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Failed to build: buffer_overflow in drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.o #5
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ghost
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Failed to build: buffer_overflow
Failed to build: buffer_overflow in drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.o
May 6, 2017
It's fixed now. |
andyrj
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May 6, 2017
commit f222449 upstream. We cannot do printk() from tk_debug_account_sleep_time(), because tk_debug_account_sleep_time() is called under tk_core seq lock. The reason why printk() is unsafe there is that console_sem may invoke scheduler (up()->wake_up_process()->activate_task()), which, in turn, can return back to timekeeping code, for instance, via get_time()->ktime_get(), deadlocking the system on tk_core seq lock. [ 48.950592] ====================================================== [ 48.950622] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 48.950622] 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170213+ #101 Not tainted [ 48.950622] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 48.950622] kworker/0:0/3 is trying to acquire lock: [ 48.950653] (tk_core){----..}, at: [<c01cc624>] retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90 [ 48.950683] but task is already holding lock: [ 48.950683] (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<c01cc610>] retrigger_next_event+0x38/0x90 [ 48.950714] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 48.950714] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 48.950714] -> GrapheneOS#5 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}: [ 48.950744] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.950775] lock_hrtimer_base+0x28/0x58 [ 48.950775] hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x20/0x5c8 [ 48.950775] __enqueue_rt_entity+0x320/0x360 [ 48.950805] enqueue_rt_entity+0x2c/0x44 [ 48.950805] enqueue_task_rt+0x24/0x94 [ 48.950836] ttwu_do_activate+0x54/0xc0 [ 48.950836] try_to_wake_up+0x248/0x5c8 [ 48.950836] __setup_irq+0x420/0x5f0 [ 48.950836] request_threaded_irq+0xdc/0x184 [ 48.950866] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x58/0xa4 [ 48.950866] omap_i2c_probe+0x530/0x6a0 [ 48.950897] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xb0 [ 48.950897] driver_probe_device+0x1f8/0x2cc [ 48.950897] __driver_attach+0xc0/0xc4 [ 48.950927] bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xa0 [ 48.950927] bus_add_driver+0x100/0x210 [ 48.950927] driver_register+0x78/0xf4 [ 48.950958] do_one_initcall+0x3c/0x16c [ 48.950958] kernel_init_freeable+0x20c/0x2d8 [ 48.950958] kernel_init+0x8/0x110 [ 48.950988] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.950988] -> GrapheneOS#4 (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock){-.-...}: [ 48.951019] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50 [ 48.951019] rq_offline_rt+0x9c/0x2bc [ 48.951019] set_rq_offline.part.2+0x2c/0x58 [ 48.951049] rq_attach_root+0x134/0x144 [ 48.951049] cpu_attach_domain+0x18c/0x6f4 [ 48.951049] build_sched_domains+0xba4/0xd80 [ 48.951080] sched_init_smp+0x68/0x10c [ 48.951080] kernel_init_freeable+0x160/0x2d8 [ 48.951080] kernel_init+0x8/0x110 [ 48.951080] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951110] -> GrapheneOS#3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}: [ 48.951110] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50 [ 48.951141] task_fork_fair+0x30/0x124 [ 48.951141] sched_fork+0x194/0x2e0 [ 48.951141] copy_process.part.5+0x448/0x1a20 [ 48.951171] _do_fork+0x98/0x7e8 [ 48.951171] kernel_thread+0x2c/0x34 [ 48.951171] rest_init+0x1c/0x18c [ 48.951202] start_kernel+0x35c/0x3d4 [ 48.951202] 0x8000807c [ 48.951202] -> GrapheneOS#2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}: [ 48.951232] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.951232] try_to_wake_up+0x30/0x5c8 [ 48.951232] up+0x4c/0x60 [ 48.951263] __up_console_sem+0x2c/0x58 [ 48.951263] console_unlock+0x3b4/0x650 [ 48.951263] vprintk_emit+0x270/0x474 [ 48.951293] vprintk_default+0x20/0x28 [ 48.951293] printk+0x20/0x30 [ 48.951324] kauditd_hold_skb+0x94/0xb8 [ 48.951324] kauditd_thread+0x1a4/0x56c [ 48.951324] kthread+0x104/0x148 [ 48.951354] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951354] -> GrapheneOS#1 ((console_sem).lock){-.....}: [ 48.951385] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x64 [ 48.951385] down_trylock+0xc/0x2c [ 48.951385] __down_trylock_console_sem+0x24/0x80 [ 48.951385] console_trylock+0x10/0x8c [ 48.951416] vprintk_emit+0x264/0x474 [ 48.951416] vprintk_default+0x20/0x28 [ 48.951416] printk+0x20/0x30 [ 48.951446] tk_debug_account_sleep_time+0x5c/0x70 [ 48.951446] __timekeeping_inject_sleeptime.constprop.3+0x170/0x1a0 [ 48.951446] timekeeping_resume+0x218/0x23c [ 48.951477] syscore_resume+0x94/0x42c [ 48.951477] suspend_enter+0x554/0x9b4 [ 48.951477] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xd8/0x4b4 [ 48.951507] enter_state+0x934/0xbd4 [ 48.951507] pm_suspend+0x14/0x70 [ 48.951507] state_store+0x68/0xc8 [ 48.951538] kernfs_fop_write+0xf4/0x1f8 [ 48.951538] __vfs_write+0x1c/0x114 [ 48.951538] vfs_write+0xa0/0x168 [ 48.951568] SyS_write+0x3c/0x90 [ 48.951568] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10 [ 48.951568] -> #0 (tk_core){----..}: [ 48.951599] lock_acquire+0xe0/0x294 [ 48.951599] ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x5c/0x1d4 [ 48.951629] retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90 [ 48.951629] on_each_cpu+0x40/0x7c [ 48.951629] clock_was_set_work+0x14/0x20 [ 48.951660] process_one_work+0x2b4/0x808 [ 48.951660] worker_thread+0x3c/0x550 [ 48.951660] kthread+0x104/0x148 [ 48.951690] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24 [ 48.951690] other info that might help us debug this: [ 48.951690] Chain exists of: tk_core --> &rt_b->rt_runtime_lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock [ 48.951721] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 48.951721] CPU0 CPU1 [ 48.951721] ---- ---- [ 48.951721] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); [ 48.951751] lock(&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock); [ 48.951751] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); [ 48.951751] lock(tk_core); [ 48.951782] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 48.951782] 3 locks held by kworker/0:0/3: [ 48.951782] #0: ("events"){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0156590>] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x808 [ 48.951812] GrapheneOS#1: (hrtimer_work){+.+...}, at: [<c0156590>] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x808 [ 48.951843] GrapheneOS#2: (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<c01cc610>] retrigger_next_event+0x38/0x90 [ 48.951843] stack backtrace: [ 48.951873] CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170213+ [ 48.951904] Workqueue: events clock_was_set_work [ 48.951904] [<c0110208>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010c224>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 48.951934] [<c010c224>] (show_stack) from [<c04ca6c0>] (dump_stack+0xac/0xe0) [ 48.951934] [<c04ca6c0>] (dump_stack) from [<c019b5cc>] (print_circular_bug+0x1d0/0x308) [ 48.951965] [<c019b5cc>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c019d2a8>] (validate_chain+0xf50/0x1324) [ 48.951965] [<c019d2a8>] (validate_chain) from [<c019ec18>] (__lock_acquire+0x468/0x7e8) [ 48.951995] [<c019ec18>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c019f634>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0x294) [ 48.951995] [<c019f634>] (lock_acquire) from [<c01d0ea0>] (ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x5c/0x1d4) [ 48.952026] [<c01d0ea0>] (ktime_get_update_offsets_now) from [<c01cc624>] (retrigger_next_event+0x4c/0x90) [ 48.952026] [<c01cc624>] (retrigger_next_event) from [<c01e4e24>] (on_each_cpu+0x40/0x7c) [ 48.952056] [<c01e4e24>] (on_each_cpu) from [<c01cafc4>] (clock_was_set_work+0x14/0x20) [ 48.952056] [<c01cafc4>] (clock_was_set_work) from [<c015664c>] (process_one_work+0x2b4/0x808) [ 48.952087] [<c015664c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0157774>] (worker_thread+0x3c/0x550) [ 48.952087] [<c0157774>] (worker_thread) from [<c015d644>] (kthread+0x104/0x148) [ 48.952087] [<c015d644>] (kthread) from [<c0107830>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) Replace printk() with printk_deferred(), which does not call into the scheduler. Fixes: 0bf43f1 ("timekeeping: Prints the amounts of time spent during suspend") Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit f50b878 upstream. A NULL-pointer dereference bug in gadgetfs was uncovered by syzkaller: > kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access > general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN > Dumping ftrace buffer: > (ftrace buffer empty) > Modules linked in: > CPU: 2 PID: 4820 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc4+ #5 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 > task: ffff880039542dc0 task.stack: ffff88003bdd0000 > RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x170 lib/list_debug.c:51 > RSP: 0018:ffff88003bdd6e50 EFLAGS: 00010246 > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000010000 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff86504948 RDI: ffffffff86504950 > RBP: ffff88003bdd6e68 R08: ffff880039542dc0 R09: ffffffff8778ce00 > R10: ffff88003bdd6e68 R11: dffffc0000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff100077badd2 R15: ffffffff864d2e40 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 000000002014aff9 CR3: 0000000006022000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 > Call Trace: > __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:116 [inline] > list_del include/linux/list.h:124 [inline] > usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0x166/0x4c0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:1387 > dev_release+0x80/0x160 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1187 > __fput+0x332/0x7f0 fs/file_table.c:209 > ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:245 > task_work_run+0x19b/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:116 > exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21 [inline] > do_exit+0x18a3/0x2820 kernel/exit.c:878 > do_group_exit+0x149/0x420 kernel/exit.c:982 > get_signal+0x77f/0x1780 kernel/signal.c:2318 > do_signal+0xd2/0x2130 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:808 > exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:157 > prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] > syscall_return_slowpath+0x3ba/0x410 arch/x86/entry/common.c:263 > entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe > RIP: 0033:0x4461f9 > RSP: 002b:00007fdac2b1ecf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca > RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000007080c8 RCX: 00000000004461f9 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000007080c8 > RBP: 00000000007080a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fdac2b1f9c0 R15: 00007fdac2b1f700 > Code: 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 39 c4 74 6a 48 b8 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de > 48 89 da 48 39 c3 74 74 48 c1 ea 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> > 3c 02 00 0f 85 92 00 00 00 48 8b 13 48 39 f2 75 66 49 8d 7c > RIP: __list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x170 lib/list_debug.c:51 RSP: ffff88003bdd6e50 > ---[ end trace 30e94b1eec4831c8 ]--- > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The bug was caused by dev_release() failing to turn off its gadget_registered flag after unregistering the gadget driver. As a result, when a later user closed the device file before writing a valid set of descriptors, dev_release() thought the gadget had been registered and tried to unregister it, even though it had not been. This led to the NULL pointer dereference. The fix is simple: turn off the flag when the gadget is unregistered. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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'perf annotate' is dropping the cr* fields from branch instructions. Fix it by adding support to display branch instructions having multiple operands. Power Arch objdump of int_sqrt: 20.36 | c0000000004d2694: subf r10,r10,r3 | c0000000004d2698: v bgt cr6,c0000000004d26a0 <int_sqrt+0x40> 1.82 | c0000000004d269c: mr r3,r10 29.18 | c0000000004d26a0: mr r10,r8 | c0000000004d26a4: v bgt cr7,c0000000004d26ac <int_sqrt+0x4c> | c0000000004d26a8: mr r10,r7 Power Arch Before Patch: 20.36 | subf r10,r10,r3 | v bgt 40 1.82 | mr r3,r10 29.18 | 40: mr r10,r8 | v bgt 4c | mr r10,r7 Power Arch After patch: 20.36 | subf r10,r10,r3 | v bgt cr6,40 1.82 | mr r3,r10 29.18 | 40: mr r10,r8 | v bgt cr7,4c | mr r10,r7 Also support AArch64 conditional branch instructions, which can have up to three operands: Aarch64 Non-simplified (raw objdump) view: │ffff0000083cd11c: ↑ cbz w0, ffff0000083cd100 <security_fil▒ ... 4.44 │ffff000│083cd134: ↓ tbnz w0, #26, ffff0000083cd190 <securit▒ ... 1.37 │ffff000│083cd144: ↓ tbnz w22, #5, ffff0000083cd1a4 <securit▒ │ffff000│083cd148: mov w19, #0x20000 //▒ 1.02 │ffff000│083cd14c: ↓ tbz w22, #2, ffff0000083cd1ac <securit▒ ... 0.68 │ffff000└──3cd16c: ↑ cbnz w0, ffff0000083cd120 <security_fil▒ Aarch64 Simplified, before this patch: │ ↑ cbz 40 ... 4.44 │ │↓ tbnz w0, #26, ffff0000083cd190 <security_file_permiss▒ ... 1.37 │ │↓ tbnz w22, #5, ffff0000083cd1a4 <security_file_permiss▒ │ │ mov w19, #0x20000 // #131072 1.02 │ │↓ tbz w22, #2, ffff0000083cd1ac <security_file_permiss▒ ... 0.68 │ └──cbnz 60 the cbz operand is missing, and the tbz doesn't get simplified processing at all because the parsing function failed to match an address. Aarch64 Simplified, After this patch applied: │ ↑ cbz w0, 40 ... 4.44 │ │↓ tbnz w0, #26, d0 ... 1.37 │ │↓ tbnz w22, #5, e4 │ │ mov w19, #0x20000 // #131072 1.02 │ │↓ tbz w22, #2, ec ... 0.68 │ └──cbnz w0, 60 Originally-by: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]> Reported-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Taeung Song <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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MSS change on active QPs is not supported. Store new MSS value for new QPs only. Remove code to modify MSS on the fly. This also resolves a crash on QP modify to QP 0. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: i40iw_sc_qp_modify+0x22/0x280 [i40iw] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 1236 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc1 #5 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./Q87M-D2H, BIOS F7 01/17/2014 Workqueue: l2params i40iw_l2params_worker [i40iw] task: ffff88070f5a9b40 task.stack: ffff88070f5a0000 RIP: 0010:i40iw_sc_qp_modify+0x22/0x280 [i40iw] ... Call Trace: i40iw_exec_cqp_cmd+0x2ce/0x410 [i40iw] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6f/0x80 ? i40iw_process_cqp_cmd+0x1d/0x80 [i40iw] i40iw_process_cqp_cmd+0x7c/0x80 [i40iw] i40iw_handle_cqp_op+0x2f/0x200 [i40iw] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x50 i40iw_hw_modify_qp+0x5e/0x90 [i40iw] i40iw_qp_mss_modify+0x52/0x60 [i40iw] i40iw_change_l2params+0x145/0x160 [i40iw] i40iw_l2params_worker+0x1f/0x40 [i40iw] process_one_work+0x1f5/0x650 ? process_one_work+0x161/0x650 worker_thread+0x48/0x3b0 kthread+0x112/0x150 ? process_one_work+0x650/0x650 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x40 Code: 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 cd 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 89 d6 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 87 10 01 00 00 <48> 8b 40 08 4c 8b b0 40 04 00 00 4c 89 f7 e8 1b e5 ff ff 48 85 RIP: i40iw_sc_qp_modify+0x22/0x280 [i40iw] RSP: ffff88070f5a7c28 CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 77a405931e296060 ]--- Reported-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
