initial commit of extracted grsecurity chroot hardening #1

andyrj · 2017-05-04T00:49:18Z

closing to move this PR to it's own branch based on origin/4.11 to have a clean separation of this extraction

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

Taken from PaX. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

At least when CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION is enabled. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

Based on the grsecurity feature, but with a per-cache random value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they're only designed to detect write overflows and are overly complex. A single inline branch works for everything but strncat while those intrinsics would force the creation of a bunch of extra non-inline wrappers that aren't able to receive the detected source buffer size. As a future improvement, the fortified string functions can place a limit on reads from the source. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

…_ethtool.c

…ioc.c

…e/qlge_dbg.c

…/mesh.c

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

From the configuration option: Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing some performance and memory usage for security. Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY. Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero byte and provide basic double-free detection. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

In the 5.3 merge window, commit 7c7e301 ("btrfs: sysfs: Replace default_attrs in ktypes with groups"), we started using the member "defaults_groups" for the kobject type "btrfs_raid_ktype". That leads to a series of warnings when running some test cases of fstests, such as btrfs/027, btrfs/124 and btrfs/176. The traces produced by those warnings are like the following: [116648.059212] kernfs: can not remove 'total_bytes', no directory [116648.060112] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 28500 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1504 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x75/0x80 (...) [116648.066482] CPU: 3 PID: 28500 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-54 GrapheneOS#1 (...) [116648.069376] RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x75/0x80 (...) [116648.072385] RSP: 0018:ffffabfd0090bd08 EFLAGS: 00010282 [116648.073437] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0c11998 RCX: 0000000000000000 [116648.074201] RDX: ffff9fff603a7a00 RSI: ffff9fff603978a8 RDI: ffff9fff603978a8 [116648.074956] RBP: ffffffffc0b9ca2f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [116648.075708] R10: ffff9ffe1f72e1c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffc0b94120 [116648.076434] R13: ffffffffb3d9b4e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dead000000000100 [116648.077143] FS: 00007f9cdc78a2c0(0000) GS:ffff9fff60380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [116648.077852] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [116648.078546] CR2: 00007f9fc4747ab4 CR3: 00000005c7832003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [116648.079235] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [116648.079907] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [116648.080585] Call Trace: [116648.081262] remove_files+0x31/0x70 [116648.081929] sysfs_remove_group+0x38/0x80 [116648.082596] sysfs_remove_groups+0x34/0x70 [116648.083258] kobject_del+0x20/0x60 [116648.083933] btrfs_free_block_groups+0x405/0x430 [btrfs] [116648.084608] close_ctree+0x19a/0x380 [btrfs] [116648.085278] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x110 [116648.085951] kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30 [116648.086621] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0xa0 [btrfs] [116648.087289] deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x70 [116648.087956] cleanup_mnt+0xb4/0x160 [116648.088620] task_work_run+0x7e/0xc0 [116648.089285] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xfa/0x100 [116648.089933] do_syscall_64+0x1cb/0x220 [116648.090567] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [116648.091197] RIP: 0033:0x7f9cdc073b37 (...) [116648.100046] ---[ end trace 22e24db328ccadf8 ]--- [116648.100618] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [116648.101175] kernfs: can not remove 'used_bytes', no directory [116648.101731] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 28500 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1504 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x75/0x80 (...) [116648.105649] CPU: 3 PID: 28500 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-54 GrapheneOS#1 (...) [116648.107461] RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x75/0x80 (...) [116648.109336] RSP: 0018:ffffabfd0090bd08 EFLAGS: 00010282 [116648.109979] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0c119a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [116648.110625] RDX: ffff9fff603a7a00 RSI: ffff9fff603978a8 RDI: ffff9fff603978a8 [116648.111283] RBP: ffffffffc0b9ca41 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [116648.111940] R10: ffff9ffe1f72e1c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffc0b94120 [116648.112603] R13: ffffffffb3d9b4e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dead000000000100 [116648.113268] FS: 00007f9cdc78a2c0(0000) GS:ffff9fff60380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [116648.113939] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [116648.114607] CR2: 00007f9fc4747ab4 CR3: 00000005c7832003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [116648.115286] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [116648.115966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [116648.116649] Call Trace: [116648.117326] remove_files+0x31/0x70 [116648.117997] sysfs_remove_group+0x38/0x80 [116648.118671] sysfs_remove_groups+0x34/0x70 [116648.119342] kobject_del+0x20/0x60 [116648.120022] btrfs_free_block_groups+0x405/0x430 [btrfs] [116648.120707] close_ctree+0x19a/0x380 [btrfs] [116648.121396] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x110 [116648.122057] kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30 [116648.122702] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0xa0 [btrfs] [116648.123335] deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x70 [116648.123961] cleanup_mnt+0xb4/0x160 [116648.124586] task_work_run+0x7e/0xc0 [116648.125210] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xfa/0x100 [116648.125830] do_syscall_64+0x1cb/0x220 [116648.126463] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [116648.127080] RIP: 0033:0x7f9cdc073b37 (...) [116648.135923] ---[ end trace 22e24db328ccadf9 ]--- These happen because, during the unmount path, we call kobject_del() for raid kobjects that are not fully initialized, meaning that we set their ktype (as btrfs_raid_ktype) through link_block_group() but we didn't set their parent kobject, which is done through btrfs_add_raid_kobjects(). We have this split raid kobject setup since commit 75cb379 ("btrfs: defer adding raid type kobject until after chunk relocation") in order to avoid triggering reclaim during contextes where we can not (either we are holding a transaction handle or some lock required by the transaction commit path), so that we do the calls to kobject_add(), which triggers GFP_KERNEL allocations, through btrfs_add_raid_kobjects() in contextes where it is safe to trigger reclaim. That change expected that a new raid kobject can only be created either when mounting the filesystem or after raid profile conversion through the relocation path. However, we can have new raid kobject created in other two cases at least: 1) During device replace (or scrub) after adding a device a to the filesystem. The replace procedure (and scrub) do calls to btrfs_inc_block_group_ro() which can allocate a new block group with a new raid profile (because we now have more devices). This can be triggered by test cases btrfs/027 and btrfs/176. 2) During a degraded mount trough any write path. This can be triggered by test case btrfs/124. Fixing this by adding extra calls to btrfs_add_raid_kobjects(), not only makes things more complex and fragile, can also introduce deadlocks with reclaim the following way: 1) Calling btrfs_add_raid_kobjects() at btrfs_inc_block_group_ro() or anywhere in the replace/scrub path will cause a deadlock with reclaim because if reclaim happens and a transaction commit is triggered, the transaction commit path will block at btrfs_scrub_pause(). 2) During degraded mounts it is essentially impossible to figure out where to add extra calls to btrfs_add_raid_kobjects(), because allocation of a block group with a new raid profile can happen anywhere, which means we can't safely figure out which contextes are safe for reclaim, as we can either hold a transaction handle or some lock needed by the transaction commit path. So it is too complex and error prone to have this split setup of raid kobjects. So fix the issue by consolidating the setup of the kobjects in a single place, at link_block_group(), and setup a nofs context there in order to prevent reclaim being triggered by the memory allocations done through the call chain of kobject_add(). Besides fixing the sysfs warnings during kobject_del(), this also ensures the sysfs directories for the new raid profiles end up created and visible to users (a bug that existed before the 5.3 commit 7c7e301 ("btrfs: sysfs: Replace default_attrs in ktypes with groups")). Fixes: 75cb379 ("btrfs: defer adding raid type kobject until after chunk relocation") Fixes: 7c7e301 ("btrfs: sysfs: Replace default_attrs in ktypes with groups") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

If a rule that has already a bound anonymous set fails to be added, the preparation phase releases the rule and the bound set. However, the transaction object from the abort path still has a reference to the set object that is stale, leading to a use-after-free when checking for the set->bound field. Add a new field to the transaction that specifies if the set is bound, so the abort path can skip releasing it since the rule command owns it and it takes care of releasing it. After this update, the set->bound field is removed. [ 24.649883] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000040434 [ 24.657858] Mem abort info: [ 24.660686] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 24.663769] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 24.669725] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 24.672804] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 24.675975] Data abort info: [ 24.678880] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 24.682743] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 24.685723] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000428952000 [ 24.692207] [0000000000040434] pgd=0000000000000000 [ 24.697119] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP [...] [ 24.889414] Call trace: [ 24.891870] __nf_tables_abort+0x3f0/0x7a0 [ 24.895984] nf_tables_abort+0x20/0x40 [ 24.899750] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x17c/0x588 [ 24.904037] nfnetlink_rcv+0x13c/0x190 [ 24.907803] netlink_unicast+0x18c/0x208 [ 24.911742] netlink_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x350 [ 24.915682] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x68 [ 24.919185] ___sys_sendmsg+0x288/0x2c8 [ 24.923037] __sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0 [ 24.926628] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.930744] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x94/0x158 [ 24.935556] el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x90 [ 24.939322] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 24.942216] Code: 37280300 f9404023 91014262 aa1703e0 (f9401863) [ 24.948336] ---[ end trace cebbb9dcbed3b56f ]--- Fixes: f6ac858 ("netfilter: nf_tables: unbind set in rule from commit path") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== Fix collisions in socket cookie generation This change makes the socket cookie generator as a global counter instead of per netns in order to fix cookie collisions for BPF use cases we ran into. See main patch GrapheneOS#1 for more details. Given the change is small/trivial and fixes an issue we're seeing my preference would be net tree (though it cleanly applies to net-next as well). Went for net tree instead of bpf tree here given the main change is in net/core/sock_diag.c, but either way would be fine with me. v1 -> v2: - Fix up commit description in patch GrapheneOS#1, thanks Eric! ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

