_transport_srp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod CPU: 80 PID: 1856 Comm: kworker/80:2 Tainted: G W 5.8.0+ #4 Workqueue: events __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic] NIP: c008000003dea7cc LR: c008000003dea7bc CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000007ef7db860 TRAP: 0380 Tainted: G W (5.8.0+) MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28002422 XER: 0000000d CFAR: c000000000bd9520 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c008000003dea7bc c0000007ef7dbaf0 c008000003df7400 c0000007fa26ec00 GPR04: c0000007fcd0d008 c0000007fcd96350 0000000000000027 c0000007fcd0d010 GPR08: 0000000000000023 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000002000 c00000001ec18e00 c0000000001982f8 c0000007bad6e840 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffef7 GPR24: 0000000000000402 c0000007fa26f3a8 0000000000000003 c00000016f8ec048 GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000007fa26ec00 NIP [c008000003dea7cc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x15c/0x258 [ibmvnic] LR [c008000003dea7bc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x14c/0x258 [ibmvnic] Call Trace: [c0000007ef7dbaf0] [c008000003dea7bc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x14c/0x258 [ibmvnic] (unreliable) [c0000007ef7dbb80] [c008000003de8860] __ibmvnic_reset+0x408/0x970 [ibmvnic] [c0000007ef7dbc50] [c00000000018b7cc] process_one_work+0x2cc/0x800 [c0000007ef7dbd20] [c00000000018bd78] worker_thread+0x78/0x520 [c0000007ef7dbdb0] [c0000000001984c4] kthread+0x1d4/0x1e0 [c0000007ef7dbe20] [c00000000000cea8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74 Fixes: 57a4943 ("ibmvnic: Reset sub-crqs during driver reset") Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 0e435be ] crq->msgs could be NULL if the previous reset did not complete after freeing crq->msgs. Check for NULL before dereferencing them. Snippet of call trace: ... ibmvnic 30000003 env3 (unregistering): Releasing sub-CRQ ibmvnic 30000003 env3 (unregistering): Releasing CRQ BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000c1a30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: ibmvnic(E-) rpadlpar_io rpaphp xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables xsk_diag tcp_diag udp_diag tun raw_diag inet_diag unix_diag bridge af_packet_diag netlink_diag stp llc rfkill sunrpc pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio binfmt_misc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: ibmvnic] CPU: 20 PID: 8426 Comm: kworker/20:0 Tainted: G E 5.10.0-rc1+ torvalds#12 Workqueue: events __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic] NIP: c0000000000c1a30 LR: c008000001b00c18 CTR: 0000000000000400 REGS: c00000000d05b7a0 TRAP: 0380 Tainted: G E (5.10.0-rc1+) MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002480 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000000c19ec IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000400 c00000000d05ba30 c008000001b17c00 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000000001e2 GPR08: 000000000001f400 ffffffffffffd950 0000000000000000 c008000001b0b280 GPR12: c0000000000c19c8 c00000001ec72e00 c00000000019a778 c00000002647b440 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000006 0000000000000001 0000000000000003 0000000000000002 GPR24: 0000000000001000 c008000001b0d570 0000000000000005 c00000007ab5d550 GPR28: c00000007ab5c000 c000000032fcf848 c00000007ab5cc00 c000000032fcf800 NIP [c0000000000c1a30] memset+0x68/0x104 LR [c008000001b00c18] ibmvnic_reset_crq+0x70/0x110 [ibmvnic] Call Trace: [c00000000d05ba30] [0000000000000800] 0x800 (unreliable) [c00000000d05bab0] [c008000001b0a930] do_reset.isra.40+0x224/0x634 [ibmvnic] [c00000000d05bb80] [c008000001b08574] __ibmvnic_reset+0x17c/0x3c0 [ibmvnic] [c00000000d05bc50] [c00000000018d9ac] process_one_work+0x2cc/0x800 [c00000000d05bd20] [c00000000018df58] worker_thread+0x78/0x520 [c00000000d05bdb0] [c00000000019a934] kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0 [c00000000d05be20] [c00000000000d5d0] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c Fixes: 032c5e8 ("Driver for IBM System i/p VNIC protocol") Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Sorry for all the reverts. Just trying to get my head round this whole pull/branch/commit/push cycle.