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A NULL-pointer dereference bug in gadgetfs was uncovered by syzkaller: > kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access > general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN > Dumping ftrace buffer: > (ftrace buffer empty) > Modules linked in: > CPU: 2 PID: 4820 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc4+ #5 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 > task: ffff880039542dc0 task.stack: ffff88003bdd0000 > RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x170 lib/list_debug.c:51 > RSP: 0018:ffff88003bdd6e50 EFLAGS: 00010246 > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000010000 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff86504948 RDI: ffffffff86504950 > RBP: ffff88003bdd6e68 R08: ffff880039542dc0 R09: ffffffff8778ce00 > R10: ffff88003bdd6e68 R11: dffffc0000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff100077badd2 R15: ffffffff864d2e40 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 000000002014aff9 CR3: 0000000006022000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 > Call Trace: > __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:116 [inline] > list_del include/linux/list.h:124 [inline] > usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0x166/0x4c0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:1387 > dev_release+0x80/0x160 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1187 > __fput+0x332/0x7f0 fs/file_table.c:209 > ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:245 > task_work_run+0x19b/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:116 > exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21 [inline] > do_exit+0x18a3/0x2820 kernel/exit.c:878 > do_group_exit+0x149/0x420 kernel/exit.c:982 > get_signal+0x77f/0x1780 kernel/signal.c:2318 > do_signal+0xd2/0x2130 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:808 > exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a7/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:157 > prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] > syscall_return_slowpath+0x3ba/0x410 arch/x86/entry/common.c:263 > entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe > RIP: 0033:0x4461f9 > RSP: 002b:00007fdac2b1ecf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca > RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000007080c8 RCX: 00000000004461f9 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000007080c8 > RBP: 00000000007080a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fdac2b1f9c0 R15: 00007fdac2b1f700 > Code: 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 39 c4 74 6a 48 b8 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de > 48 89 da 48 39 c3 74 74 48 c1 ea 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> > 3c 02 00 0f 85 92 00 00 00 48 8b 13 48 39 f2 75 66 49 8d 7c > RIP: __list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x170 lib/list_debug.c:51 RSP: ffff88003bdd6e50 > ---[ end trace 30e94b1eec4831c8 ]--- > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The bug was caused by dev_release() failing to turn off its gadget_registered flag after unregistering the gadget driver. As a result, when a later user closed the device file before writing a valid set of descriptors, dev_release() thought the gadget had been registered and tried to unregister it, even though it had not been. This led to the NULL pointer dereference. The fix is simple: turn off the flag when the gadget is unregistered. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
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Jul 3, 2017
Fix the following kernel bug: kernel BUG at drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c:3260! invalid opcode: 0000 [#5] PREEMPT SMP Hardware name: Intel Corp. Harcuvar/Server, BIOS HAVLCRB0.X64.0013.D39.1608311820 08/31/2016 task: ffff880175389950 ti: ffff880176bec000 task.ti: ffff880176bec000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150a83b>] [<ffffffff8150a83b>] intel_unmap+0x25b/0x260 RSP: 0018:ffff880176bef5e8 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffff8800773c7c88 RCX: 000000000000ce04 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000009 RBP: ffff880176bef638 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: ffff880175389c78 R11: 0000000000000a4f R12: ffff8800773c7868 R13: 00000000ffffac88 R14: ffff8800773c7818 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fef21258700(0000) GS:ffff88017b5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000066d6d8 CR3: 000000007118c000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 Stack: 00000000ffffac88 ffffffff8199867f ffff880176bef5f8 ffff880100000030 ffff880176bef668 ffff8800773c7c88 ffff880178288098 ffff8800772c0010 ffff8800773c7818 0000000000000001 ffff880176bef648 ffffffff8150a86e Call Trace: [<ffffffff8199867f>] ? printk+0x46/0x48 [<ffffffff8150a86e>] intel_unmap_page+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffffa039d99b>] ismt_access+0x27b/0x8fa [i2c_ismt] [<ffffffff81554420>] ? __pm_runtime_suspend+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff815544a0>] ? pm_suspend_timer_fn+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff81554420>] ? __pm_runtime_suspend+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff815544a0>] ? pm_suspend_timer_fn+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff8143dfd0>] ? pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id+0xf0/0xf0 [<ffffffff8172b36c>] i2c_smbus_xfer+0xec/0x4b0 [<ffffffff810aa4d5>] ? vprintk_emit+0x345/0x530 [<ffffffffa038936b>] i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x12b/0x240 [i2c_dev] [<ffffffff810aa829>] ? vprintk_default+0x29/0x40 [<ffffffffa0389b33>] i2cdev_ioctl+0x63/0x1ec [i2c_dev] [<ffffffff811b04c8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x328/0x5d0 [<ffffffff8119d8ec>] ? vfs_write+0x11c/0x190 [<ffffffff8109d449>] ? rt_up_read+0x19/0x20 [<ffffffff811b07f1>] SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0 [<ffffffff819a351b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x6e This happen When run "i2cdetect -y 0" detect SMBus iSMT adapter. After finished I2C block read/write, when unmap the data buffer, a wrong device address was pass to dma_unmap_single(). To fix this, give dma_unmap_single() the "dev" parameter, just like what dma_map_single() does, then unmap can find the right devices. Fixes: 13f35ac ("i2c: Adding support for Intel iSMT SMBus 2.0 host controller") Signed-off-by: Liwei Song <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
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Jul 28, 2017
commit cdea465 upstream. A vendor with a system having more than 128 CPUs occasionally encounters the following crash during shutdown. This is not an easily reproduceable event, but the vendor was able to provide the following analysis of the crash, which exhibits the same footprint each time. crash> bt PID: 0 TASK: ffff88017c70ce70 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "swapper/5" #0 [ffff88085c143ac8] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059c8b #1 [ffff88085c143b28] __crash_kexec at ffffffff811052e2 #2 [ffff88085c143bf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff811053d0 #3 [ffff88085c143c10] oops_end at ffffffff8168ef88 #4 [ffff88085c143c38] no_context at ffffffff8167ebb3 #5 [ffff88085c143c88] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ec49 #6 [ffff88085c143cd0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167edb3 #7 [ffff88085c143ce0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff81691d1e #8 [ffff88085c143d40] do_page_fault at ffffffff81691ec5 #9 [ffff88085c143d70] page_fault at ffffffff8168e188 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: ffffffffa053c800 RSP: ffff88085c143e28 RFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff88017c72bfd8 RBX: ffff88017a8dc000 RCX: ffff8810588b5ac8 RDX: ffff8810588b5a00 RSI: ffffffffa053c800 RDI: ffff8810588b5a00 RBP: ffff88085c143e58 R8: ffff88017c70d408 R9: ffff88017a8dc000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88085c143da0 R12: ffff8810588b5ac8 R13: 0000000000000100 R14: ffffffffa053c800 R15: ffff8810588b5a00 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 <IRQ stack> [exception RIP: cpuidle_enter_state+82] RIP: ffffffff81514192 RSP: ffff88017c72be50 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000001e4c3c6f16 RBX: 000000000000f8a0 RCX: 0000000000000018 RDX: 0000000225c17d03 RSI: ffff88017c72bfd8 RDI: 0000001e4c3c6f16 RBP: ffff88017c72be78 R8: 000000000000237e R9: 0000000000000018 R10: 0000000000002494 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88017c72be20 R13: ffff88085c14f8e0 R14: 0000000000000082 R15: 0000001e4c3bb400 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 CS: 0010 SS: 0018 This is the corresponding stack trace It has crashed because the area pointed with RIP extracted from timer element is already removed during a shutdown process. The function is smi_timeout(). And we think ffff8810588b5a00 in RDX is a parameter struct smi_info crash> rd ffff8810588b5a00 20 ffff8810588b5a00: ffff8810588b6000 0000000000000000 .`.X............ ffff8810588b5a10: ffff880853264400 ffffffffa05417e0 .D&S......T..... ffff8810588b5a20: 24a024a000000000 0000000000000000 .....$.$........ ffff8810588b5a30: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ................ ffff8810588b5a30: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ................ ffff8810588b5a40: ffffffffa053a040 ffffffffa053a060 @.S.....`.S..... ffff8810588b5a50: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ................ ffff8810588b5a60: 0000000000000000 0000000000000e00 ................ ffff8810588b5a70: ffffffffa053a580 ffffffffa053a6e0 ..S.......S..... ffff8810588b5a80: ffffffffa053a4a0 ffffffffa053a250 ..S.....P.S..... ffff8810588b5a90: 0000000500000002 0000000000000000 ................ Unfortunately the top of this area is already detroyed by someone. But because of two reasonns we think this is struct smi_info 1) The address included in between ffff8810588b5a70 and ffff8810588b5a80: are inside of ipmi_si_intf.c see crash> module ffff88085779d2c0 2) We've found the area which point this. It is offset 0x68 of ffff880859df4000 crash> rd ffff880859df4000 100 ffff880859df4000: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ................ ffff880859df4010: ffffffffa0535290 dead000000000200 .RS............. ffff880859df4020: ffff880859df4020 ffff880859df4020 @.Y.... @.Y.... ffff880859df4030: 0000000000000002 0000000000100010 ................ ffff880859df4040: ffff880859df4040 ffff880859df4040 @@.Y....@@.Y.... ffff880859df4050: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ................ ffff880859df4060: 0000000000000000 ffff8810588b5a00 .........Z.X.... ffff880859df4070: 0000000000000001 ffff880859df4078 [email protected].... If we regards it as struct ipmi_smi in shutdown process it looks consistent. The remedy for this apparent race is affixed below. Signed-off-by: Tony Camuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> This was first introduced in 7ea0ed2 ipmi: Make the message handler easier to use for SMI interfaces where some code was moved outside of the rcu_read_lock() and the lock was not added. Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
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Nov 2, 2017