The dsa framework has optional .port_mdb_{prepare,add,del} callback fields for drivers to handle multicast database entries. When adding an entry, the framework goes through a prepare phase, then a commit phase. Drivers not providing these callbacks should be detected in the prepare phase. DSA core may still bypass the bridge layer and call the dsa_port_mdb_add function directly with no prepare phase or no switchdev trans object, and the framework ends up calling an undefined .port_mdb_add callback. This results in a NULL pointer dereference, as shown in the log below. The other functions seem to be properly guarded. Do the same for .port_mdb_add in dsa_switch_mdb_add_bitmap() as well. 8<--- cut here --- Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = (ptrval) [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: rtl8xxxu rtl8192cu rtl_usb rtl8192c_common rtlwifi mac80211 cfg80211 CPU: 1 PID: 134 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-00247-gd3519030752a GrapheneOS#1 Hardware name: Allwinner sun7i (A20) Family Workqueue: events switchdev_deferred_process_work PC is at 0x0 LR is at dsa_switch_event+0x570/0x620 pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<c08533ec>] psr: 80070013 sp : ee871db8 ip : 00000000 fp : ee98d0a4 r10: 0000000c r9 : 00000008 r8 : ee89f710 r7 : ee98d040 r6 : ee98d088 r5 : c0f04c48 r4 : ee98d04c r3 : 00000000 r2 : ee89f710 r1 : 00000008 r0 : ee98d040 Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: 6deb406a DAC: 00000051 Process kworker/1:2 (pid: 134, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) Stack: (0xee871db8 to 0xee872000) 1da0: ee871e14 103ace2d 1dc0: 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 ee871e14 00000005 00000000 c08524a0 00000000 1de0: ffffe000 c014bdfc c0f04c48 ee871e98 c0f04c48 ee9e5000 c0851120 c014bef0 1e00: 00000000 b643aea2 ee9b4068 c08509a8 ee2bf940 ee89f710 ee871ecb 00000000 1e20: 00000008 103ace2d 00000000 c087e248 ee29c868 103ace2d 00000001 ffffffff 1e40: 00000000 ee871e98 00000006 00000000 c0fb2a50 c087e2d0 ffffffff c08523c4 1e60: ffffffff c014bdfc 00000006 c0fad2d0 ee871e98 ee89f710 00000000 c014c500 1e80: 00000000 ee89f3c0 c0f04c48 00000000 ee9e5000 c087dfb4 ee9e5000 00000000 1ea0: ee89f710 ee871ecb 00000001 103ace2d 00000000 c0f04c48 00000000 c087e0a8 1ec0: 00000000 efd9a3e0 0089f3c0 103ace2d ee89f700 ee89f710 ee9e5000 00000122 1ee0: 00000100 c087e130 ee89f700 c0fad2c8 c1003ef0 c087de4c 2e928000 c0fad2ec 1f00: c0fad2ec ee839580 ef7a62c0 ef7a9400 00000000 c087def8 c0fad2ec c01447dc 1f20: ef315640 ef7a62c0 00000008 ee839580 ee839594 ef7a62c0 00000008 c0f03d00 1f40: ef7a62d8 ef7a62c0 ffffe000 c0145b84 ffffe000 c0fb2420 c0bfaa8c 00000000 1f60: ffffe000 ee84b600 ee84b5c0 00000000 ee870000 ee839580 c0145b40 ef0e5ea4 1f80: ee84b61c c014a6f8 00000001 ee84b5c0 c014a5b0 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c01010e8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [<c08533ec>] (dsa_switch_event) from [<c014bdfc>] (notifier_call_chain+0x48/0x84) [<c014bdfc>] (notifier_call_chain) from [<c014bef0>] (raw_notifier_call_chain+0x18/0x20) [<c014bef0>] (raw_notifier_call_chain) from [<c08509a8>] (dsa_port_mdb_add+0x48/0x74) [<c08509a8>] (dsa_port_mdb_add) from [<c087e248>] (__switchdev_handle_port_obj_add+0x54/0xd4) [<c087e248>] (__switchdev_handle_port_obj_add) from [<c087e2d0>] (switchdev_handle_port_obj_add+0x8/0x14) [<c087e2d0>] (switchdev_handle_port_obj_add) from [<c08523c4>] (dsa_slave_switchdev_blocking_event+0x94/0xa4) [<c08523c4>] (dsa_slave_switchdev_blocking_event) from [<c014bdfc>] (notifier_call_chain+0x48/0x84) [<c014bdfc>] (notifier_call_chain) from [<c014c500>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68) [<c014c500>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c087dfb4>] (switchdev_port_obj_notify+0x44/0xa8) [<c087dfb4>] (switchdev_port_obj_notify) from [<c087e0a8>] (switchdev_port_obj_add_now+0x90/0x104) [<c087e0a8>] (switchdev_port_obj_add_now) from [<c087e130>] (switchdev_port_obj_add_deferred+0x14/0x5c) [<c087e130>] (switchdev_port_obj_add_deferred) from [<c087de4c>] (switchdev_deferred_process+0x64/0x104) [<c087de4c>] (switchdev_deferred_process) from [<c087def8>] (switchdev_deferred_process_work+0xc/0x14) [<c087def8>] (switchdev_deferred_process_work) from [<c01447dc>] (process_one_work+0x218/0x50c) [<c01447dc>] (process_one_work) from [<c0145b84>] (worker_thread+0x44/0x5bc) [<c0145b84>] (worker_thread) from [<c014a6f8>] (kthread+0x148/0x150) [<c014a6f8>] (kthread) from [<c01010e8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) Exception stack(0xee871fb0 to 0xee871ff8) 1fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 1292c61abd17b130 ]--- [<c08533ec>] (dsa_switch_event) from [<c014bdfc>] (notifier_call_chain+0x48/0x84) corresponds to $ arm-linux-gnueabihf-addr2line -C -i -e vmlinux c08533ec linux/net/dsa/switch.c:156 linux/net/dsa/switch.c:178 linux/net/dsa/switch.c:328 Fixes: e6db98d ("net: dsa: add switch mdb bitmap functions") Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vivien Didelot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Call to uverbs_close_fd() releases file pointer to 'ev_file' and mlx5_ib_dev is going to be inaccessible. Cache pointer prior cleaning resources to solve the KASAN warning below. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in devx_async_event_close+0x391/0x480 [mlx5_ib] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888301e3cec0 by task devx_direct_tes/4631 CPU: 1 PID: 4631 Comm: devx_direct_tes Tainted: G OE 5.3.0-rc1-for-upstream-dbg-2019-07-26_01-19-56-93 GrapheneOS#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x9a/0xeb print_address_description+0x1e2/0x400 ? devx_async_event_close+0x391/0x480 [mlx5_ib] __kasan_report+0x15c/0x1df ? devx_async_event_close+0x391/0x480 [mlx5_ib] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 devx_async_event_close+0x391/0x480 [mlx5_ib] __fput+0x26a/0x7b0 task_work_run+0x10d/0x180 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x137/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x3c7/0x490 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7f5df907d664 Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 6a cd 20 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 44 f3 c3 66 90 48 83 ec 18 48 89 7c 24 08 e8 RSP: 002b:00007ffd353cb958 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000056017a88c348 RCX: 00007f5df907d664 RDX: 00007f5df969d400 RSI: 00007f5de8f1ec90 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f5df9681dc0 R08: 00007f5de8736410 R09: 000056017a9d2dd0 R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5de899d7d0 R13: 00007f5df96c4248 R14: 00007f5de8f1ecb0 R15: 000056017ae41308 Allocated by task 4631: save_stack+0x19/0x80 kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 alloc_uobj+0x71/0x230 [ib_uverbs] alloc_begin_fd_uobject+0x2e/0xc0 [ib_uverbs] rdma_alloc_begin_uobject+0x96/0x140 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_run_method+0xdf0/0x1940 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x57e/0xdb0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x177/0x260 [ib_uverbs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18f/0x1010 ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x490 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 4631: save_stack+0x19/0x80 __kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x160 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x67/0x1a0 kfree+0xb9/0x2a0 uverbs_close_fd+0x118/0x1c0 [ib_uverbs] devx_async_event_close+0x28a/0x480 [mlx5_ib] __fput+0x26a/0x7b0 task_work_run+0x10d/0x180 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x137/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x3c7/0x490 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888301e3cda8 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 280 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff888301e3cda8, ffff888301e3cfa8) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea000c078e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888352811300 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x2fffff80010200(slab|head) raw: 002fffff80010200 ffffea000d152608 ffffea000c077808 ffff888352811300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000250025 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888301e3cd80: fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888301e3ce00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888301e3ce80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888301e3cf00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888301e3cf80: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.2 Fixes: 7597385 ("IB/mlx5: Enable subscription for device events over DEVX") Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>

