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This changes also enabled support of OpenSSL 3 via `openssl` PortGroup for `retdec-devel`. Anyway, `v4.0` is shipped with OpenSSL 1.1.1 and should be build against OpenSSL 1.1 branch. Fixes: https://trac.macports.org/ticket/63882
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ | ||
| commit 3dbe9deaf35ad423769104db70dd062dba2973cc | ||
| Author: Kirill A. Korinsky <[email protected]> | ||
| Date: Mon Nov 8 11:48:09 2021 +0100 | ||
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| Update API for OpenSSL 3.0 | ||
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| Fixes: https://github.com/avast/retdec/issues/1040 | ||
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| diff --git a/deps/authenticode-parser/src/authenticode.c b/deps/authenticode-parser/src/authenticode.c | ||
| index bd860fe3..724b64f9 100644 | ||
| --- a/deps/authenticode-parser/src/authenticode.c | ||
| +++ b/deps/authenticode-parser/src/authenticode.c | ||
| @@ -581,7 +581,11 @@ AuthenticodeArray* parse_authenticode(const uint8_t* pe_data, long pe_len) | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
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| +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL | ||
| + int mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md); | ||
| +#else | ||
| int mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); | ||
| +#endif | ||
| sig->file_digest.len = mdlen; | ||
| sig->file_digest.data = (uint8_t*)malloc(mdlen); | ||
| if (!sig->file_digest.data) | ||
| diff --git a/deps/authenticode-parser/src/certificate.c b/deps/authenticode-parser/src/certificate.c | ||
| index 7686c516..2f1a4f0c 100644 | ||
| --- a/deps/authenticode-parser/src/certificate.c | ||
| +++ b/deps/authenticode-parser/src/certificate.c | ||
| @@ -287,7 +287,11 @@ Certificate* certificate_new(X509* x509) | ||
| EVP_PKEY* pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509); | ||
| if (pkey) { | ||
| result->key = pubkey_to_pem(pkey); | ||
| +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL | ||
| + result->key_alg = strdup(OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_get_base_id(pkey))); | ||
| +#else | ||
| result->key_alg = strdup(OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey))); | ||
| +#endif | ||
| } | ||
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| return result; | ||
| diff --git a/deps/authenticode-parser/src/countersignature.c b/deps/authenticode-parser/src/countersignature.c | ||
| index 5bc2c108..59ca8038 100644 | ||
| --- a/deps/authenticode-parser/src/countersignature.c | ||
| +++ b/deps/authenticode-parser/src/countersignature.c | ||
| @@ -137,7 +137,11 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new( | ||
| * but other times it is just purely and I didn't find another way to distinguish it but only | ||
| * based on the length of data we get. Found mention of this in openssl mailing list: | ||
| * https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2015-September/002054.html */ | ||
| +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL | ||
| + size_t mdLen = EVP_MD_get_size(md); | ||
| +#else | ||
| size_t mdLen = EVP_MD_size(md); | ||
| +#endif | ||
| if (mdLen == decLen) { | ||
| isValid = !memcmp(calc_digest, decData, mdLen); | ||
| } else { | ||
| @@ -238,7 +242,11 @@ Countersignature* ms_countersig_new(const uint8_t* data, long size, ASN1_STRING* | ||
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| uint8_t calc_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | ||
| calculate_digest(md, enc_digest->data, enc_digest->length, calc_digest); | ||
| +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL | ||
| + int mdLen = EVP_MD_get_size(md); | ||
| +#else | ||
| int mdLen = EVP_MD_size(md); | ||
| +#endif | ||
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| if (digestLen != mdLen || memcmp(calc_digest, digestData, mdLen) != 0) { | ||
| result->verify_flags = COUNTERSIGNATURE_VFY_DOESNT_MATCH_SIGNATURE; | ||
| @@ -251,7 +259,11 @@ Countersignature* ms_countersig_new(const uint8_t* data, long size, ASN1_STRING* | ||
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| TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(ctx, TS_VFY_VERSION | TS_VFY_IMPRINT); | ||
| TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, store); | ||
| +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL | ||
| + TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, p7->d.sign->cert); | ||
| +#else | ||
| TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(ctx, p7->d.sign->cert); | ||
| +#endif | ||
| TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(ctx, calc_digest, mdLen); | ||
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| bool isValid = TS_RESP_verify_token(ctx, p7) == 1; |