commit ab31fd0 upstream. v4.10 commit 6f2ce1c ("scsi: zfcp: fix rport unblock race with LUN recovery") extended accessing parent pointer fields of struct zfcp_erp_action for tracing. If an erp_action has never been enqueued before, these parent pointer fields are uninitialized and NULL. Examples are zfcp objects freshly added to the parent object's children list, before enqueueing their first recovery subsequently. In zfcp_erp_try_rport_unblock(), we iterate such list. Accessing erp_action fields can cause a NULL pointer dereference. Since the kernel can read from lowcore on s390, it does not immediately cause a kernel page fault. Instead it can cause hangs on trying to acquire the wrong erp_action->adapter->dbf->rec_lock in zfcp_dbf_rec_action_lvl() ^bogus^ while holding already other locks with IRQs disabled. Real life example from attaching lots of LUNs in parallel on many CPUs: crash> bt 17723 PID: 17723 TASK: ... CPU: 25 COMMAND: "zfcperp0.0.1800" LOWCORE INFO: -psw : 0x0404300180000000 0x000000000038e424 -function : _raw_spin_lock_wait_flags at 38e424 ... #0 [fdde8fc90] zfcp_dbf_rec_action_lvl at 3e0004e9862 [zfcp] #1 [fdde8fce8] zfcp_erp_try_rport_unblock at 3e0004dfddc [zfcp] #2 [fdde8fd38] zfcp_erp_strategy at 3e0004e0234 [zfcp] #3 [fdde8fda8] zfcp_erp_thread at 3e0004e0a12 [zfcp] #4 [fdde8fe60] kthread at 173550 #5 [fdde8feb8] kernel_thread_starter at 10add2 zfcp_adapter zfcp_port zfcp_unit <address>, 0x404040d600000000 scsi_device NULL, returning early! zfcp_scsi_dev.status = 0x40000000 0x40000000 ZFCP_STATUS_COMMON_RUNNING crash> zfcp_unit <address> struct zfcp_unit { erp_action = { adapter = 0x0, port = 0x0, unit = 0x0, }, } zfcp_erp_action is always fully embedded into its container object. Such container object is never moved in its object tree (only add or delete). Hence, erp_action parent pointers can never change. To fix the issue, initialize the erp_action parent pointers before adding the erp_action container to any list and thus before it becomes accessible from outside of its initializing function. In order to also close the time window between zfcp_erp_setup_act() memsetting the entire erp_action to zero and setting the parent pointers again, drop the memset and instead explicitly initialize individually all erp_action fields except for parent pointers. To be extra careful not to introduce any other unintended side effect, even keep zeroing the erp_action fields for list and timer. Also double-check with WARN_ON_ONCE that erp_action parent pointers never change, so we get to know when we would deviate from previous behavior. Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <[email protected]> Fixes: 6f2ce1c ("scsi: zfcp: fix rport unblock race with LUN recovery") Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Dec 30, 2017
This reverts commit c97e410, which incorrectly was taken from upstream c0a32fe. The referenced memory leak doesn't exist on the 4.14 stable branch as the new logic of doing the kzalloc hasn't moved to this function. By adding this kfree we actually end up doing double kfree as all callers of smi_add does a kfree on error. Sample with SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y: ipmi_si: Adding ACPI-specified kcs state machine IPMI System Interface driver. ipmi_si: probing via SPMI ipmi_si: SPMI: io 0xca2 regsize 1 spacing 1 irq 0 (NULL device *): SPMI-specified kcs state machine: duplicate ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:295! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.14.8-gentoo-r1 #5 Hardware name: Supermicro X9SCL/X9SCM/X9SCL/X9SCM, BIOS 2.2 02/20/2015 task: ffff88080c208000 task.stack: ffffc90000020000 RIP: 0010:kfree+0xf5/0x157 RSP: 0000:ffffc90000023e58 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88080b2e6200 RBX: ffff88080b2e6200 RCX: ffff88080b2e6200 RDX: 000000000000008e RSI: ffff88082fc1cd60 RDI: ffff88080c003080 RBP: ffffc90000002808 R08: 000000000001cd60 R09: ffffffff814da10e R10: ffffea00202cb980 R11: 000000000000005c R12: ffffffff814da10e R13: 00000000ffffffed R14: ffffffff82317bd0 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88082fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002e09001 CR4: 00000000001606f0 Call Trace: init_ipmi_si+0x493/0x5c7 ? cleanup_ipmi_si+0x84/0x84 ? set_debug_rodata+0xc/0xc ? kthread+0x4c/0x11c do_one_initcall+0x94/0x13d ? set_debug_rodata+0xc/0xc kernel_init_freeable+0x112/0x18e ? rest_init+0xa0/0xa0 kernel_init+0x5/0xe1 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Code: 24 18 49 8b 7a 30 48 8b 37 65 48 8b 56 08 65 48 03 35 3a 29 e2 7e 4c 3b 56 10 75 39 48 8b 0e 48 63 47 20 48 01 d8 48 39 cb 75 02 <0f> 0b 49 89 c0 4c 33 87 40 01 00 00 4c 31 c1 48 89 08 48 8d 4a ---[ end trace 4ac2e2c100842676 ]--- Signed-off-by: John Einar Reitan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Lockdep gifted us with noticing the following 4-way lockup scenario: perf_trace_init() #0 mutex_lock(&event_mutex) perf_trace_event_init() perf_trace_event_reg() tp_event->class->reg() := tracepoint_probe_register #1 mutex_lock(&tracepoints_mutex) trace_point_add_func() #2 static_key_enable() #2 do_cpu_up() perf_event_init_cpu() #3 mutex_lock(&pmus_lock) #4 mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex) perf_event_task_disable() mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex) #4 ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock() #5 perf_event_for_each_child() do_exit() task_work_run() __fput() perf_release() perf_event_release_kernel() #4 mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex) #5 mutex_lock(&event->child_mutex) free_event() _free_event() event->destroy() := perf_trace_destroy #0 mutex_lock(&event_mutex); Fix that by moving the free_event() out from under the locks. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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Feb 9, 2018
Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 GrapheneOS#1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 GrapheneOS#2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 GrapheneOS#3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c GrapheneOS#4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 GrapheneOS#5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 GrapheneOS#6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 GrapheneOS#7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 GrapheneOS#8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] GrapheneOS#9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 GrapheneOS#10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 GrapheneOS#11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 GrapheneOS#1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf GrapheneOS#2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 GrapheneOS#3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb GrapheneOS#4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] GrapheneOS#5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] GrapheneOS#6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] GrapheneOS#7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] GrapheneOS#8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit df45bf8 ] Since the block is freed with last chain being put, once we reach the end of iteration of list_for_each_entry_safe, the block may be already freed. I'm hitting this only by creating and deleting clsact: [ 202.171952] ================================================================== [ 202.180182] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.187590] Read of size 8 at addr ffff880225539a80 by task tc/796 [ 202.194508] [ 202.196185] CPU: 0 PID: 796 Comm: tc Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2jiri+ #5 [ 202.203200] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2100-CB2F"/"SA001017", BIOS 5.6.5 06/07/2016 [ 202.213613] Call Trace: [ 202.216369] dump_stack+0xda/0x169 [ 202.220192] ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x147/0x147 [ 202.224790] ? show_regs_print_info+0x54/0x54 [ 202.229691] ? tcf_chain_destroy+0x1dc/0x250 [ 202.234494] print_address_description+0x83/0x3d0 [ 202.239781] ? tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.244575] kasan_report+0x1ba/0x460 [ 202.248707] ? tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.253518] tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.258117] ? tcf_chain_flush+0x290/0x290 [ 202.262708] ? qdisc_hash_del+0x82/0x1a0 [ 202.267111] ? qdisc_hash_add+0x50/0x50 [ 202.271411] ? __lock_is_held+0x5f/0x1a0 [ 202.275843] clsact_destroy+0x3d/0x80 [sch_ingress] [ 202.281323] qdisc_destroy+0xcb/0x240 [ 202.285445] qdisc_graft+0x216/0x7b0 [ 202.289497] tc_get_qdisc+0x260/0x560 Fix this by holding the block also by chain 0 and put chain 0 explicitly, out of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop at the very end of tcf_block_put_ext. Fixes: efbf789 ("net_sched: get rid of rcu_barrier() in tcf_block_put_ext()") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Feb 27, 2018
It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) GrapheneOS#1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) GrapheneOS#2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) GrapheneOS#3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) GrapheneOS#4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) GrapheneOS#5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) GrapheneOS#6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) GrapheneOS#7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) GrapheneOS#8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) GrapheneOS#9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) GrapheneOS#10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) GrapheneOS#11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Streetman <[email protected]> Cc: Seth Jennings <[email protected]> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Feb 28, 2018
commit 7ba7166 upstream. It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Streetman <[email protected]> Cc: Seth Jennings <[email protected]> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
thestinger
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Feb 28, 2018
commit 7ba7166 upstream. It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Streetman <[email protected]> Cc: Seth Jennings <[email protected]> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
thestinger
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Mar 4, 2018
[ Upstream commit 642a843 ] Calling tipc_mon_delete() before the monitor has been created will oops. This can happen in tipc_enable_bearer() error path if tipc_disc_create() fails. [ 48.589074] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001008 [ 48.590266] IP: tipc_mon_delete+0xea/0x270 [tipc] [ 48.591223] PGD 1e60c5067 P4D 1e60c5067 PUD 1eb0cf067 PMD 0 [ 48.592230] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN [ 48.595610] CPU: 5 PID: 1199 Comm: tipc Tainted: G B 4.15.0-rc4-pc64-dirty #5 [ 48.597176] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014 [ 48.598489] RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_delete+0xea/0x270 [tipc] [ 48.599347] RSP: 0018:ffff8801d827f668 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 48.600705] RAX: ffff8801ee813f00 RBX: 0000000000000204 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 48.602183] RDX: 1ffffffff1de6a75 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297 [ 48.604373] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff1dd1533 [ 48.605607] R10: ffffffff8eafbb05 R11: fffffbfff1dd1534 R12: 0000000000000050 [ 48.607082] R13: dead000000000200 R14: ffffffff8e73f310 R15: 0000000000001020 [ 48.608228] FS: 00007fc686484800(0000) GS:ffff8801f5540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 48.610189] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 48.611459] CR2: 0000000000001008 CR3: 00000001dda70002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 48.612759] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 48.613831] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 48.615038] Call Trace: [ 48.615635] tipc_enable_bearer+0x415/0x5e0 [tipc] [ 48.620623] tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x1ab/0x200 [tipc] [ 48.625118] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x36b/0x570 [ 48.631233] genl_rcv_msg+0x5a/0xa0 [ 48.631867] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1cc/0x220 [ 48.636373] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 48.637306] netlink_unicast+0x29c/0x350 [ 48.639664] netlink_sendmsg+0x439/0x590 [ 48.642014] SYSC_sendto+0x199/0x250 [ 48.649912] do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 48.650651] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 48.651843] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6859848e3 [ 48.652539] RSP: 002b:00007ffd25dff938 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 48.654003] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd25dff990 RCX: 00007fc6859848e3 [ 48.655303] RDX: 0000000000000054 RSI: 00007ffd25dff990 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 48.656512] RBP: 00007ffd25dff980 R08: 00007fc685c35fc0 R09: 000000000000000c [ 48.657697] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000d13010 [ 48.658840] R13: 00007ffd25e009c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 48.662972] RIP: tipc_mon_delete+0xea/0x270 [tipc] RSP: ffff8801d827f668 [ 48.664073] CR2: 0000000000001008 [ 48.664576] ---[ end trace e811818d54d5ce88 ]--- Acked-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
thestinger
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Mar 4, 2018
commit df45bf8 upstream. Since the block is freed with last chain being put, once we reach the end of iteration of list_for_each_entry_safe, the block may be already freed. I'm hitting this only by creating and deleting clsact: [ 202.171952] ================================================================== [ 202.180182] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.187590] Read of size 8 at addr ffff880225539a80 by task tc/796 [ 202.194508] [ 202.196185] CPU: 0 PID: 796 Comm: tc Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2jiri+ #5 [ 202.203200] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2100-CB2F"/"SA001017", BIOS 5.6.5 06/07/2016 [ 202.213613] Call Trace: [ 202.216369] dump_stack+0xda/0x169 [ 202.220192] ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x147/0x147 [ 202.224790] ? show_regs_print_info+0x54/0x54 [ 202.229691] ? tcf_chain_destroy+0x1dc/0x250 [ 202.234494] print_address_description+0x83/0x3d0 [ 202.239781] ? tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.244575] kasan_report+0x1ba/0x460 [ 202.248707] ? tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.253518] tcf_block_put_ext+0x240/0x390 [ 202.258117] ? tcf_chain_flush+0x290/0x290 [ 202.262708] ? qdisc_hash_del+0x82/0x1a0 [ 202.267111] ? qdisc_hash_add+0x50/0x50 [ 202.271411] ? __lock_is_held+0x5f/0x1a0 [ 202.275843] clsact_destroy+0x3d/0x80 [sch_ingress] [ 202.281323] qdisc_destroy+0xcb/0x240 [ 202.285445] qdisc_graft+0x216/0x7b0 [ 202.289497] tc_get_qdisc+0x260/0x560 Fix this by holding the block also by chain 0 and put chain 0 explicitly, out of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop at the very end of tcf_block_put_ext. Fixes: efbf789 ("net_sched: get rid of rcu_barrier() in tcf_block_put_ext()") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Apr 12, 2018