The original driver author seemed to be under the impression that a driver cannot be removed if it does not have a .remove method. Or maybe if it is a built-in platform driver. This is not true. This crash can be created: root@ubuntu:/sys/bus/platform/drivers/hisi-lpc# echo HISI0191\:00 > unbind root@ubuntu:/sys/bus/platform/drivers/hisi-lpc# ipmitool raw 6 1 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000010035010 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000047 Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000047 CM = 0, WnR = 1 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000118b000 [ffff000010035010] pgd=0000041ffbfff003, pud=0000041ffbffe003, pmd=0000041ffbffd003, pte=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000047 [GrapheneOS#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 17 PID: 1473 Comm: ipmitool Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5-00003-gf68c53b414a3-dirty #198 Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /D05, BIOS Hisilicon D05 IT21 Nemo 2.0 RC0 04/18/2018 pstate: 20000085 (nzCv daIf -PAN -UAO) pc : hisi_lpc_target_in+0x7c/0x120 lr : hisi_lpc_target_in+0x70/0x120 sp : ffff00001efe3930 x29: ffff00001efe3930 x28: ffff841f9f599200 x27: 0000000000000002 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000080 x24: 00000000000000e4 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000064 x21: ffff801fb667d280 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff00001efe39ac x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff841febe60340 x7 : ffff801fb55c52e8 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000ffc0e3 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff801fb667d280 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffff000010035010 x0 : ffff000010035000 Call trace: hisi_lpc_target_in+0x7c/0x120 hisi_lpc_comm_in+0x88/0x98 logic_inb+0x5c/0xb8 port_inb+0x18/0x20 bt_event+0x38/0x808 smi_event_handler+0x4c/0x5a0 check_start_timer_thread.part.4+0x40/0x58 sender+0x78/0x88 smi_send.isra.6+0x94/0x108 i_ipmi_request+0x2c4/0x8f8 ipmi_request_settime+0x124/0x160 handle_send_req+0x19c/0x208 ipmi_ioctl+0x2c0/0x990 do_vfs_ioctl+0xb8/0x8f8 ksys_ioctl+0x80/0xb8 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x64/0x160 el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78 el0_svc+0x8/0xc Code: 941d1511 aa0003f9 f94006a0 91004001 (b9000034) ---[ end trace aa842b86af7069e4 ]--- The problem here is that the host goes away but the associated logical PIO region remains registered, as do the children devices. Fix by adding a .remove method to tidy-up by removing the child devices and unregistering the logical PIO region. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: adf38bb ("HISI LPC: Support the LPC host on Hip06/Hip07 with DT bindings") Signed-off-by: John Garry <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <[email protected]>

…OL_MF_STRICT were specified When both MPOL_MF_MOVE* and MPOL_MF_STRICT was specified, mbind() should try best to migrate misplaced pages, if some of the pages could not be migrated, then return -EIO. There are three different sub-cases: 1. vma is not migratable 2. vma is migratable, but there are unmovable pages 3. vma is migratable, pages are movable, but migrate_pages() fails If GrapheneOS#1 happens, kernel would just abort immediately, then return -EIO, after a7f40cf ("mm: mempolicy: make mbind() return -EIO when MPOL_MF_STRICT is specified"). If GrapheneOS#3 happens, kernel would set policy and migrate pages with best-effort, but won't rollback the migrated pages and reset the policy back. Before that commit, they behaves in the same way. It'd better to keep their behavior consistent. But, rolling back the migrated pages and resetting the policy back sounds not feasible, so just make GrapheneOS#1 behave as same as GrapheneOS#3. Userspace will know that not everything was successfully migrated (via -EIO), and can take whatever steps it deems necessary - attempt rollback, determine which exact page(s) are violating the policy, etc. Make queue_pages_range() return 1 to indicate there are unmovable pages or vma is not migratable. The GrapheneOS#2 is not handled correctly in the current kernel, the following patch will fix it. [[email protected]: fix review comments from Vlastimil] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

When running syzkaller internally, we ran into the below bug on 4.9.x kernel: kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:2124! invalid opcode: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 1518 Comm: syz-executor107 Not tainted 4.9.168+ GrapheneOS#2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 task: ffff880067b34900 task.stack: ffff880068998000 RIP: split_huge_page_to_list+0x8fb/0x1030 mm/huge_memory.c:2124 Call Trace: split_huge_page include/linux/huge_mm.h:100 [inline] queue_pages_pte_range+0x7e1/0x1480 mm/mempolicy.c:538 walk_pmd_range mm/pagewalk.c:50 [inline] walk_pud_range mm/pagewalk.c:90 [inline] walk_pgd_range mm/pagewalk.c:116 [inline] __walk_page_range+0x44a/0xdb0 mm/pagewalk.c:208 walk_page_range+0x154/0x370 mm/pagewalk.c:285 queue_pages_range+0x115/0x150 mm/mempolicy.c:694 do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1241 [inline] SYSC_mbind+0x3c3/0x1030 mm/mempolicy.c:1370 SyS_mbind+0x46/0x60 mm/mempolicy.c:1352 do_syscall_64+0x1d2/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:282 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs+0x5d/0xdb Code: c7 80 1c 02 00 e8 26 0a 76 01 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 40 46 45 84 e8 4c RIP [<ffffffff81895d6b>] split_huge_page_to_list+0x8fb/0x1030 mm/huge_memory.c:2124 RSP <ffff88006899f980> with the below test: uint64_t r[1] = {0xffffffffffffffff}; int main(void) { syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0); intptr_t res = 0; res = syscall(__NR_socket, 0x11, 3, 0x300); if (res != -1) r[0] = res; *(uint32_t*)0x20000040 = 0x10000; *(uint32_t*)0x20000044 = 1; *(uint32_t*)0x20000048 = 0xc520; *(uint32_t*)0x2000004c = 1; syscall(__NR_setsockopt, r[0], 0x107, 0xd, 0x20000040, 0x10); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20fed000, 0x10000, 0, 0x8811, r[0], 0); *(uint64_t*)0x20000340 = 2; syscall(__NR_mbind, 0x20ff9000, 0x4000, 0x4002, 0x20000340, 0x45d4, 3); return 0; } Actually the test does: mmap(0x20000000, 16777216, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x20000000 socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, 768) = 3 setsockopt(3, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_RING, {block_size=65536, block_nr=1, frame_size=50464, frame_nr=1}, 16) = 0 mmap(0x20fed000, 65536, PROT_NONE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_FIXED|MAP_POPULATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0x20fed000 mbind(..., MPOL_MF_STRICT|MPOL_MF_MOVE) = 0 The setsockopt() would allocate compound pages (16 pages in this test) for packet tx ring, then the mmap() would call packet_mmap() to map the pages into the user address space specified by the mmap() call. When calling mbind(), it would scan the vma to queue the pages for migration to the new node. It would split any huge page since 4.9 doesn't support THP migration, however, the packet tx ring compound pages are not THP and even not movable. So, the above bug is triggered. However, the later kernel is not hit by this issue due to commit d44d363 ("mm: don't assume anonymous pages have SwapBacked flag"), which just removes the PageSwapBacked check for a different reason. But, there is a deeper issue. According to the semantic of mbind(), it should return -EIO if MPOL_MF_MOVE or MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL was specified and MPOL_MF_STRICT was also specified, but the kernel was unable to move all existing pages in the range. The tx ring of the packet socket is definitely not movable, however, mbind() returns success for this case. Although the most socket file associates with non-movable pages, but XDP may have movable pages from gup. So, it sounds not fine to just check the underlying file type of vma in vma_migratable(). Change migrate_page_add() to check if the page is movable or not, if it is unmovable, just return -EIO. But do not abort pte walk immediately, since there may be pages off LRU temporarily. We should migrate other pages if MPOL_MF_MOVE* is specified. Set has_unmovable flag if some paged could not be not moved, then return -EIO for mbind() eventually. With this change the above test would return -EIO as expected. [[email protected]: fix review comments from Vlastimil] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

