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Bluetooth: ATT: Respond with not support error for unknown PDUs #6
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if (att_op_get_type(hdr->code) != ATT_COMMAND) { | ||
send_err_rsp(chan->conn, hdr->code, 0, | ||
BT_ATT_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); | ||
} |
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I'm not convinced that this is the right behavior. I'd have thought that unknown opcodes are essentially RFU, and any RFU fields are generally mandated to be ignored upon reception. So "not supported" is not quite the same as "unknown". Do you have some reference to the spec that says something about this?
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Not sure how else we would handle new opcodes, if we just ignore we basically stall the request queue and no other request can be sent. Marcel had similar interpretation wich led us to change the behavior on BlueZ as well.
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Do you have some reference to a section in the spec that this interpretation comes from?
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BLUETOOTH SPECIFICATION Version 5.0 | Vol 3, Part F page 2179
If a server receives a request that it does not support, then the server shall
respond with the Error Response with the Error Code «Request Not
Supported», with the Attribute Handle In Error set to 0x0000.
If a server receives a command that it does not support, indicated by the
Command Flag of the PDU set to one, then the server shall ignore the
Command.
Note that the spec differentiate not supported request from commands, so only commands shall be ignored while request shall be replied. Now you can argue that request not supported is not exactly not understood, or something like that, still by not responding it will stall the request queue which inevitably will disconnect after 30 seconds and there is nowhere mentioned that an unknown PDU shall cause the server to disconnect. I don't know how likely it is to have any new requests introduced to ATT/GATT, but I guess it better to be safe than sorry if anything changes in the future.
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BLUETOOTH SPECIFICATION Version 5.0 | Vol 3, Part F page 2173
A client may send attribute protocol requests to a server, and the server shall
respond to all requests that it receives.
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Is it guaranteed that if the command flag is not set in an unrecognized PDU that it must then be a request PDU? There are more PDU types than requests and commands in ATT. Btw, I'm not saying that you're wrong (in that the patch would be better than not having it) but I still fail to see some unambiguous evidence for what's the right thing.
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Oh, you'll want to rebase and reupload this one, since the rebase that was done for the bluetooth branch seems to have made github think this pull request contains multiple patches, when in reality it's just one.
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Sure I will do this in a moment, regarding other types of PDUs honestly this seems an issue from the spec, though it is unlikely there will be new types of PDUs, other than notify and indicate. The spec also got inconsistent defining the notify and indicate PDUs, that should probably have its own mask like commands, instead the authors just jumped 0x1A and 0x1C.
This ensures that an unknown request won't cause ATT to timeout since no response is currently generated. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
W25Q16FW Flash driver support Closes zephyrproject-rtos#6 See merge request blik/embedded/zephyr!11
Update code to boot on QEMU and UP Squared board
* Include HOSTAP_BASE to fix header file paths * Select WEP automatically through Kconfig Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <[email protected]>
* Include HOSTAP_BASE to fix header file paths * Select WEP automatically through Kconfig Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <[email protected]>
* Include HOSTAP_BASE to fix header file paths * Select WEP automatically through Kconfig Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <[email protected]>
…v-6801 CP9314 v0.1.1
# This is the 1st commit message: posix: Tests for putmsg Add in tests for putmsg impl and headers Signed-off-by: Abhinav Srivastava <[email protected]> # This is the commit message zephyrproject-rtos#2: posix: Tests for putmsg Add tests for implentation and header file. Signed-off-by: Abhinav Srivastava <[email protected]> # This is the commit message zephyrproject-rtos#3: posix: fix stropts_h.c faulty imports and function usage # This is the commit message zephyrproject-rtos#4: posix: fix streams config symbol Makes more sense to use CONFIG_POSIX_STROPTS Signed-off-by: Abhinav Srivastava <[email protected]> # This is the commit message zephyrproject-rtos#5: Revert "posix: fix streams config symbol" This reverts commit aa03b70. Signed-off-by: Abhinav Srivastava <[email protected]> # This is the commit message zephyrproject-rtos#6: Update tests/posix/headers/src/stropts_h.c Co-authored-by: Chris Friedt <[email protected]>
Flush all messages and invoke `abort()` when a k_panic() or k_oops() is hit in native_posix mode. One of the main purposes of `native_posix` is to provide debug convenience. When running in a debugger, `abort()` stops execution which provides a backtrace and the ability to inspect all variables. A practical use case is fuzzing failures in SOF, see an example in: thesofproject/sof#8632 In such a case, this commit adds value even before using a debugger. Without this commit, confusingly meaningless stack trace: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb Exiting due to fatal error ==314134== ERROR: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited #0 0x81d9637 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9637) #1 0x80cc42b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc42b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab79e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExitCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab864 