[ Upstream commit d754941 ] If, for any reason, userland shuts down iscsi transport interfaces before proper logouts - like when logging in to LUNs manually, without logging out on server shutdown, or when automated scripts can't umount/logout from logged LUNs - kernel will hang forever on its sd_sync_cache() logic, after issuing the SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE cmd to all still existent paths. PID: 1 TASK: ffff8801a69b8000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffff8801a69c3a30] __schedule at ffffffff8183e9ee #1 [ffff8801a69c3a80] schedule at ffffffff8183f0d5 #2 [ffff8801a69c3a98] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81842199 #3 [ffff8801a69c3b40] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8183e604 #4 [ffff8801a69c3b70] wait_for_completion_io_timeout at ffffffff8183fc6c #5 [ffff8801a69c3bd0] blk_execute_rq at ffffffff813cfe10 #6 [ffff8801a69c3c88] scsi_execute at ffffffff815c3fc7 #7 [ffff8801a69c3cc8] scsi_execute_req_flags at ffffffff815c60fe #8 [ffff8801a69c3d30] sd_sync_cache at ffffffff815d37d7 #9 [ffff8801a69c3da8] sd_shutdown at ffffffff815d3c3c This happens because iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out(), the transport layer timeout helper, would tell the queue timeout function (scsi_times_out) to reset the request timer over and over, until the session state is back to logged in state. Unfortunately, during server shutdown, this might never happen again. Other option would be "not to handle" the issue in the transport layer. That would trigger the error handler logic, which would also need the session state to be logged in again. Best option, for such case, is to tell upper layers that the command was handled during the transport layer error handler helper, marking it as DID_NO_CONNECT, which will allow completion and inform about the problem. After the session was marked as ISCSI_STATE_FAILED, due to the first timeout during the server shutdown phase, all subsequent cmds will fail to be queued, allowing upper logic to fail faster. Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
thestinger
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Apr 12, 2018
[ Upstream commit d754941 ] If, for any reason, userland shuts down iscsi transport interfaces before proper logouts - like when logging in to LUNs manually, without logging out on server shutdown, or when automated scripts can't umount/logout from logged LUNs - kernel will hang forever on its sd_sync_cache() logic, after issuing the SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE cmd to all still existent paths. PID: 1 TASK: ffff8801a69b8000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffff8801a69c3a30] __schedule at ffffffff8183e9ee #1 [ffff8801a69c3a80] schedule at ffffffff8183f0d5 #2 [ffff8801a69c3a98] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81842199 #3 [ffff8801a69c3b40] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8183e604 #4 [ffff8801a69c3b70] wait_for_completion_io_timeout at ffffffff8183fc6c #5 [ffff8801a69c3bd0] blk_execute_rq at ffffffff813cfe10 #6 [ffff8801a69c3c88] scsi_execute at ffffffff815c3fc7 #7 [ffff8801a69c3cc8] scsi_execute_req_flags at ffffffff815c60fe #8 [ffff8801a69c3d30] sd_sync_cache at ffffffff815d37d7 #9 [ffff8801a69c3da8] sd_shutdown at ffffffff815d3c3c This happens because iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out(), the transport layer timeout helper, would tell the queue timeout function (scsi_times_out) to reset the request timer over and over, until the session state is back to logged in state. Unfortunately, during server shutdown, this might never happen again. Other option would be "not to handle" the issue in the transport layer. That would trigger the error handler logic, which would also need the session state to be logged in again. Best option, for such case, is to tell upper layers that the command was handled during the transport layer error handler helper, marking it as DID_NO_CONNECT, which will allow completion and inform about the problem. After the session was marked as ISCSI_STATE_FAILED, due to the first timeout during the server shutdown phase, all subsequent cmds will fail to be queued, allowing upper logic to fail faster. Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
d1b
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Apr 25, 2018
Currently we can crash perf record when running in pipe mode, like: $ perf record ls | perf report # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options. # perf: Segmentation fault Error: The - file has no samples! The callstack of the crash is: 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name 3513 ev = event_update_event__new(len + 1, PERF_EVENT_UPDATE__NAME, evsel->id[0]); (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name GrapheneOS#1 0x00000000005158a4 in perf_event__synthesize_extra_attr GrapheneOS#2 0x0000000000443347 in record__synthesize GrapheneOS#3 0x00000000004438e3 in __cmd_record GrapheneOS#4 0x000000000044514e in cmd_record GrapheneOS#5 0x00000000004cbc95 in run_builtin GrapheneOS#6 0x00000000004cbf02 in handle_internal_command GrapheneOS#7 0x00000000004cc054 in run_argv GrapheneOS#8 0x00000000004cc422 in main The reason of the crash is that the evsel does not have ids array allocated and the pipe's synthesize code tries to access it. We don't force evsel ids allocation when we have single event, because it's not needed. However we need it when we are in pipe mode even for single event as a key for evsel update event. Fixing this by forcing evsel ids allocation event for single event, when we are in pipe mode. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
anthraxx
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in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Apr 26, 2018
[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 #1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 #2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 #3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c #4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 #5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 #6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 #7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] #9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 #10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 #11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 #1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf #2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 #3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb #4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] #5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] #6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] #7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] #8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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May 21, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
anthraxx
referenced
this issue
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
May 22, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
anthraxx
referenced
this issue
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
May 22, 2018
commit c171654 upstream. stub_probe() calls put_busid_priv() in an error path when device isn't found in the busid_table. Fix it by making put_busid_priv() safe to be called with null struct bus_id_priv pointer. This problem happens when "usbip bind" is run without loading usbip_host driver and then running modprobe. The first failed bind attempt unbinds the device from the original driver and when usbip_host is modprobed, stub_probe() runs and doesn't find the device in its busid table and calls put_busid_priv(0 with null bus_id_priv pointer. usbip-host 3-10.2: 3-10.2 is not in match_busid table... skip! [ 367.359679] ===================================== [ 367.359681] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! [ 367.359683] 4.17.0-rc4+ #5 Not tainted [ 367.359685] ------------------------------------- [ 367.359688] modprobe/2768 is trying to release lock ( [ 367.359689] ================================================================== [ 367.359696] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x99/0x110 [ 367.359699] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000058 by task modprobe/2768 [ 367.359705] CPU: 4 PID: 2768 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #5 Fixes: 2207655 ("usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors") in usb-linus Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
anthraxx
referenced
this issue
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
May 22, 2018
commit c171654 upstream. stub_probe() calls put_busid_priv() in an error path when device isn't found in the busid_table. Fix it by making put_busid_priv() safe to be called with null struct bus_id_priv pointer. This problem happens when "usbip bind" is run without loading usbip_host driver and then running modprobe. The first failed bind attempt unbinds the device from the original driver and when usbip_host is modprobed, stub_probe() runs and doesn't find the device in its busid table and calls put_busid_priv(0 with null bus_id_priv pointer. usbip-host 3-10.2: 3-10.2 is not in match_busid table... skip! [ 367.359679] ===================================== [ 367.359681] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! [ 367.359683] 4.17.0-rc4+ #5 Not tainted [ 367.359685] ------------------------------------- [ 367.359688] modprobe/2768 is trying to release lock ( [ 367.359689] ================================================================== [ 367.359696] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x99/0x110 [ 367.359699] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000058 by task modprobe/2768 [ 367.359705] CPU: 4 PID: 2768 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #5 Fixes: 2207655 ("usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors") in usb-linus Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
randomhydrosol
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Feb 3, 2019
Song Liu reported crash in 'perf record': > #0 0x0000000000500055 in ordered_events(float, long double,...)(...) () > GrapheneOS#1 0x0000000000500196 in ordered_events.reinit () > GrapheneOS#2 0x00000000004fe413 in perf_session.process_events () > GrapheneOS#3 0x0000000000440431 in cmd_record () > GrapheneOS#4 0x00000000004a439f in run_builtin () > GrapheneOS#5 0x000000000042b3e5 in main ()" This can happen when we get out of buffers during event processing. The subsequent ordered_events__free() call assumes oe->buffer != NULL and crashes. Add a check to prevent that. Reported-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: d5ceb62 ("perf ordered_events: Add 'struct ordered_events_buffer' layer") Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
randomhydrosol
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Feb 3, 2019
When option CONFIG_KASAN is enabled toghether with ftrace, function ftrace_graph_caller() gets in to a recursion, via functions kasan_check_read() and kasan_check_write(). Breakpoint 2, ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 179 mcount_get_pc x0 // function's pc (gdb) bt #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 GrapheneOS#1 0xffffff90101406c8 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 GrapheneOS#2 0xffffff90106fd084 in kasan_check_write (p=0xffffffc06c170878, size=4) at ../mm/kasan/common.c:105 GrapheneOS#3 0xffffff90104a2464 in atomic_add_return (v=<optimized out>, i=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:71 GrapheneOS#4 atomic_inc_return (v=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-fallback.h:284 GrapheneOS#5 trace_graph_entry (trace=0xffffffc03f5ff380) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:441 GrapheneOS#6 0xffffff9010481774 in trace_graph_entry_watchdog (trace=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_selftest.c:741 GrapheneOS#7 0xffffff90104a185c in function_graph_enter (ret=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728, retp=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:196 GrapheneOS#8 0xffffff9010140628 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743592948977792, parent=0xffffffc03f5ff418, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728) at ../arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c:231 GrapheneOS#9 0xffffff90101406f4 in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?) (gdb) Rework so that the kasan implementation isn't traced. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
anthraxx
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in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Feb 14, 2019
[ Upstream commit 6347244 ] Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 is marked as notrace, the function called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 shouldn't be traceable either. ftrace_graph_caller() gets called every time func write_comp_data() gets called if it isn't marked 'notrace'. This is the backtrace from gdb: #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff8010201920 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff8010439714 in write_comp_data (type=5, arg1=0, arg2=0, ip=18446743524224276596) at ../kernel/kcov.c:116 #3 0xffffff8010439894 in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (arg1=<optimized out>, arg2=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/kcov.c:188 #4 0xffffff8010201874 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743524226602768, parent=0xffffff801014b918, frame_pointer=18446743524223531344) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:27 #5 0xffffff801020194c in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Rework so that write_comp_data() that are called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_*_cmp*() are marked as 'notrace'. Commit 903e8ff ("kernel/kcov.c: mark funcs in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() as notrace") missed to mark write_comp_data() as 'notrace'. When that patch was created gcc-7 was used. In lib/Kconfig.debug config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp) That code path isn't hit with gcc-7. However, it were that with gcc-8. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx
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in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Feb 14, 2019
[ Upstream commit 6347244 ] Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 is marked as notrace, the function called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 shouldn't be traceable either. ftrace_graph_caller() gets called every time func write_comp_data() gets called if it isn't marked 'notrace'. This is the backtrace from gdb: #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff8010201920 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff8010439714 in write_comp_data (type=5, arg1=0, arg2=0, ip=18446743524224276596) at ../kernel/kcov.c:116 #3 0xffffff8010439894 in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (arg1=<optimized out>, arg2=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/kcov.c:188 #4 0xffffff8010201874 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743524226602768, parent=0xffffff801014b918, frame_pointer=18446743524223531344) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:27 #5 0xffffff801020194c in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Rework so that write_comp_data() that are called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_*_cmp*() are marked as 'notrace'. Commit 903e8ff ("kernel/kcov.c: mark funcs in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() as notrace") missed to mark write_comp_data() as 'notrace'. When that patch was created gcc-7 was used. In lib/Kconfig.debug config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp) That code path isn't hit with gcc-7. However, it were that with gcc-8. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
randomhydrosol
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Feb 17, 2019
KMSAN reported batadv_interface_tx() was possibly using a garbage value [1] batadv_get_vid() does have a pskb_may_pull() call but batadv_interface_tx() does not actually make sure this did not fail. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 CPU: 0 PID: 10006 Comm: syz-executor469 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ GrapheneOS#5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4356 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4365 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3257 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x607/0xc40 net/core/dev.c:3273 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2e42/0x3bc0 net/core/dev.c:3843 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3876 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2928 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8306/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x441889 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 10 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdda6fd468 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000441889 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007ffdda6fd4c0 R13: 00007ffdda6fd4b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1c7/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:5220 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10e0 net/core/sock.c:2083 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2781 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2872 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x661a/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Fixes: c6c8fea ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Marek Lindner <[email protected]> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
anthraxx
referenced
this issue
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Feb 28, 2019
[ Upstream commit 4ffcbfa ] KMSAN reported batadv_interface_tx() was possibly using a garbage value [1] batadv_get_vid() does have a pskb_may_pull() call but batadv_interface_tx() does not actually make sure this did not fail. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 CPU: 0 PID: 10006 Comm: syz-executor469 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4356 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4365 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3257 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x607/0xc40 net/core/dev.c:3273 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2e42/0x3bc0 net/core/dev.c:3843 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3876 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2928 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8306/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x441889 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 10 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdda6fd468 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000441889 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007ffdda6fd4c0 R13: 00007ffdda6fd4b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1c7/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:5220 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10e0 net/core/sock.c:2083 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2781 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2872 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x661a/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Fixes: c6c8fea ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Marek Lindner <[email protected]> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
anthraxx
referenced
this issue
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Feb 28, 2019
[ Upstream commit 4ffcbfa ] KMSAN reported batadv_interface_tx() was possibly using a garbage value [1] batadv_get_vid() does have a pskb_may_pull() call but batadv_interface_tx() does not actually make sure this did not fail. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 CPU: 0 PID: 10006 Comm: syz-executor469 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4356 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4365 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3257 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x607/0xc40 net/core/dev.c:3273 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2e42/0x3bc0 net/core/dev.c:3843 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3876 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2928 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8306/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x441889 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 10 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdda6fd468 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000441889 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007ffdda6fd4c0 R13: 00007ffdda6fd4b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1c7/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:5220 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10e0 net/core/sock.c:2083 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2781 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2872 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x661a/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Fixes: c6c8fea ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Marek Lindner <[email protected]> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
anthraxx
referenced
this issue
in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Feb 28, 2019
[ Upstream commit 4ffcbfa ] KMSAN reported batadv_interface_tx() was possibly using a garbage value [1] batadv_get_vid() does have a pskb_may_pull() call but batadv_interface_tx() does not actually make sure this did not fail. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 CPU: 0 PID: 10006 Comm: syz-executor469 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 batadv_interface_tx+0x908/0x1e40 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c:231 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4356 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4365 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3257 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x607/0xc40 net/core/dev.c:3273 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2e42/0x3bc0 net/core/dev.c:3843 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3876 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2928 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8306/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x441889 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 10 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdda6fd468 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000441889 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007ffdda6fd4c0 R13: 00007ffdda6fd4b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1c7/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:5220 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10e0 net/core/sock.c:2083 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2781 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2872 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x661a/0x8f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2953 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Fixes: c6c8fea ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Marek Lindner <[email protected]> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 13, 2019
[ Upstream commit 99d86c8 ] Song Liu reported crash in 'perf record': > #0 0x0000000000500055 in ordered_events(float, long double,...)(...) () > #1 0x0000000000500196 in ordered_events.reinit () > #2 0x00000000004fe413 in perf_session.process_events () > #3 0x0000000000440431 in cmd_record () > #4 0x00000000004a439f in run_builtin () > #5 0x000000000042b3e5 in main ()" This can happen when we get out of buffers during event processing. The subsequent ordered_events__free() call assumes oe->buffer != NULL and crashes. Add a check to prevent that. Reported-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: d5ceb62 ("perf ordered_events: Add 'struct ordered_events_buffer' layer") Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…_map Detected via gcc's ASan: Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 64 object(s) allocated from: 6 #0 0x7f606512e370 in __interceptor_realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee370) 7 GrapheneOS#1 0x556b0f1d7ddd in thread_map__realloc util/thread_map.c:43 8 GrapheneOS#2 0x556b0f1d84c7 in thread_map__new_by_tid util/thread_map.c:85 9 GrapheneOS#3 0x556b0f0e045e in is_event_supported util/parse-events.c:2250 10 GrapheneOS#4 0x556b0f0e1aa1 in print_hwcache_events util/parse-events.c:2382 11 GrapheneOS#5 0x556b0f0e3231 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2514 12 GrapheneOS#6 0x556b0ee0a66e in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58 13 GrapheneOS#7 0x556b0f01e0ae in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 14 GrapheneOS#8 0x556b0f01e859 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 15 GrapheneOS#9 0x556b0f01edc8 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 16 GrapheneOS#10 0x556b0f01f71f in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 17 GrapheneOS#11 0x7f6062ccf09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 8989605 ("perf tools: Do not put a variable sized type not at the end of a struct") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Detected with gcc's ASan: Direct leak of 66 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7ff3b1f32070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070) GrapheneOS#1 0x560c8761034d in collect_config util/config.c:597 GrapheneOS#2 0x560c8760d9cb in get_value util/config.c:169 GrapheneOS#3 0x560c8760dfd7 in perf_parse_file util/config.c:285 GrapheneOS#4 0x560c8760e0d2 in perf_config_from_file util/config.c:476 GrapheneOS#5 0x560c876108fd in perf_config_set__init util/config.c:661 GrapheneOS#6 0x560c87610c72 in perf_config_set__new util/config.c:709 GrapheneOS#7 0x560c87610d2f in perf_config__init util/config.c:718 GrapheneOS#8 0x560c87610e5d in perf_config util/config.c:730 GrapheneOS#9 0x560c875ddea0 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:442 GrapheneOS#10 0x7ff3afb8609a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Taeung Song <[email protected]> Fixes: 20105ca ("perf config: Introduce perf_config_set class") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Detected with gcc's ASan: Direct leak of 4356 byte(s) in 120 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7ff1a2b5a070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070) GrapheneOS#1 0x55719aef4814 in build_id_cache__origname util/build-id.c:215 GrapheneOS#2 0x55719af649b6 in print_sdt_events util/parse-events.c:2339 GrapheneOS#3 0x55719af66272 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2542 GrapheneOS#4 0x55719ad1ecaa in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58 GrapheneOS#5 0x55719aec745d in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#6 0x55719aec7d1a in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#7 0x55719aec8184 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#8 0x55719aeca41a in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#9 0x7ff1a07ae09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 40218da ("perf list: Show SDT and pre-cached events") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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…r-free issue The evlist should be destroyed before the perf session. Detected with gcc's ASan: ================================================================= ==27350==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x62b000002e38 at pc 0x5611da276999 bp 0x7ffce8f1d1a0 sp 0x7ffce8f1d190 WRITE of size 8 at 0x62b000002e38 thread T0 #0 