Since commit e1ab9a4 ("i2c: imx: improve the error handling in i2c_imx_dma_request()") when booting with the DMA driver as module (such as CONFIG_FSL_EDMA=m) the following endless clk warnings are seen: [ 153.077831] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 153.082528] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at drivers/clk/clk.c:924 clk_core_disable_lock+0x18/0x24 [ 153.093077] i2c0 already disabled [ 153.096416] Modules linked in: [ 153.099521] CPU: 0 PID: 15 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W 5.2.0+ #321 [ 153.107290] Hardware name: Freescale Vybrid VF5xx/VF6xx (Device Tree) [ 153.113772] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func [ 153.118979] [<c0019560>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 153.126778] [<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c083f8dc>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xd4) [ 153.134051] [<c083f8dc>] (dump_stack) from [<c0031154>] (__warn+0xf8/0x124) [ 153.141056] [<c0031154>] (__warn) from [<c0031248>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x48) [ 153.148580] [<c0031248>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c040fde0>] (clk_core_disable_lock+0x18/0x24) [ 153.157413] [<c040fde0>] (clk_core_disable_lock) from [<c058f520>] (i2c_imx_probe+0x554/0x6ec) [ 153.166076] [<c058f520>] (i2c_imx_probe) from [<c04b9178>] (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x98) [ 153.174297] [<c04b9178>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c04b7298>] (really_probe+0x1d8/0x2c0) [ 153.182605] [<c04b7298>] (really_probe) from [<c04b7554>] (driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x174) [ 153.190909] [<c04b7554>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c04b58c8>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x44/0x8c) [ 153.199480] [<c04b58c8>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c04b746c>] (__device_attach+0xa0/0x108) [ 153.207782] [<c04b746c>] (__device_attach) from [<c04b65a4>] (bus_probe_device+0x88/0x90) [ 153.215999] [<c04b65a4>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c04b6a04>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x60/0x90) [ 153.225003] [<c04b6a04>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c004f190>] (process_one_work+0x204/0x634) [ 153.234178] [<c004f190>] (process_one_work) from [<c004f618>] (worker_thread+0x20/0x484) [ 153.242315] [<c004f618>] (worker_thread) from [<c0055c2c>] (kthread+0x118/0x150) [ 153.249758] [<c0055c2c>] (kthread) from [<c00090b4>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) [ 153.257006] Exception stack(0xdde43fb0 to 0xdde43ff8) [ 153.262095] 3fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 153.270306] 3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 153.278520] 3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 [ 153.285159] irq event stamp: 3323022 [ 153.288787] hardirqs last enabled at (3323021): [<c0861c4c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x2c [ 153.297261] hardirqs last disabled at (3323022): [<c040d7a0>] clk_enable_lock+0x10/0x124 [ 153.305392] softirqs last enabled at (3322092): [<c000a504>] __do_softirq+0x344/0x540 [ 153.313352] softirqs last disabled at (3322081): [<c00385c0>] irq_exit+0x10c/0x128 [ 153.320946] ---[ end trace a506731ccd9bd703 ]--- This endless clk warnings behaviour is well explained by Andrey Smirnov: "Allocating DMA after registering I2C adapter can lead to infinite probing loop, for example, consider the following scenario: 1. i2c_imx_probe() is called and successfully registers an I2C adapter via i2c_add_numbered_adapter() 2. As a part of i2c_add_numbered_adapter() new I2C slave devices are added from DT which results in a call to driver_deferred_probe_trigger() 3. i2c_imx_probe() continues and calls i2c_imx_dma_request() which due to lack of proper DMA driver returns -EPROBE_DEFER 4. i2c_imx_probe() fails, removes I2C adapter and returns -EPROBE_DEFER, which places it into deferred probe list 5. Deferred probe work triggered in GrapheneOS#2 above kicks in and calls i2c_imx_probe() again thus bringing us to step GrapheneOS#1" So revert commit e1ab9a4 ("i2c: imx: improve the error handling in i2c_imx_dma_request()") and restore the old behaviour, in order to avoid regressions on existing setups. Cc: <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andrey Smirnov <[email protected]> Reported-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Fixes: e1ab9a4 ("i2c: imx: improve the error handling in i2c_imx_dma_request()") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

batadv_netlink_get_ifindex() needs to make sure user passed a correct u32 attribute. syzbot reported : BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in batadv_netlink_dump_hardif+0x70d/0x880 net/batman-adv/netlink.c:968 CPU: 1 PID: 11705 Comm: syz-executor888 Not tainted 5.1.0+ GrapheneOS#1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x130/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:622 __msan_warning+0x75/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310 batadv_netlink_dump_hardif+0x70d/0x880 net/batman-adv/netlink.c:968 genl_lock_dumpit+0xc6/0x130 net/netlink/genetlink.c:482 netlink_dump+0xa84/0x1ab0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2253 __netlink_dump_start+0xa3a/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2361 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:550 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0xfc1/0x1a40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:627 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2486 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:638 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1311 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf3e/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1337 netlink_sendmsg+0x127e/0x12f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1926 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:661 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xcc6/0x1200 net/socket.c:2260 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2298 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2307 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2305 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2305 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440209 Fixes: b60620c ("batman-adv: netlink: hardif query") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]>

I -thought- I had fixed this entirely, but it looks like that I didn't test this thoroughly enough as we apparently still make one big mistake with nv50_msto_atomic_check() - we don't handle the following scenario: * CRTC GrapheneOS#1 has n VCPI allocated to it, is attached to connector DP-4 which is attached to encoder GrapheneOS#1. enabled=y active=n * CRTC GrapheneOS#1 is changed from DP-4 to DP-5, causing: * DP-4 crtc=GrapheneOS#1→NULL (VCPI n→0) * DP-5 crtc=NULL→GrapheneOS#1 * CRTC GrapheneOS#1 steals encoder GrapheneOS#1 back from DP-4 and gives it to DP-5 * CRTC GrapheneOS#1 maintains the same mode as before, just with a different connector * mode_changed=n connectors_changed=y (we _SHOULD_ do VCPI 0→n here, but don't) Once the above scenario is repeated once, we'll attempt freeing VCPI from the connector that we didn't allocate due to the connectors changing, but the mode staying the same. Sigh. Since nv50_msto_atomic_check() has broken a few times now, let's rethink things a bit to be more careful: limit both VCPI/PBN allocations to mode_changed || connectors_changed, since neither VCPI or PBN should ever need to change outside of routing and mode changes. Changes since v1: * Fix accidental reversal of clock and bpp arguments in drm_dp_calc_pbn_mode() - William Lewis Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]> Reported-by: Bohdan Milar <[email protected]> Tested-by: Bohdan Milar <[email protected]> Fixes: 232c9ee ("drm/nouveau: Use atomic VCPI helpers for MST") References: 412e85b ("drm/nouveau: Only release VCPI slots on mode changes") Cc: Lyude Paul <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: David Airlie <[email protected]> Cc: Jerry Zuo <[email protected]> Cc: Harry Wentland <[email protected]> Cc: Juston Li <[email protected]> Cc: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Cc: Karol Herbst <[email protected]> Cc: Ilia Mirkin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.1+ Acked-by: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

If driver probe needs to be deferred, e.g. because ci_hdrc_add_device() isn't ready yet, this driver currently misbehaves badly: a) success is still reported to the driver core (meaning a 2nd probe attempt will never be done), leaving the driver in a dysfunctional state and the hardware unusable b) driver remove / shutdown OOPSes: [ 206.786916] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffdff [ 206.794148] pgd = 880b9f82 [ 206.796890] [fffffdff] *pgd=abf5e861, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 [ 206.803179] Internal error: Oops: 37 [GrapheneOS#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 206.808581] Modules linked in: wl18xx evbug [ 206.813308] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 4.19.35+gf345c93b4195 GrapheneOS#1 [ 206.821053] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX7 Dual (Device Tree) [ 206.826813] PC is at ci_hdrc_remove_device+0x4/0x20 [ 206.831699] LR is at ci_hdrc_imx_remove+0x20/0xe8 [ 206.836407] pc : [<805cd4b0>] lr : [<805d62cc>] psr: 20000013 [ 206.842678] sp : a806be40 ip : 00000001 fp : 80adbd3c [ 206.847906] r10: 80b1b794 r9 : 80d5dfe0 r8 : a8192c44 [ 206.853136] r7 : 80db93a0 r6 : a8192c10 r5 : a8192c00 r4 : a93a4a00 [ 206.859668] r3 : 00000000 r2 : a8192ce4 r1 : ffffffff r0 : fffffdfb [ 206.866201] Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 206.873341] Control: 10c5387d Table: a9e0c06a DAC: 00000051 [ 206.879092] Process systemd-shutdow (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xb271353c) [ 206.885624] Stack: (0xa806be40 to 0xa806c000) [ 206.889992] be40: a93a4a00 805d62cc a8192c1c a8170e10 a8192c10 8049a490 80d04d08 00000000 [ 206.898179] be60: 00000000 80d0da2c fee1dead 00000000 a806a000 00000058 00000000 80148b08 [ 206.906366] be80: 01234567 80148d8c a9858600 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80d04d08 [ 206.914553] bea0: 00000000 00000000 a82741e0 a9858600 00000024 00000002 a9858608 00000005 [ 206.922740] bec0: 0000001e 8022c058 00000000 00000000 a806bf14 a9858600 00000000 a806befc [ 206.930927] bee0: a806bf78 00000000 7ee12c30 8022c18c a806bef8 a806befc 00000000 00000001 [ 206.939115] bf00: 00000000 00000024 a806bf14 00000005 7ee13b34 7ee12c68 00000004 7ee13f20 [ 206.947302] bf20: 00000010 7ee12c7c 00000005 7ee12d04 0000000a 76e7dc00 00000001 80d0f140 [ 206.955490] bf40: ab637880 a974de40 60000013 80d0f140 ab6378a0 80d04d08 a8080470 a9858600 [ 206.963677] bf60: a9858600 00000000 00000000 8022c24c 00000000 80144310 00000000 00000000 [ 206.971864] bf80: 80101204 80d04d08 00000000 80d04d08 00000000 00000000 00000003 00000058 [ 206.980051] bfa0: 80101204 80101000 00000000 00000000 fee1dead 28121969 01234567 00000000 [ 206.988237] bfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000003 00000058 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 206.996425] bfe0: 0049ffb0 7ee13d58 0048a84b 76f245a6 60000030 fee1dead 00000000 00000000 [ 207.004622] [<805cd4b0>] (ci_hdrc_remove_device) from [<805d62cc>] (ci_hdrc_imx_remove+0x20/0xe8) [ 207.013509] [<805d62cc>] (ci_hdrc_imx_remove) from [<8049a490>] (device_shutdown+0x16c/0x218) [ 207.022050] [<8049a490>] (device_shutdown) from [<80148b08>] (kernel_restart+0xc/0x50) [ 207.029980] [<80148b08>] (kernel_restart) from [<80148d8c>] (sys_reboot+0xf4/0x1f0) [ 207.037648] [<80148d8c>] (sys_reboot) from [<80101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 207.045308] Exception stack(0xa806bfa8 to 0xa806bff0) [ 207.050368] bfa0: 00000000 00000000 fee1dead 28121969 01234567 00000000 [ 207.058554] bfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000003 00000058 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 207.066737] bfe0: 0049ffb0 7ee13d58 0048a84b 76f245a6 [ 207.071799] Code: ebffffa8 e3a00000 e8bd8010 e92d4010 (e5904004) [ 207.078021] ---[ end trace be47424e3fd46e9f ]--- [ 207.082647] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 207.087894] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- c) the error path in combination with driver removal causes imbalanced calls to the clk_*() and pm_()* APIs a) happens because the original intended return value is overwritten (with 0) by the return code of regulator_disable() in ci_hdrc_imx_probe()'s error path b) happens because ci_pdev is -EPROBE_DEFER, which causes ci_hdrc_remove_device() to OOPS Fix a) by being more careful in ci_hdrc_imx_probe()'s error path and not overwriting the real error code Fix b) by calling the respective cleanup functions during remove only when needed (when ci_pdev != NULL, i.e. when everything was initialised correctly). This also has the side effect of not causing imbalanced clk_*() and pm_*() API calls as part of the error code path. Fixes: 7c8e890 ("usb: chipidea: imx: add HSIC support") Signed-off-by: André Draszik <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> CC: Peter Chen <[email protected]> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> CC: Shawn Guo <[email protected]> CC: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]> CC: Pengutronix Kernel Team <[email protected]> CC: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> CC: NXP Linux Team <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread"). Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex - i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen afterwards. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 GrapheneOS#1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 GrapheneOS#2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec GrapheneOS#3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 GrapheneOS#4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f GrapheneOS#5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 GrapheneOS#6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 GrapheneOS#7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] GrapheneOS#8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] GrapheneOS#9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] GrapheneOS#10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce GrapheneOS#11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 GrapheneOS#12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f GrapheneOS#13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 GrapheneOS#14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device") Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>

packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide if it must call tpacket_snd(). Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL. Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can perform the check again to solve the race. syzbot reported : kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ #101 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474 Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50 R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline] tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657 ___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 69e3c75 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

reply_cache_stats uses wrong parameter as seq file private structure and thus causes the following kernel crash when users read /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001f9 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [GrapheneOS#3] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 1502 Comm: cat Tainted: G D 5.3.0-rc3+ GrapheneOS#1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Broadwell Client platform/Basking Ridge, BIOS BDW-E2R1.86C.0118.R01.1503110618 03/11/2015 RIP: 0010:nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show+0x3b/0x2d0 Code: 41 54 49 89 f4 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b3 10 33 88 53 bb e8 03 00 00 e8 88 82 d1 ff bf 58 89 41 00 e8 eb c5 85 00 48 83 eb 01 75 f0 <41> 8b 94 24 f8 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 be 10 33 88 4c 89 ef bb e8 03 00 RSP: 0018:ffffaa520106fe08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000cfe1a77123 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000291b46 RDX: 000000cf00000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000291b28 RBP: ffffaa520106fe20 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 000000cfe17e55dd R10: ffffa424e47c0000 R11: 000000000000030b R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffa424e5697000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa424e5697000 FS: 00007f805735f580(0000) GS:ffffa424f8f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000001f9 CR3: 00000000655ce005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: seq_read+0x194/0x3e0 __vfs_read+0x1b/0x40 vfs_read+0x95/0x140 ksys_read+0x61/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f805728b861 Code: fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 86 b4 09 00 e8 79 e0 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d 05 d9 19 0d 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 RSP: 002b:00007ffea1ce3c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f805728b861 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f8057183000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8057183000 R08: 00007f8057182010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559a60e8ff10 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000000001f9 ---[ end trace 01613595153f0cba ]--- RIP: 0010:nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show+0x3b/0x2d0 Code: 41 54 49 89 f4 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b3 10 33 88 53 bb e8 03 00 00 e8 88 82 d1 ff bf 58 89 41 00 e8 eb c5 85 00 48 83 eb 01 75 f0 <41> 8b 94 24 f8 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 be 10 33 88 4c 89 ef bb e8 03 00 RSP: 0018:ffffaa52004b3e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000002bab45a7c6 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000291b4c RDX: 0000002b00000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000291b28 RBP: ffffaa52004b3e20 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000002bab1c8c7a R10: ffffa424e5500000 R11: 00000000000002a9 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffa424e4475000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa424e4475000 FS: 00007f805735f580(0000) GS:ffffa424f8f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000001f9 CR3: 00000000655ce005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Killed Fixes: 3ba7583 ("nfsd4: drc containerization") Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>

lockdep reports the following deadlock scenario: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected kworker/1:1/48 is trying to acquire lock: 000000008d7a62b2 (text_mutex){+.+.}, at: kprobe_optimizer+0x163/0x290 but task is already holding lock: 00000000850b5e2d (module_mutex){+.+.}, at: kprobe_optimizer+0x31/0x290 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> GrapheneOS#1 (module_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0xac/0x9f0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 set_all_modules_text_rw+0x22/0x90 ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare+0x1c/0x20 ftrace_run_update_code+0xe/0x30 ftrace_startup_enable+0x2e/0x50 ftrace_startup+0xa7/0x100 register_ftrace_function+0x27/0x70 arm_kprobe+0xb3/0x130 enable_kprobe+0x83/0xa0 enable_trace_kprobe.part.0+0x2e/0x80 kprobe_register+0x6f/0xc0 perf_trace_event_init+0x16b/0x270 perf_kprobe_init+0xa7/0xe0 perf_kprobe_event_init+0x3e/0x70 perf_try_init_event+0x4a/0x140 perf_event_alloc+0x93a/0xde0 __do_sys_perf_event_open+0x19f/0xf30 __x64_sys_perf_event_open+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (text_mutex){+.+.}: __lock_acquire+0xfcb/0x1b60 lock_acquire+0xca/0x1d0 __mutex_lock+0xac/0x9f0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kprobe_optimizer+0x163/0x290 process_one_work+0x22b/0x560 worker_thread+0x50/0x3c0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(module_mutex); lock(text_mutex); lock(module_mutex); lock(text_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** As a reproducer I've been using bcc's funccount.py (https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/blob/master/tools/funccount.py), for example: # ./funccount.py '*interrupt*' That immediately triggers the lockdep splat. Fix by acquiring text_mutex before module_mutex in kprobe_optimizer(). Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Fixes: d5b844a ("ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190812184302.GA7010@xps-13 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

If QP is not visible to the pid, then we try to decrease its reference count and return from the function before the QP pointer is initialized. This lead to NULL pointer dereference. Fix it by pass directly the res to the rdma_restract_put as arg instead of &qp->res. This fixes below call trace: [ 5845.110329] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000dc [ 5845.120482] Oops: 0002 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP PTI [ 5845.129119] RIP: 0010:rdma_restrack_put+0x5/0x30 [ib_core] [ 5845.169450] Call Trace: [ 5845.170544] rdma_counter_get_qp+0x5c/0x70 [ib_core] [ 5845.172074] rdma_counter_bind_qpn_alloc+0x6f/0x1a0 [ib_core] [ 5845.173731] nldev_stat_set_doit+0x314/0x330 [ib_core] [ 5845.175279] rdma_nl_rcv_msg+0xeb/0x1d0 [ib_core] [ 5845.176772] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x20b/0x2b0 [ 5845.178321] rdma_nl_rcv+0xcb/0x120 [ib_core] [ 5845.179753] netlink_unicast+0x179/0x220 [ 5845.181066] netlink_sendmsg+0x2d8/0x3d0 [ 5845.182338] sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40 [ 5845.183544] __sys_sendto+0xdc/0x160 [ 5845.184832] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1f8/0x2e0 [ 5845.186209] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x1d9/0x280 [ 5845.187584] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [ 5845.188867] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x120 [ 5845.190097] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 1bd8e0a ("RDMA/counter: Allow manual mode configuration support") Signed-off-by: Ido Kalir <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>

Calling ceph_buffer_put() in __ceph_setxattr() may end up freeing the i_xattrs.prealloc_blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by postponing the call until later, when the lock is released. The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/117. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 650, name: fsstress 3 locks held by fsstress/650: #0: 00000000870a0fe8 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 GrapheneOS#1: 00000000ba0c4c74 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6){++++}, at: vfs_setxattr+0x55/0xa0 GrapheneOS#2: 000000008dfbb3f2 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: __ceph_setxattr+0x297/0x810 CPU: 1 PID: 650 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.2.0+ #437 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 ___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1 vfree+0x4b/0x60 ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60 __ceph_setxattr+0x2b4/0x810 __vfs_setxattr+0x66/0x80 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x59/0xf0 vfs_setxattr+0x81/0xa0 setxattr+0x115/0x230 ? filename_lookup+0xc9/0x140 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x74/0x80 ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2e/0x60 ? __sb_start_write+0x142/0x1a0 ? mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 path_setxattr+0xba/0xd0 __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7ff23514359a Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

…s_blob() Calling ceph_buffer_put() in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() may result in freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by having this function returning the old blob buffer and have the callers of this function freeing it when the lock is released. The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/117. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 649, name: fsstress 4 locks held by fsstress/649: #0: 00000000a7478e7e (&type->s_umount_key#19){++++}, at: iterate_supers+0x77/0xf0 GrapheneOS#1: 00000000f8de1423 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x7b/0xc60 GrapheneOS#2: 00000000562f2b27 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3bd/0xc60 GrapheneOS#3: 00000000f83ce16a (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3ed/0xc60 CPU: 1 PID: 649 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.2.0+ #439 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 ___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1 vfree+0x4b/0x60 ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60 __ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x12b/0x170 __send_cap+0x302/0x540 ? __lock_acquire+0x23c/0x1e40 ? __mark_caps_flushing+0x15c/0x280 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30 ceph_check_caps+0x5f0/0xc60 ceph_flush_dirty_caps+0x7c/0x150 ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 ceph_sync_fs+0x5a/0x130 iterate_supers+0x8f/0xf0 ksys_sync+0x4f/0xb0 __ia32_sys_sync+0xa/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fc6409ab617 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

Calling ceph_buffer_put() in fill_inode() may result in freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by postponing the call until later, when the lock is released. The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/070. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3852, name: kworker/0:4 6 locks held by kworker/0:4/3852: #0: 000000004270f6bb ((wq_completion)ceph-msgr){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 GrapheneOS#1: 00000000eb420803 ((work_completion)(&(&con->work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 GrapheneOS#2: 00000000be1c53a4 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x288/0x1476 GrapheneOS#3: 00000000559cb958 (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476 GrapheneOS#4: 000000000d5ebbae (&req->r_fill_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x2fc/0x1476 GrapheneOS#5: 00000000a83d0514 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: fill_inode.isra.0+0xf8/0xf70 CPU: 0 PID: 3852 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #441 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 ___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1 vfree+0x4b/0x60 ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60 fill_inode.isra.0+0xa9b/0xf70 ceph_fill_trace+0x13b/0xc70 ? dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476 dispatch+0x320/0x1476 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x4d/0x2a0 ceph_con_workfn+0xc97/0x2ec0 ? process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0 kthread+0x105/0x140 ? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

syzkaller managed to trigger the warning in bpf_jit_free() which checks via bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off() for potentially unlinked JITed BPF progs in kallsyms, and subsequently trips over GPF when walking kallsyms entries: [...] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9869 at kernel/bpf/core.c:810 bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ GrapheneOS#1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x113/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x212/0x40b kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold.8+0x1b/0x38 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x1a4/0x200 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271 do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0 Code: 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 86 00 00 00 48 ba 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 0f b6 43 02 49 39 d6 0f 84 5f fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 58 fe ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 RSP: 0018:ffff888092f67cd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffc90001947000 RCX: ffffffff816e9d88 RDX: dead000000000200 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88808769f7f0 RBP: ffff888092f67d00 R08: fffffbfff1394059 R09: fffffbfff1394058 R10: fffffbfff1394058 R11: ffffffff89ca02c7 R12: ffffc90001947002 R13: ffffc90001947020 R14: ffffffff881eca80 R15: ffff88808769f7e8 BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff400d000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21ffed067 PMD 9f942067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ GrapheneOS#1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:495 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:558 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline] RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find+0x107/0x2e0 kernel/bpf/core.c:632 Code: 00 f0 ff ff 44 38 c8 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 fa 00 00 00 41 f6 45 02 01 75 02 0f 0b 48 39 da 0f 82 92 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 45 01 00 00 8b 03 48 c1 e0 [...] Upon further debugging, it turns out that whenever we trigger this issue, the kallsyms removal in bpf_prog_ksym_node_del() was /skipped/ but yet bpf_jit_free() reported that the entry is /in use/. Problem is that symbol exposure via bpf_prog_kallsyms_add() but also perf_event_bpf_event() were done /after/ bpf_prog_new_fd(). Once the fd is exposed to the public, a parallel close request came in right before we attempted to do the bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(). Given at this time the prog reference count is one, we start to rip everything underneath us via bpf_prog_release() -> bpf_prog_put(). The memory is eventually released via deferred free, so we're seeing that bpf_jit_free() has a kallsym entry because we added it from bpf_prog_load() but /after/ bpf_prog_put() from the remote CPU. Therefore, move both notifications /before/ we install the fd. The issue was never seen between bpf_prog_alloc_id() and bpf_prog_new_fd() because upon bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id() we'll take another reference to the BPF prog, so we're still holding the original reference from the bpf_prog_load(). Fixes: 6ee52e2 ("perf, bpf: Introduce PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT") Fixes: 74451e6 ("bpf: make jited programs visible in traces") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]>

Hangbin Liu says: ==================== fix dev null pointer dereference when send packets larger than mtu in collect_md mode When we send a packet larger than PMTU, we need to reply with icmp_send(ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) or icmpv6_send(ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG). But with collect_md mode, kernel will crash while accessing the dst dev as __metadata_dst_init() init dst->dev to NULL by default. Here is what the code path looks like, for GRE: - ip6gre_tunnel_xmit - ip6gre_xmit_ipv4 - __gre6_xmit - ip6_tnl_xmit - if skb->len - t->tun_hlen - eth_hlen > mtu; return -EMSGSIZE - icmp_send - net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev); <-- here - ip6gre_xmit_ipv6 - __gre6_xmit - ip6_tnl_xmit - if skb->len - t->tun_hlen - eth_hlen > mtu; return -EMSGSIZE - icmpv6_send ... - decode_session4 - oif = skb_dst(skb)->dev->ifindex; <-- here - decode_session6 - oif = skb_dst(skb)->dev->ifindex; <-- here We could not fix it in __metadata_dst_init() as there is no dev supplied. Look in to the __icmp_send()/decode_session{4,6} code we could find the dst dev is actually not needed. In __icmp_send(), we could get the net by skb->dev. For decode_session{4,6}, as it was called by xfrm_decode_session_reverse() in this scenario, the oif is not used by fl4->flowi4_oif = reverse ? skb->skb_iif : oif; The reproducer is easy: ovs-vsctl add-br br0 ip link set br0 up ovs-vsctl add-port br0 gre0 -- set interface gre0 type=gre options:remote_ip=$dst_addr ip link set gre0 up ip addr add ${local_gre6}/64 dev br0 ping6 $remote_gre6 -s 1500 The kernel will crash like [40595.821651] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000108 [40595.822411] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [40595.822949] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [40595.823492] PGD 0 P4D 0 [40595.823767] Oops: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP PTI [40595.824139] CPU: 0 PID: 2831 Comm: handler12 Not tainted 5.2.0 GrapheneOS#57 [40595.824788] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-3.module+el8.1.0+2983+b2ae9c0a 04/01/2014 [40595.825680] RIP: 0010:__xfrm_decode_session+0x6b/0x930 [40595.826219] Code: b7 c0 00 00 00 b8 06 00 00 00 66 85 d2 0f b7 ca 48 0f 45 c1 44 0f b6 2c 06 48 8b 47 58 48 83 e0 fe 0f 84 f4 04 00 00 48 8b 00 <44> 8b 80 08 01 00 00 41 f6 c4 01 4c 89 e7 ba 58 00 00 00 0f 85 47 [40595.828155] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a73438 EFLAGS: 00010286 [40595.828705] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881329d7100 RCX: 0000000000000000 [40595.829450] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8881339e70ce RDI: ffff8881329d7100 [40595.830191] RBP: ffffc90000a73470 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000a [40595.830936] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000a73490 [40595.831682] R13: 000000000000002c R14: ffff888132ff1301 R15: ffff8881329d7100 [40595.832427] FS: 00007f5bfcfd6700(0000) GS:ffff88813ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [40595.833266] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [40595.833883] CR2: 0000000000000108 CR3: 000000013a368000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [40595.834633] Call Trace: [40595.835392] ? rt6_multipath_hash+0x4c/0x390 [40595.835853] icmpv6_route_lookup+0xcb/0x1d0 [40595.836296] ? icmpv6_xrlim_allow+0x3e/0x140 [40595.836751] icmp6_send+0x537/0x840 [40595.837125] icmpv6_send+0x20/0x30 [40595.837494] tnl_update_pmtu.isra.27+0x19d/0x2a0 [ip_tunnel] [40595.838088] ip_md_tunnel_xmit+0x1b6/0x510 [ip_tunnel] [40595.838633] gre_tap_xmit+0x10c/0x160 [ip_gre] [40595.839103] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x93/0x200 [40595.839551] sch_direct_xmit+0x101/0x2d0 [40595.839967] __dev_queue_xmit+0x69f/0x9c0 [40595.840399] do_execute_actions+0x1717/0x1910 [openvswitch] [40595.840987] ? validate_set.isra.12+0x2f5/0x3d0 [openvswitch] [40595.841596] ? reserve_sfa_size+0x31/0x130 [openvswitch] [40595.842154] ? __ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x1b4/0xad0 [openvswitch] [40595.842778] ? __kmalloc_reserve.isra.50+0x2e/0x80 [40595.843285] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20 [40595.843696] ? __kmalloc+0x188/0x220 [40595.844078] ? __alloc_skb+0x97/0x270 [40595.844472] ovs_execute_actions+0x47/0x120 [openvswitch] [40595.845041] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x27d/0x2b0 [openvswitch] [40595.845648] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x3a8/0x430 [40595.846101] genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0x90 [40595.846476] ? __alloc_skb+0x83/0x270 [40595.846866] ? genl_family_rcv_msg+0x430/0x430 [40595.847335] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcb/0x100 [40595.847777] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [40595.848113] netlink_unicast+0x17f/0x230 [40595.848535] netlink_sendmsg+0x2ed/0x3e0 [40595.848951] sock_sendmsg+0x4f/0x60 [40595.849323] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2bd/0x2e0 [40595.849733] ? sock_poll+0x6f/0xb0 [40595.850098] ? ep_scan_ready_list.isra.14+0x20b/0x240 [40595.850634] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [40595.851032] ? ep_poll+0x11b/0x440 [40595.851401] ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30 [40595.851799] __sys_sendmsg+0x58/0xa0 [40595.852180] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x190 [40595.852574] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [40595.853105] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c00038c7d [40595.853489] Code: c7 20 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e f7 ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 d7 f7 ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01 [40595.855443] RSP: 002b:00007f5bfcf73c00 EFLAGS: 00003293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [40595.856244] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5bfcf74a60 RCX: 00007f5c00038c7d [40595.856990] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f5bfcf73c60 RDI: 0000000000000015 [40595.857736] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000b7c R09: 0000000000000110 [40595.858613] R10: 0001000800050004 R11: 0000000000003293 R12: 000055c2d8329da0 [40595.859401] R13: 00007f5bfcf74120 R14: 0000000000000347 R15: 00007f5bfcf73c60 [40595.860185] Modules linked in: ip_gre ip_tunnel gre openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 sunrpc bochs_drm ttm drm_kms_helper drm pcspkr joydev i2c_piix4 qemu_fw_cfg xfs libcrc32c virtio_net net_failover serio_raw failover ata_generic virtio_blk pata_acpi floppy [40595.863155] CR2: 0000000000000108 [40595.863551] ---[ end trace 22209bbcacb4addd ]--- v4: Julian Anastasov remind skb->dev also could be NULL in icmp_send. We'd better still use dst.dev and do a check to avoid crash. v3: only replace pkg to packets in cover letter. So I didn't update the version info in the follow up patches. v2: fix it in __icmp_send() and decode_session{4,6} separately instead of updating shared dst dev in {ip_md, ip6}_tunnel_xmit. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Donald reported this sequence: ip next add id 1 blackhole ip next add id 2 blackhole ip ro add 1.1.1.1/32 nhid 1 ip ro add 1.1.1.2/32 nhid 2 would cause a crash. Backtrace is: [ 151.302790] general protection fault: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 151.304043] CPU: 1 PID: 277 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5+ GrapheneOS#37 [ 151.305078] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.1-1 04/01/2014 [ 151.306526] RIP: 0010:fib_add_nexthop+0x8b/0x2aa [ 151.307343] Code: 35 f7 81 48 8d 14 01 c7 02 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 42 04 01 f4 f4 f4 48 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 65 48 8b 0c 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 4d d0 31 c9 <80> 3c 02 00 74 08 48 89 f7 e8 1a e8 53 ff be 08 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 [ 151.310549] RSP: 0018:ffff888116c27340 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 151.311469] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881154ece00 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 151.312713] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000020 RDI: ffff888115649b40 [ 151.313968] RBP: ffff888116c273d8 R08: ffffed10221e3757 R09: ffff888110f1bab8 [ 151.315212] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888110f1bab3 R12: ffff888115649b40 [ 151.316456] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: ffff888116c273b0 R15: ffff888115649b40 [ 151.317707] FS: 00007f60b4d8d800(0000) GS:ffff88811ac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 151.319113] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 151.320119] CR2: 0000555671ffdc00 CR3: 00000001136ba005 CR4: 0000000000020ee0 [ 151.321367] Call Trace: [ 151.321820] ? fib_nexthop_info+0x635/0x635 [ 151.322572] fib_dump_info+0xaa4/0xde0 [ 151.323247] ? fib_create_info+0x2431/0x2431 [ 151.324008] ? napi_alloc_frag+0x2a/0x2a [ 151.324711] rtmsg_fib+0x2c4/0x3be [ 151.325339] fib_table_insert+0xe2f/0xeee ... fib_dump_info incorrectly has nhs = 0 for blackhole nexthops, so it believes the nexthop object is a multipath group (nhs != 1) and ends up down the nexthop_mpath_fill_node() path which is wrong for a blackhole. The blackhole check in nexthop_num_path is leftover from early days of the blackhole implementation which did not initialize the device. In the end the design was simpler (fewer special case checks) to set the device to loopback in nh_info, so the check in nexthop_num_path should have been removed. Fixes: 430a049 ("nexthop: Add support for nexthop groups") Reported-by: Donald Sharp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