0x5611da276998 in __list_del /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:89 GrapheneOS#1 0x5611da276d4a in __list_del_entry /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:102 GrapheneOS#2 0x5611da276e77 in list_del_init /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:145 GrapheneOS#3 0x5611da2781cd in thread__put util/thread.c:130 GrapheneOS#4 0x5611da2cc0a8 in __thread__zput util/thread.h:68 GrapheneOS#5 0x5611da2d2dcb in hist_entry__delete util/hist.c:1148 GrapheneOS#6 0x5611da2cdf91 in hists__delete_entry util/hist.c:337 GrapheneOS#7 0x5611da2ce19e in hists__delete_entries util/hist.c:365 GrapheneOS#8 0x5611da2db2ab in hists__delete_all_entries util/hist.c:2639 GrapheneOS#9 0x5611da2db325 in hists_evsel__exit util/hist.c:2651 GrapheneOS#10 0x5611da1c5352 in perf_evsel__exit util/evsel.c:1304 GrapheneOS#11 0x5611da1c5390 in perf_evsel__delete util/evsel.c:1309 GrapheneOS#12 0x5611da1b35f0 in perf_evlist__purge util/evlist.c:124 GrapheneOS#13 0x5611da1b38e2 in perf_evlist__delete util/evlist.c:148 GrapheneOS#14 0x5611da069781 in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1645 GrapheneOS#15 0x5611da17d038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#16 0x5611da17d577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#17 0x5611da17d97b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#18 0x5611da17e0e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#19 0x7fdcc970f09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) GrapheneOS#20 0x5611d9ff35c9 in _start (/home/work/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x3e95c9) 0x62b000002e38 is located 11320 bytes inside of 27448-byte region [0x62b000000200,0x62b000006d38) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdccb04ab70 in free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedb70) GrapheneOS#1 0x5611da260df4 in perf_session__delete util/session.c:201 GrapheneOS#2 0x5611da063de5 in __cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1300 GrapheneOS#3 0x5611da06973c in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1642 GrapheneOS#4 0x5611da17d038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#5 0x5611da17d577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#6 0x5611da17d97b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#7 0x5611da17e0e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#8 0x7fdcc970f09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdccb04b138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) GrapheneOS#1 0x5611da26010c in zalloc util/util.h:23 GrapheneOS#2 0x5611da260824 in perf_session__new util/session.c:118 GrapheneOS#3 0x5611da0633a6 in __cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1192 GrapheneOS#4 0x5611da06973c in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1642 GrapheneOS#5 0x5611da17d038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#6 0x5611da17d577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#7 0x5611da17d97b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#8 0x5611da17e0e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#9 0x7fdcc970f09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:89 in __list_del Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c567fff8570: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8580: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8590: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85a0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85b0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd =>0x0c567fff85c0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85e0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85f0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8600: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8610: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==27350==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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The array str[] should have six elements. ================================================================= ==4322==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x56463844e300 at pc 0x564637e7ad0d bp 0x7f30c8c89d10 sp 0x7f30c8c89d00 READ of size 8 at 0x56463844e300 thread T9 #0 0x564637e7ad0c in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:316 GrapheneOS#1 0x564637e7b0e4 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:338 GrapheneOS#2 0x564637c6a57d in process_thread /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1073 GrapheneOS#3 0x7f30d173a163 in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x8163) GrapheneOS#4 0x7f30cfffbdee in __clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x11adee) 0x56463844e300 is located 32 bytes to the left of global variable 'flags' defined in 'util/trace-event-parse.c:229:26' (0x56463844e320) of size 192 0x56463844e300 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'str' defined in 'util/ordered-events.c:268:28' (0x56463844e2e0) of size 32 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow util/ordered-events.c:316 in __ordered_events__flush Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0ac947081c10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081c20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081c30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081c40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081c50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 =>0x0ac947081c60:[f9]f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081c70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0ac947081c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081c90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081ca0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0ac947081cb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Thread T9 created by T0 here: #0 0x7f30d179de5f in __interceptor_pthread_create (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x4ae5f) GrapheneOS#1 0x564637c6b954 in __cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1253 GrapheneOS#2 0x564637c7173c in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1642 GrapheneOS#3 0x564637d85038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#4 0x564637d85577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#5 0x564637d8597b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#6 0x564637d860e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#7 0x7f30cff0509a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Fixes: 16c66bc ("perf top: Add processing thread") Fixes: 68ca5d0 ("perf ordered_events: Add ordered_events__flush_time interface") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Mar 27, 2019
Using gcc's ASan, Changbin reports: ================================================================= ==7494==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) GrapheneOS#1 0x5625e5330a5e in zalloc util/util.h:23 GrapheneOS#2 0x5625e5330a9b in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:10 GrapheneOS#3 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47 GrapheneOS#4 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505 GrapheneOS#5 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347 GrapheneOS#6 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47 GrapheneOS#7 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 GrapheneOS#8 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 GrapheneOS#9 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 GrapheneOS#10 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 GrapheneOS#11 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#12 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#13 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#14 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#15 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Indirect leak of 72 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) GrapheneOS#1 0x5625e532560d in zalloc util/util.h:23 GrapheneOS#2 0x5625e532566b in xyarray__new util/xyarray.c:10 GrapheneOS#3 0x5625e5330aba in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:15 GrapheneOS#4 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47 GrapheneOS#5 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505 GrapheneOS#6 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347 GrapheneOS#7 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47 GrapheneOS#8 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 GrapheneOS#9 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 GrapheneOS#10 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 GrapheneOS#11 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 GrapheneOS#12 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#13 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#14 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#15 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#16 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) His patch took care of evsel->prev_raw_counts, but the above backtraces are about evsel->counts, so fix that instead. Reported-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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…_event_on_all_cpus test ================================================================= ==7497==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0333a88f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30) GrapheneOS#1 0x5625e5326213 in cpu_map__trim_new util/cpumap.c:45 GrapheneOS#2 0x5625e5326703 in cpu_map__read util/cpumap.c:103 GrapheneOS#3 0x5625e53267ef in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map util/cpumap.c:120 GrapheneOS#4 0x5625e5326915 in cpu_map__new util/cpumap.c:135 GrapheneOS#5 0x5625e517b355 in test__openat_syscall_event_on_all_cpus tests/openat-syscall-all-cpus.c:36 GrapheneOS#6 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 GrapheneOS#7 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 GrapheneOS#8 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 GrapheneOS#9 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 GrapheneOS#10 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#11 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#12 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#13 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#14 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: f30a79b ("perf tools: Add reference counting for cpu_map object") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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================================================================= ==7506==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 13 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f03339d6070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070) GrapheneOS#1 0x5625e53aaef0 in expr__find_other util/expr.y:221 GrapheneOS#2 0x5625e51bcd3f in test__expr tests/expr.c:52 GrapheneOS#3 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 GrapheneOS#4 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 GrapheneOS#5 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 GrapheneOS#6 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 GrapheneOS#7 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#8 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#9 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#10 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#11 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 0751673 ("perf tools: Add a simple expression parser for JSON") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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================================================================= ==20875==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 1160 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f1b6fc84138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) GrapheneOS#1 0x55bd50005599 in zalloc util/util.h:23 GrapheneOS#2 0x55bd500068f5 in perf_evsel__newtp_idx util/evsel.c:327 GrapheneOS#3 0x55bd4ff810fc in perf_evsel__newtp /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:216 GrapheneOS#4 0x55bd4ff81608 in test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test tests/evsel-tp-sched.c:69 GrapheneOS#5 0x55bd4ff528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 GrapheneOS#6 0x55bd4ff52baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 GrapheneOS#7 0x55bd4ff543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 GrapheneOS#8 0x55bd4ff5572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 GrapheneOS#9 0x55bd4ffc4087 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 GrapheneOS#10 0x55bd4ffc45c6 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 GrapheneOS#11 0x55bd4ffc49ca in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 GrapheneOS#12 0x55bd4ffc5138 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 GrapheneOS#13 0x7f1b6e34809a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Indirect leak of 19 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f1b6fc83f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30) GrapheneOS#1 0x7f1b6e3ac30f in vasprintf (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x8830f) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a6cd11 ("perf test: Add test for the sched tracepoint format fields") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Apr 9, 2019