After commit baeabab ("tun: return NET_XMIT_DROP for dropped packets"), when tun_net_xmit drop packets, it will free skb and return NET_XMIT_DROP, netpoll_send_skb_on_dev will run into following use after free cases: 1. retry netpoll_start_xmit with freed skb; 2. queue freed skb in npinfo->txq. queue_process will also run into use after free case. hit netpoll_send_skb_on_dev first case with following kernel log: [ 117.864773] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:306! [ 117.864773] invalid opcode: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP PTI [ 117.864774] CPU: 3 PID: 2627 Comm: loop_printmsg Kdump: loaded Tainted: P OE 5.3.0-050300rc5-generic #201908182231 [ 117.864775] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 117.864775] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_free+0x28d/0x2b0 [ 117.864781] Call Trace: [ 117.864781] ? tun_net_xmit+0x21c/0x460 [ 117.864781] kfree_skbmem+0x4e/0x60 [ 117.864782] kfree_skb+0x3a/0xa0 [ 117.864782] tun_net_xmit+0x21c/0x460 [ 117.864782] netpoll_start_xmit+0x11d/0x1b0 [ 117.864788] netpoll_send_skb_on_dev+0x1b8/0x200 [ 117.864789] __br_forward+0x1b9/0x1e0 [bridge] [ 117.864789] ? skb_clone+0x53/0xd0 [ 117.864790] ? __skb_clone+0x2e/0x120 [ 117.864790] deliver_clone+0x37/0x50 [bridge] [ 117.864790] maybe_deliver+0x89/0xc0 [bridge] [ 117.864791] br_flood+0x6c/0x130 [bridge] [ 117.864791] br_dev_xmit+0x315/0x3c0 [bridge] [ 117.864792] netpoll_start_xmit+0x11d/0x1b0 [ 117.864792] netpoll_send_skb_on_dev+0x1b8/0x200 [ 117.864792] netpoll_send_udp+0x2c6/0x3e8 [ 117.864793] write_msg+0xd9/0xf0 [netconsole] [ 117.864793] console_unlock+0x386/0x4e0 [ 117.864793] vprintk_emit+0x17e/0x280 [ 117.864794] vprintk_default+0x29/0x50 [ 117.864794] vprintk_func+0x4c/0xbc [ 117.864794] printk+0x58/0x6f [ 117.864795] loop_fun+0x24/0x41 [printmsg_loop] [ 117.864795] kthread+0x104/0x140 [ 117.864795] ? 0xffffffffc05b1000 [ 117.864796] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 117.864796] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Signed-off-by: Feng Sun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xiaojun Zhao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

The compaction code already marks pages as offline when it enqueues pages in the ballooned page list, and removes the mapping when the pages are removed from the list. VMware balloon also updates the flags, instead of letting the balloon-compaction logic handle it, which causes the assertion VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageOffline(page)) to fire, when __ClearPageOffline is called the second time. This causes the following crash. [ 487.104520] kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:749! [ 487.106364] invalid opcode: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [ 487.107681] CPU: 7 PID: 1106 Comm: kworker/7:3 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5balloon #227 [ 487.109196] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 12/12/2018 [ 487.111452] Workqueue: events_freezable vmballoon_work [vmw_balloon] [ 487.112779] RIP: 0010:vmballoon_release_page_list+0xaa/0x100 [vmw_balloon] [ 487.114200] Code: fe 48 c1 e7 06 4c 01 c7 8b 47 30 41 89 c1 41 81 e1 00 01 00 f0 41 81 f9 00 00 00 f0 74 d3 48 c7 c6 08 a1 a1 c0 e8 06 0d e7 ea <0f> 0b 44 89 f6 4c 89 c7 e8 49 9c e9 ea 49 8d 75 08 49 8b 45 08 4d [ 487.118033] RSP: 0018:ffffb82f012bbc98 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 487.119135] RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 487.120601] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9a85b6bd7620 [ 487.122071] RBP: ffffb82f012bbcc0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 487.123536] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb82f012bbd00 [ 487.125002] R13: ffffe97f4598d9c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffb82f012bbd34 [ 487.126463] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9a85b6bc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 487.128110] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 487.129316] CR2: 00007ffe6e413ea0 CR3: 0000000230b18001 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 487.130812] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 487.132283] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 487.133749] Call Trace: [ 487.134333] vmballoon_deflate+0x22c/0x390 [vmw_balloon] [ 487.135468] vmballoon_work+0x6e7/0x913 [vmw_balloon] [ 487.136711] ? process_one_work+0x21a/0x5e0 [ 487.138581] process_one_work+0x298/0x5e0 [ 487.139926] ? vmballoon_migratepage+0x310/0x310 [vmw_balloon] [ 487.141610] ? process_one_work+0x298/0x5e0 [ 487.143053] worker_thread+0x41/0x400 [ 487.144389] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 487.145582] ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 487.146937] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 [ 487.148637] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Fix it by updating the PageOffline indication only when a 2MB page is enqueued and dequeued. The 4KB pages will be handled correctly by the balloon compaction logic. Fixes: 83a8afa ("vmw_balloon: Compaction support") Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Thomas Hellstrom <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Now that 'TCQ_F_CPUSTATS' bit can be cleared, depending on the value of 'TCQ_F_NOLOCK' bit in the parent qdisc, we need to be sure that per-cpu counters are present when 'reset()' is called for pfifo_fast qdiscs. Otherwise, the following script: # tc q a dev lo handle 1: root htb default 100 # tc c a dev lo parent 1: classid 1:100 htb \ > rate 95Mbit ceil 100Mbit burst 64k [...] # tc f a dev lo parent 1: protocol arp basic classid 1:100 [...] # tc q a dev lo parent 1:100 handle 100: pfifo_fast [...] # tc q d dev lo root can generate the following splat: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff2c01bd148000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 [dfff2c01bd148000] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP [...] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : pfifo_fast_reset+0x280/0x4d8 lr : pfifo_fast_reset+0x21c/0x4d8 sp : ffff800d09676fa0 x29: ffff800d09676fa0 x28: ffff200012ee22e4 x27: dfff200000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff800ca0799958 x24: ffff1001940f332b x23: 0000000000000007 x22: ffff200012ee1ab8 x21: 0000600de8a40000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800ca0799900 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000002 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff1001b922e6e2 x11: 1ffff001b922e6e1 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 1ffff001b922e6e1 x8 : dfff200000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 1fffe400025dc45c x4 : 1fffe400025dc357 x3 : 00000c01bd148000 x2 : 0000600de8a40000 x1 : 0000000000000007 x0 : 0000600de8a40004 Call trace: pfifo_fast_reset+0x280/0x4d8 qdisc_reset+0x6c/0x370 htb_reset+0x150/0x3b8 [sch_htb] qdisc_reset+0x6c/0x370 dev_deactivate_queue.constprop.5+0xe0/0x1a8 dev_deactivate_many+0xd8/0x908 dev_deactivate+0xe4/0x190 qdisc_graft+0x88c/0xbd0 tc_get_qdisc+0x418/0x8a8 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3a8/0xa78 netlink_rcv_skb+0x18c/0x328 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x38 netlink_unicast+0x3c4/0x538 netlink_sendmsg+0x538/0x9a0 sock_sendmsg+0xac/0xf8 ___sys_sendmsg+0x53c/0x658 __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x140 __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x74/0xa8 el0_svc_handler+0x164/0x468 el0_svc+0x10/0x14 Code: 910012a0 92400801 d343fc03 11000c21 (38fb6863) Fix this by testing the value of 'TCQ_F_CPUSTATS' bit in 'qdisc->flags', before dereferencing 'qdisc->cpu_qstats'. Changes since v1: - coding style improvements, thanks to Stefano Brivio Fixes: 8a53e61 ("net: sched: when clearing NOLOCK, clear TCQ_F_CPUSTATS, too") CC: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reported-by: Li Shuang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Now that 'TCQ_F_CPUSTATS' bit can be cleared, depending on the value of 'TCQ_F_NOLOCK' bit in the parent qdisc, we can't assume anymore that per-cpu counters are there in the error path of skb_array_produce(). Otherwise, the following splat can be seen: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000600dea430008 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000005 Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 000000007b97530e [0000600dea430008] pgd=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP [...] pstate: 10000005 (nzcV daif -PAN -UAO) pc : pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x524/0x6e8 lr : pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x46c/0x6e8 sp : ffff800d39376fe0 x29: ffff800d39376fe0 x28: 1ffff001a07d1e40 x27: ffff800d03e8f188 x26: ffff800d03e8f200 x25: 0000000000000062 x24: ffff800d393772f0 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000403 x21: ffff800cca569a00 x20: ffff800d03e8ee00 x19: ffff800cca569a10 x18: 00000000000000bf x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffff1001a726edd0 x13: 1fffe4000276a9a4 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: dfff200000000000 x10: ffff800d03e8f1a0 x9 : 0000000000000003 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 00000000f1f1f1f1 x6 : ffff1001a726edea x5 : ffff800cca56a53c x4 : 1ffff001bf9a8003 x3 : 1ffff001bf9a8003 x2 : 1ffff001a07d1dcb x1 : 0000600dea430000 x0 : 0000600dea430008 Process ping (pid: 6067, stack limit = 0x00000000dc0aa557) Call trace: pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x524/0x6e8 htb_enqueue+0x660/0x10e0 [sch_htb] __dev_queue_xmit+0x123c/0x2de0 dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30 ip_finish_output2+0xc48/0x1720 ip_finish_output+0x548/0x9d8 ip_output+0x334/0x788 ip_local_out+0x90/0x138 ip_send_skb+0x44/0x1d0 ip_push_pending_frames+0x5c/0x78 raw_sendmsg+0xed8/0x28d0 inet_sendmsg+0xc4/0x5c0 sock_sendmsg+0xac/0x108 __sys_sendto+0x1ac/0x2a0 __arm64_sys_sendto+0xc4/0x138 el0_svc_handler+0x13c/0x298 el0_svc+0x8/0xc Code: f9402e80 d538d081 91002000 8b010000 (885f7c03) Fix this by testing the value of 'TCQ_F_CPUSTATS' bit in 'qdisc->flags', before dereferencing 'qdisc->cpu_qstats'. Fixes: 8a53e61 ("net: sched: when clearing NOLOCK, clear TCQ_F_CPUSTATS, too") CC: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> CC: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]> Reported-by: Li Shuang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Hayes Wang says: ==================== r8152: fix side effect v3: Update the commit message for patch GrapheneOS#1. v2: Replace patch GrapheneOS#2 with "r8152: remove calling netif_napi_del". v1: The commit 0ee1f47 ("r8152: napi hangup fix after disconnect") add a check to avoid using napi_disable after netif_napi_del. However, the commit ffa9fec ("r8152: set RTL8152_UNPLUG only for real disconnection") let the check useless. Therefore, I revert commit 0ee1f47 ("r8152: napi hangup fix after disconnect") first, and add another patch to fix it. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

LTP testsuite on powerpc results in the below crash: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000029d800 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [GrapheneOS#1] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV ... CPU: 68 PID: 96584 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W NIP: c00000000029d800 LR: c00000000029dac4 CTR: c0000000001e6ad0 REGS: c0002017fae8ba10 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28022422 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c00000000029d90c DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP [c00000000029d800] t_probe_next+0x60/0x180 LR [c00000000029dac4] t_mod_start+0x1a4/0x1f0 Call Trace: [c0002017fae8bc90] [c000000000cdbc40] _cond_resched+0x10/0xb0 (unreliable) [c0002017fae8bce0] [c0000000002a15b0] t_start+0xf0/0x1c0 [c0002017fae8bd30] [c0000000004ec2b4] seq_read+0x184/0x640 [c0002017fae8bdd0] [c0000000004a57bc] sys_read+0x10c/0x300 [c0002017fae8be30] [c00000000000b388] system_call+0x5c/0x70 The test (ftrace_set_ftrace_filter.sh) is part of ftrace stress tests and the crash happens when the test does 'cat $TRACING_PATH/set_ftrace_filter'. The address points to the second line below, in t_probe_next(), where filter_hash is dereferenced: hash = iter->probe->ops.func_hash->filter_hash; size = 1 << hash->size_bits; This happens due to a race with register_ftrace_function_probe(). A new ftrace_func_probe is created and added into the func_probes list in trace_array under ftrace_lock. However, before initializing the filter, we drop ftrace_lock, and re-acquire it after acquiring regex_lock. If another process is trying to read set_ftrace_filter, it will be able to acquire ftrace_lock during this window and it will end up seeing a NULL filter_hash. Fix this by just checking for a NULL filter_hash in t_probe_next(). If the filter_hash is NULL, then this probe is just being added and we can simply return from here. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/05e021f757625cbbb006fad41380323dbe4e3b43.1562249521.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 7b60f3d ("ftrace: Dynamically create the probe ftrace_ops for the trace_array") Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>

If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [GrapheneOS#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70 Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key. Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side. [DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine] Fixes: 04c567d ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

thestinger added 30 commits May 3, 2017 19:43

enable CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS by default

c607904

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

enable CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST by default

313bc9a

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

enable SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM by default

ae12fbf

set kptr_restrict=2 by default

cdb398d

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

add __ro_after_init to slab_nomerge

e32ea1a

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

add a SLAB_HARDENED configuration option

b835fbc

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

disable slab merging

8f36fe9

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

add missing cache_from_obj !PageSlab check

b238307

Taken from PaX. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

real slab_equal_or_root check for !MEMCG_KMEM

133cc26

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

bug on kmem_cache_free with the wrong cache

e45250a

At least when CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION is enabled. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

always perform cache_from_obj consistency checks

6e098ef

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

bug on !PageSlab && !PageCompound in ksize

eb54ce7

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

add kmalloc alloc_size attributes

6efe84c

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

add vmalloc alloc_size attributes

d342da3

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

arm64: zero the leading stack canary byte

e1f59d4

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

x86_64: zero the leading stack canary byte

624349a

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary

0926d3f

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

zero leading per-task stack canary byte on 64-bit

daaf36f

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

add slub free list XOR encryption

e1d4586

Based on the grsecurity feature, but with a per-cache random value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

work around undefined memcmp in arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c

4764563

work around undefined memcmp in kernel/kexec_file.c

7a841c1

work around undefined memcpy in drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad…

46e3c06

…_ethtool.c

work around undefined memcpy in drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bfa_…

9e2e0bd

…ioc.c

work around undefined memcpy calls in drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlg…

3222859

…e/qlge_dbg.c

work around undefined memcpy in drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas…

0638b18

…/mesh.c

work around undefined memcpy in drivers/net/wireless/ray_cs.c

81f5f22

work around undefined memcpy in drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_lnode.c

bfe45e0

add basic full slab sanitization

e20aada

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <[email protected]>

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initial commit of extracted grsecurity chroot hardening #1

initial commit of extracted grsecurity chroot hardening #1

andyrj commented May 4, 2017 •

edited

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initial commit of extracted grsecurity chroot hardening #1

initial commit of extracted grsecurity chroot hardening #1

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andyrj commented May 4, 2017 • edited Loading

andyrj commented May 4, 2017 •

edited

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