…mory When halting a guest, QEMU flushes the virtual ITS caches, which amounts to writing to the various tables that the guest has allocated. When doing this, we fail to take the srcu lock, and the kernel shouts loudly if running a lockdep kernel: [ 69.680416] ============================= [ 69.680819] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 69.681526] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty GrapheneOS#18 Not tainted [ 69.682096] ----------------------------- [ 69.682501] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 69.683225] [ 69.683225] other info that might help us debug this: [ 69.683225] [ 69.683975] [ 69.683975] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 69.684598] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/4097: [ 69.685059] #0: 0000000034196013 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0 [ 69.686087] GrapheneOS#1: 00000000f2ed935e (&its->its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0 [ 69.686919] GrapheneOS#2: 000000005e71ea54 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.687698] GrapheneOS#3: 00000000c17e548d (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.688475] GrapheneOS#4: 00000000ba386017 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.689978] GrapheneOS#5: 00000000c2c3c335 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.690729] [ 69.690729] stack backtrace: [ 69.691151] CPU: 2 PID: 4097 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty GrapheneOS#18 [ 69.691984] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019 [ 69.692831] Call trace: [ 69.694072] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110 [ 69.694490] gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190 [ 69.694853] kvm_write_guest+0x50/0xb0 [ 69.695209] vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x248/0x330 [ 69.695639] vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0 [ 69.696024] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8 [ 69.696424] kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8 [ 69.696788] do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960 [ 69.697128] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0 [ 69.697445] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38 [ 69.697817] el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138 [ 69.698173] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [ 69.698528] el0_svc+0x8/0xc The fix is to obviously take the srcu lock, just like we do on the read side of things since bf30824. One wonders why this wasn't fixed at the same time, but hey... Fixes: bf30824 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
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Calling kvm_is_visible_gfn() implies that we're parsing the memslots, and doing this without the srcu lock is frown upon: [12704.164532] ============================= [12704.164544] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [12704.164560] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty GrapheneOS#16 Tainted: G W [12704.164573] ----------------------------- [12704.164589] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [12704.164602] other info that might help us debug this: [12704.164616] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [12704.164631] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/13968: [12704.164644] #0: 000000007ebdae4f (&kvm->lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0 [12704.164691] GrapheneOS#1: 000000007d751022 (&its->its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0 [12704.164726] GrapheneOS#2: 00000000219d2706 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164761] GrapheneOS#3: 00000000a760aecd (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164794] GrapheneOS#4: 000000000ef8e31d (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164827] GrapheneOS#5: 000000007a872093 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164861] stack backtrace: [12704.164878] CPU: 2 PID: 13968 Comm: qemu-system-aar Tainted: G W 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty GrapheneOS#16 [12704.164887] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019 [12704.164896] Call trace: [12704.164910] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x138 [12704.164920] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [12704.164934] dump_stack+0xbc/0x104 [12704.164946] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110 [12704.164958] gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190 [12704.164969] kvm_is_visible_gfn+0x28/0x70 [12704.164980] vgic_its_check_id.isra.0+0xec/0x1e8 [12704.164991] vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x1ac/0x330 [12704.165001] vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0 [12704.165012] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8 [12704.165022] kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8 [12704.165035] do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960 [12704.165045] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0 [12704.165055] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38 [12704.165067] el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138 [12704.165078] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [12704.165089] el0_svc+0x8/0xc Make sure the lock is taken when doing this. Fixes: bf30824 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock") Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
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Syzkaller report this: kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ GrapheneOS#5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573 Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline] __mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072 drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934 destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319 __do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline] __se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x462e99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Fixes: 0a38c17 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue") Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
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in anthraxx/linux-hardened
Apr 9, 2019
[ Upstream commit 0510748 ] We were crashing when processing a negative fd: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000609bbf in syscall_arg__scnprintf_ioctl_cmd (bf=0x1172eca "", size=2038, arg=0x7fffffff8360) at trace/beauty/ioctl.c:182 182 if (file->dev_maj == USB_DEVICE_MAJOR) Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install bzip2-libs-1.0.6-28.fc29.x86_64 elfutils-libelf-0.174-5.fc29.x86_64 elfutils-libs-0.174-5.fc29.x86_64 glib2-2.58.3-1.fc29.x86_64 libbabeltrace-1.5.6-1.fc29.x86_64 libunwind-1.2.1-6.fc29.x86_64 libuuid-2.32.1-1.fc29.x86_64 libxcrypt-4.4.3-2.fc29.x86_64 numactl-libs-2.0.12-1.fc29.x86_64 openssl-libs-1.1.1a-1.fc29.x86_64 pcre-8.42-6.fc29.x86_64 perl-libs-5.28.1-427.fc29.x86_64 popt-1.16-15.fc29.x86_64 python2-libs-2.7.15-11.fc29.x86_64 slang-2.3.2-4.fc29.x86_64 xz-libs-5.2.4-3.fc29.x86_64 (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000609bbf in syscall_arg__scnprintf_ioctl_cmd (bf=0x1172eca "", size=2038, arg=0x7fffffff8360) at trace/beauty/ioctl.c:182 #1 0x000000000048e295 in syscall__scnprintf_val (sc=0x123b500, bf=0x1172eca "", size=2038, arg=0x7fffffff8360, val=21519) at builtin-trace.c:1594 #2 0x000000000048e60d in syscall__scnprintf_args (sc=0x123b500, bf=0x1172ec6 "-1, ", size=2042, args=0x7ffff6a7c034 "\377\377\377\377", augmented_args=0x7ffff6a7c064, augmented_args_size=4, trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, thread=0x1175cd0) at builtin-trace.c:1661 #3 0x000000000048f04e in trace__sys_enter (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, evsel=0xb260b0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8, sample=0x7fffffff84f0) at builtin-trace.c:1880 #4 0x00000000004915a4 in trace__handle_event (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8, sample=0x7fffffff84f0) at builtin-trace.c:2590 #5 0x0000000000491eed in __trace__deliver_event (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8) at builtin-trace.c:2818 #6 0x0000000000492030 in trace__deliver_event (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, event=0x7ffff6a7bfe8) at builtin-trace.c:2845 #7 0x0000000000492896 in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa8d0, argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffdb58) at builtin-trace.c:3040 #8 0x000000000049603a in cmd_trace (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffdb58) at builtin-trace.c:3952 #9 0x00000000004d5103 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffdb58) at perf.c:474 (gdb) p fd $1 = -1 (gdb) p file $7 = (struct file *) 0xfffffffffffffff0 (gdb) p ((struct thread_trace *)arg->thread)->files.table + fd $8 = (struct file *) 0xfffffffffffffff0 (gdb) Check for that and return NULL instead. This problem was introduced recently, the other codepaths leading to thread_trace__files_entry() check for negative fds, like thread__fd_path(), but we need to do it at thread_trace__files_entry() as more users are now calling it directly. Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Luis Cláudio Gonçalves <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Wang Nan <[email protected]> Fixes: 2d47338 ("perf trace beauty: Export function to get the files for a thread") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Apr 19, 2019
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes This patchset contains various small fixes for mlxsw. Patch GrapheneOS#1 fixes a warning generated by switchdev core when the driver fails to insert an MDB entry in the commit phase. Patches GrapheneOS#2-GrapheneOS#4 fix a warning in check_flush_dependency() that can be triggered when a work item in a WQ_MEM_RECLAIM workqueue tries to flush a non-WQ_MEM_RECLAIM workqueue. It seems that the semantics of the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag are not very clear [1] and that various patches have been sent to remove it from various workqueues throughout the kernel [2][3][4] in order to silence the warning. These patches do the same for the workqueues created by mlxsw that probably should not have been created with this flag in the first place. Patch GrapheneOS#5 fixes a regression where an IP address cannot be assigned to a VRF upper due to erroneous MAC validation check. Patch GrapheneOS#6 adds a test case. Patch GrapheneOS#7 adjusts Spectrum-2 shared buffer configuration to be compatible with Spectrum-1. The problem and fix are described in detail in the commit message. Please consider patches GrapheneOS#1-GrapheneOS#5 for 5.0.y. I verified they apply cleanly. [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10791315/ [2] Commit ce162bf ("mac80211_hwsim: don't use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") [3] Commit 39baf10 ("IB/core: Fix use workqueue without WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") [4] Commit 75215e5 ("iwcm: Don't allocate iwcm workqueue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Apr 19, 2019
Syzkaller report this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff830524b PGD 237fe8067 P4D 237fe8067 PUD 237e64067 PMD 1c9716067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 4465 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ GrapheneOS#5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x21/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:23 Code: 8b 0c 24 e9 17 fd ff ff 90 55 48 89 fd 48 8d 7a 08 53 48 89 d3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 8b 00 00 00 48 8b 53 08 48 39 f2 75 35 48 89 f2 RSP: 0018:ffff8881ea2278d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc1829250 RCX: 1ffff1103d444ef4 RDX: 1ffffffff830524b RSI: ffffffff85659300 RDI: ffffffffc1829258 RBP: ffffffffc1879250 R08: fffffbfff0acb269 R09: fffffbfff0acb269 R10: ffff8881ea2278f0 R11: fffffbfff0acb268 R12: ffffffffc1829250 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: ffffffffc187c830 FS: 00007fe0361df700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff830524b CR3: 00000001eb39a001 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: __list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline] list_add include/linux/list.h:79 [inline] proto_register+0x444/0x8f0 net/core/sock.c:3375 nr_proto_init+0x73/0x4b3 [netrom] ? 0xffffffffc1628000 ? 0xffffffffc1628000 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x462e99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fe0361dec58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fe0361dec70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe0361df6bc R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004 Modules linked in: netrom(+) ax25 fcrypt pcbc af_alg arizona_ldo1 v4l2_common videodev media v4l2_dv_timings hdlc ide_cd_mod snd_soc_sigmadsp_regmap snd_soc_sigmadsp intel_spi_platform intel_spi mtd spi_nor snd_usbmidi_lib usbcore lcd ti_ads7950 hi6421_regulator snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_max98927 snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_hda_ext_core snd_hda_core snd_soc_rt5663 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_compress snd_soc_rl6231 mac80211 rtc_rc5t583 spi_slave_time leds_pwm hid_gt683r hid industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio ir_kbd_i2c rc_core led_class_flash dwc_xlgmac snd_ymfpci gameport snd_mpu401_uart snd_rawmidi snd_ac97_codec snd_pcm ac97_bus snd_opl3_lib snd_timer snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd soundcore iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ide_pci_generic piix aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper ide_core psmouse input_leds i2c_piix4 serio_raw intel_agp intel_gtt ata_generic agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc rtc_cmos parport floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: rxrpc] Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) CR2: fffffbfff830524b ---[ end trace 039ab24b305c4b19 ]--- If nr_proto_init failed, it may forget to call proto_unregister, tiggering this issue.This patch rearrange code of nr_proto_init to avoid such issues. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Apr 22, 2019
By calling maps__insert() we assume to get 2 references on the map, which we relese within maps__remove call. However if there's already same map name, we currently don't bump the reference and can crash, like: Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 GrapheneOS#1 0x00007ffff75d0895 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6 GrapheneOS#2 0x00007ffff75d0769 in __assert_fail_base.cold () from /lib64/libc.so.6 GrapheneOS#3 0x00007ffff75de596 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6 GrapheneOS#4 0x00000000004fc006 in refcount_sub_and_test (i=1, r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:131 GrapheneOS#5 refcount_dec_and_test (r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:148 GrapheneOS#6 map__put (map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:299 GrapheneOS#7 0x00000000004fdb95 in __maps__remove (map=0x1224df0, maps=0xb17d80) at util/map.c:953 GrapheneOS#8 maps__remove (maps=0xb17d80, map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:959 GrapheneOS#9 0x00000000004f7d8a in map_groups__remove (map=<optimized out>, mg=<optimized out>) at util/map_groups.h:65 GrapheneOS#10 machine__process_ksymbol_unregister (sample=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, machine=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:728 GrapheneOS#11 machine__process_ksymbol (machine=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, sample=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:741 GrapheneOS#12 0x00000000004fffbb in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0xb11390, event=0x7ffff7279670, tool=0x7fffffffc7b0, file_offset=13936) at util/session.c:1362 GrapheneOS#13 0x00000000005039bb in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0xb17e80) at util/ordered-events.c:243 GrapheneOS#14 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0xb17e80, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:322 GrapheneOS#15 0x00000000005005e4 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=session@entry=0xb11390, event=event@entry=0x7ffff72a4af8, ... Add the map to the list and getting the reference event if we find the map with same name. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Saint-Etienne <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]> Fixes: 1e62856 ("perf symbols: Fix slowness due to -ffunction-section") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Jun 16, 2019
Puts range check before dereferencing the pointer. Reproducer: # echo stacktrace > trace_options # echo 1 > events/enable # cat trace > /dev/null KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in trace_stack_print+0x26b/0x2c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888069d20000 by task cat/1953 CPU: 0 PID: 1953 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3+ GrapheneOS#5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8a/0xce print_address_description+0x60/0x224 ? trace_stack_print+0x26b/0x2c0 ? trace_stack_print+0x26b/0x2c0 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x3e ? trace_stack_print+0x26b/0x2c0 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 trace_stack_print+0x26b/0x2c0 print_trace_line+0x6ea/0x14d0 ? tracing_buffers_read+0x700/0x700 ? trace_find_next_entry_inc+0x158/0x1d0 s_show+0xea/0x310 seq_read+0xaa7/0x10e0 ? seq_escape+0x230/0x230 __vfs_read+0x7c/0x100 vfs_read+0x16c/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x121/0x240 ? kernel_write+0x110/0x110 ? perf_trace_sys_enter+0x8a0/0x8a0 ? syscall_slow_exit_work+0xa9/0x410 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x390 ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x165/0x200 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f867681f910 Code: b6 fe ff ff 48 8d 3d 0f be 08 00 48 83 ec 08 e8 06 db 01 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2d 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 00 00 00 00 04 RSP: 002b:00007ffdabf23488 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f867681f910 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f8676cde000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8676cde000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000871 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8676cde000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000000ec0 Allocated by task 1214: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 kmem_cache_alloc+0xaf/0x1a0 getname_flags+0xd2/0x5b0 do_sys_open+0x277/0x5a0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 1214: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0x8a/0x1c0 putname+0xe1/0x120 do_sys_open+0x2c5/0x5a0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888069d20000 which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff888069d20000, ffff888069d21000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001a74800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806ccd1380 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0100000000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88806ccd1380 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888069d1ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888069d1ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888069d20000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888069d20080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888069d20100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 4285f2f ("tracing: Remove the ULONG_MAX stack trace hackery") Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
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Jun 18, 2019
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes This patchset contains various fixes for mlxsw. Patch GrapheneOS#1 fixes an hash polarization problem when a nexthop device is a LAG device. This is caused by the fact that the same seed is used for the LAG and ECMP hash functions. Patch GrapheneOS#2 fixes an issue in which the driver fails to refresh a nexthop neighbour after it becomes dead. This prevents the nexthop from ever being written to the adjacency table and used to forward traffic. Patch Patch GrapheneOS#4 fixes a wrong extraction of TOS value in flower offload code. Patch GrapheneOS#5 is a test case. Patch GrapheneOS#6 works around a buffer issue in Spectrum-2 by reducing the default sizes of the shared buffer pools. Patch GrapheneOS#7 prevents prio-tagged packets from entering the switch when PVID is removed from the bridge port. Please consider patches GrapheneOS#2, GrapheneOS#4 and GrapheneOS#6 for 5.1.y ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Sep 10, 2019
KASAN report this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff834f001 PGD 237fe8067 P4D 237fe8067 PUD 237e64067 PMD 1c968d067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [GrapheneOS#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 8871 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ GrapheneOS#5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x31/0xa0 lib/string.c:328 Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 55 53 48 83 ec 08 eb 0a 84 db 48 89 ef 74 5a 4c 89 e6 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 8d 6f 01 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 <42> 0f b6 04 28 38 d0 7f 04 84 c0 75 50 48 89 f0 48 89 f2 0f b6 5d RSP: 0018:ffff8881e0c57800 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 1ffffffff834f001 RBX: ffffffffc1a78000 RCX: ffffffff827b9503 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc1a40008 RDI: ffffffffc1a78008 RBP: ffffffffc1a78009 R08: fffffbfff6a92195 R09: fffffbfff6a92195 R10: ffff8881e0c578b8 R11: fffffbfff6a92194 R12: ffffffffc1a40008 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffffc1a3e470 R15: ffffffffc1a40000 FS: 00007fdcc02ff700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff834f001 CR3: 00000001b3134003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: genl_family_find_byname+0x7f/0xf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:104 genl_register_family+0x1e1/0x1070 net/netlink/genetlink.c:333 ? 0xffffffffc1978000 hwsim_init_module+0x6a/0x1000 [mac802154_hwsim] ? 0xffffffffc1978000 ? 0xffffffffc1978000 ? 0xffffffffc1978000 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x462e99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fdcc02fec58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fdcc02fec70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdcc02ff6bc R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004 Modules linked in: mac802154_hwsim(+) mac802154 ieee802154 speakup(C) rc_proteus_2309 rtc_rk808 streebog_generic rds vboxguest madera_spi madera da9052_wdt mISDN_core ueagle_atm usbatm atm ir_imon_decoder scsi_transport_sas rc_dntv_live_dvb_t panel_samsung_s6d16d0 drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks lib80211 fb_agm1264k_fl(C) gspca_pac7302 gspca_main videobuf2_v4l2 soundwire_intel_init i2c_dln2 dln2 usbcore hid_gaff 88pm8607 nfnetlink axp20x_i2c axp20x uio pata_marvell pmbus_core snd_sonicvibes gameport snd_pcm snd_opl3_lib snd_timer snd_hwdep snd_mpu401_uart snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd soundcore rtc_ds1511 rtc_ds1742 vsock dwc_xlgmac rtc_rx8010 libphy twofish_x86_64_3way twofish_x86_64 twofish_common ad5696_i2c ad5686 lp8788_charger cxd2880_spi dvb_core videobuf2_common videodev media videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops fbtft(C) sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea fb_sys_fops janz_ican3 firewire_net firewire_core crc_itu_t spi_slave_system_control i2c_matroxfb i2c_algo_bit matroxfb_base fb fbdev matroxfb_DAC1064 matroxfb_accel cfbcopyarea cfbimgblt cfbfillrect matroxfb_Ti3026 matroxfb_g450 g450_pll matroxfb_misc leds_blinkm ti_dac7311 intel_spi_pci intel_spi spi_nor hid_elan hid async_tx rc_cinergy_1400 rc_core intel_ishtp kxcjk_1013 industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf can_dev intel_th spi_pxa2xx_platform pata_artop vme_ca91cx42 gb_gbphy(C) greybus(C) industrialio mptbase st_drv cmac ttpci_eeprom via_wdt gpio_xra1403 mtd iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 input_leds crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper ide_pci_generic piix psmouse ide_core serio_raw ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos intel_agp intel_gtt agpgart sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: speakup] Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) CR2: fffffbfff834f001 ---[ end trace 5aa772c793e0e971 ]--- RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x31/0xa0 lib/string.c:328 Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 55 53 48 83 ec 08 eb 0a 84 db 48 89 ef 74 5a 4c 89 e6 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 8d 6f 01 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 <42> 0f b6 04 28 38 d0 7f 04 84 c0 75 50 48 89 f0 48 89 f2 0f b6 5d RSP: 0018:ffff8881e0c57800 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 1ffffffff834f001 RBX: ffffffffc1a78000 RCX: ffffffff827b9503 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc1a40008 RDI: ffffffffc1a78008 RBP: ffffffffc1a78009 R08: fffffbfff6a92195 R09: fffffbfff6a92195 R10: ffff8881e0c578b8 R11: fffffbfff6a92194 R12: ffffffffc1a40008 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffffc1a3e470 R15: ffffffffc1a40000 FS: 00007fdcc02ff700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff834f001 CR3: 00000001b3134003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 The error handing path misplace the cleanup in hwsim_init_module, switch the two cleanup functions to fix above issues. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Fixes: f25da51 ("ieee802154: hwsim: add replacement for fakelb") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Acked-by: Alexander Aring <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
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Sep 10, 2019
Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread"). Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex - i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen afterwards. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 GrapheneOS#1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 GrapheneOS#2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec GrapheneOS#3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 GrapheneOS#4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f GrapheneOS#5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 GrapheneOS#6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 GrapheneOS#7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] GrapheneOS#8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] GrapheneOS#9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] GrapheneOS#10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce GrapheneOS#11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 GrapheneOS#12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f GrapheneOS#13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 GrapheneOS#14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device") Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
randomhydrosol
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Sep 10, 2019
Calling ceph_buffer_put() in fill_inode() may result in freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by postponing the call until later, when the lock is released. The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/070. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3852, name: kworker/0:4 6 locks held by kworker/0:4/3852: #0: 000000004270f6bb ((wq_completion)ceph-msgr){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 GrapheneOS#1: 00000000eb420803 ((work_completion)(&(&con->work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 GrapheneOS#2: 00000000be1c53a4 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x288/0x1476 GrapheneOS#3: 00000000559cb958 (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476 GrapheneOS#4: 000000000d5ebbae (&req->r_fill_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x2fc/0x1476 GrapheneOS#5: 00000000a83d0514 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: fill_inode.isra.0+0xf8/0xf70 CPU: 0 PID: 3852 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #441 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 ___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1 vfree+0x4b/0x60 ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60 fill_inode.isra.0+0xa9b/0xf70 ceph_fill_trace+0x13b/0xc70 ? dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476 dispatch+0x320/0x1476 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x4d/0x2a0 ceph_con_workfn+0xc97/0x2ec0 ? process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0 kthread+0x105/0x140 ? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
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