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticExitCallback() (zephyr.exe+ zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf783dfe8 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3dfe8) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf783e1e6 in exit (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3e1e6) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x82a5488 in posix_exit boards/posix/native_posix/main.c:51:2 SUMMARY: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited ``` Thanks to this commit the `k_panic()` location is immediately available in the logs without even running anything: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb ==315176== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal LLVMSymbolizer: error reading file: No such file or directory #0 0x81d9647 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9647) #1 0x80cc43b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc43b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab6be in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab77b in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf7f3159f (linux-gate.so.1+0x59f) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf7f31578 (linux-gate.so.1+0x578) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0xf788ea16 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x8ea16) zephyrproject-rtos#7 0xf783b316 in raise (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3b316) zephyrproject-rtos#8 0xf7822120 in abort (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x22120) zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x82afbde in ipc_cmd src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623:2 NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers. Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports. SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal ``` Full stack trace When running zephyr.exe in gdb: ``` ./scripts/fuzz.sh -- -DEXTRA_CFLAGS="-O0 -g3" gdb ./zephyr.exe backtrace zephyrproject-rtos#2 0xf783b317 in raise () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#3 0xf7822121 in abort () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x082afbdf in ipc_cmd (_hdr=0x8b...) at src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x082fbf4b in ipc_platform_do_cmd (ipc=0x8b161c0) at src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162 zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x082e1e07 in ipc_do_cmd (data=0x8b161c0 <heapmem+1472>) at src/ipc/ipc-common.c:328 zephyrproject-rtos#7 0x083696aa in task_run (task=0x8b161e8 <heapmem+1512>) at zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94 zephyrproject-rtos#8 0x083682dc in edf_work_handler (work=0x8b1621c <heapmem+1564>) at zephyr/edf_schedule.c:32 zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x085245af in work_queue_main (workq_ptr=0x8b15b00 <edf_workq>,...) at zephyr/kernel/work.c:688 zephyrproject-rtos#10 0x0823a6bc in z_thread_entry (entry=0x8523be0 <work_queue_main>,.. at zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:48 zephyrproject-rtos#11 0x0829a6a1 in posix_arch_thread_entry (pa_thread_status=0x8630648 .. at zephyr/arch/posix/core/thread.c:56 zephyrproject-rtos#12 0x0829c043 in posix_thread_starter (arg=0x4) at zephyr/arch/posix/core/posix_core.c:293 zephyrproject-rtos#13 0x080f6041 in asan_thread_start(void*) () zephyrproject-rtos#14 0xf788c73c in ?? () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 ``` Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]>
Flush all messages and invoke `abort()` when a k_panic() or k_oops() is hit in native_posix mode. One of the main purposes of `native_posix` is to provide debug convenience. When running in a debugger, `abort()` stops execution which provides a backtrace and the ability to inspect all variables. A practical use case is fuzzing failures in SOF, see an example in: thesofproject/sof#8632 In such a case, this commit adds value even before using a debugger. Without this commit, confusingly meaningless stack trace: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb Exiting due to fatal error ==314134== ERROR: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited #0 0x81d9637 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9637) #1 0x80cc42b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc42b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab79e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExitCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab864 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticExitCallback() (zephyr.exe+ zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf783dfe8 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3dfe8) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf783e1e6 in exit (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3e1e6) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x82a5488 in posix_exit boards/posix/native_posix/main.c:51:2 SUMMARY: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited ``` Thanks to this commit the `k_panic()` location is immediately available in the logs without even running anything: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb ==315176== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal LLVMSymbolizer: error reading file: No such file or directory #0 0x81d9647 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9647) #1 0x80cc43b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc43b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab6be in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab77b in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf7f3159f (linux-gate.so.1+0x59f) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf7f31578 (linux-gate.so.1+0x578) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0xf788ea16 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x8ea16) zephyrproject-rtos#7 0xf783b316 in raise (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3b316) zephyrproject-rtos#8 0xf7822120 in abort (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x22120) zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x82afbde in ipc_cmd src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623:2 NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers. Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports. SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal ``` Full stack trace When running zephyr.exe in gdb: ``` ./scripts/fuzz.sh -- -DEXTRA_CFLAGS="-O0 -g3" gdb ./zephyr.exe backtrace zephyrproject-rtos#2 0xf783b317 in raise () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#3 0xf7822121 in abort () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x082afbdf in ipc_cmd (_hdr=0x8b...) at src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x082fbf4b in ipc_platform_do_cmd (ipc=0x8b161c0) at src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162 zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x082e1e07 in ipc_do_cmd (data=0x8b161c0 <heapmem+1472>) at src/ipc/ipc-common.c:328 zephyrproject-rtos#7 0x083696aa in task_run (task=0x8b161e8 <heapmem+1512>) at zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94 zephyrproject-rtos#8 0x083682dc in edf_work_handler (work=0x8b1621c <heapmem+1564>) at zephyr/edf_schedule.c:32 zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x085245af in work_queue_main (workq_ptr=0x8b15b00 <edf_workq>,...) at zephyr/kernel/work.c:688 zephyrproject-rtos#10 0x0823a6bc in z_thread_entry (entry=0x8523be0 <work_queue_main>,.. at zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:48 zephyrproject-rtos#11 0x0829a6a1 in posix_arch_thread_entry (pa_thread_status=0x8630648 .. at zephyr/arch/posix/core/thread.c:56 zephyrproject-rtos#12 0x0829c043 in posix_thread_starter (arg=0x4) at zephyr/arch/posix/core/posix_core.c:293 zephyrproject-rtos#13 0x080f6041 in asan_thread_start(void*) () zephyrproject-rtos#14 0xf788c73c in ?? () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 ``` Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]>
Flush all messages and invoke `abort()` when a k_panic() or k_oops() is hit in native_posix mode. One of the main purposes of `native_posix` is to provide debug convenience. When running in a debugger, `abort()` stops execution which provides a backtrace and the ability to inspect all variables. A good, sample use case is fuzzing failures in SOF, see an example in: thesofproject/sof#8632 In such a case, this commit adds value even before using a debugger. Without this commit, confusingly meaningless stack trace: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb Exiting due to fatal error ==314134== ERROR: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited #0 0x81d9637 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9637) #1 0x80cc42b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc42b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab79e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExitCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab864 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticExitCallback() (zephyr.exe+ zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf783dfe8 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3dfe8) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf783e1e6 in exit (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3e1e6) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x82a5488 in posix_exit boards/posix/native_posix/main.c:51:2 SUMMARY: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited ``` Thanks to this commit the `k_panic()` location is now immediately available in test logs without even running anything locally: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb @ WEST_TOPDIR/sof/src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 ZEPHYR FATAL ERROR: 3 ==315176== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal LLVMSymbolizer: error reading file: No such file or directory #0 0x81d9647 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9647) #1 0x80cc43b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc43b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab6be in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab77b in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf7f3159f (linux-gate.so.1+0x59f) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf7f31578 (linux-gate.so.1+0x578) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0xf788ea16 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x8ea16) zephyrproject-rtos#7 0xf783b316 in raise (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3b316) zephyrproject-rtos#8 0xf7822120 in abort (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x22120) zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x82afbde in ipc_cmd src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623:2 NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers. Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports. SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal ``` The full stack trace is now immediately available when running zephyr.exe in gdb: ``` ./scripts/fuzz.sh -- -DEXTRA_CFLAGS="-O0 -g3" gdb build-fuzz/zephyr/zephyr.exe run backtrace zephyrproject-rtos#2 0xf783b317 in raise () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#3 0xf7822121 in abort () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x082afbdf in ipc_cmd (_hdr=0x8b...) at src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x082fbf4b in ipc_platform_do_cmd (ipc=0x8b161c0) at src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162 zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x082e1e07 in ipc_do_cmd (data=0x8b161c0 <heapmem+1472>) at src/ipc/ipc-common.c:328 zephyrproject-rtos#7 0x083696aa in task_run (task=0x8b161e8 <heapmem+1512>) at zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94 zephyrproject-rtos#8 0x083682dc in edf_work_handler (work=0x8b1621c <heapmem+1564>) at zephyr/edf_schedule.c:32 zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x085245af in work_queue_main (workq_ptr=0x8b15b00 <edf_workq>,...) at zephyr/kernel/work.c:688 zephyrproject-rtos#10 0x0823a6bc in z_thread_entry (entry=0x8523be0 <work_queue_main>,.. at zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:48 zephyrproject-rtos#11 0x0829a6a1 in posix_arch_thread_entry (pa_thread_status=0x8630648 .. at zephyr/arch/posix/core/thread.c:56 zephyrproject-rtos#12 0x0829c043 in posix_thread_starter (arg=0x4) at zephyr/arch/posix/core/posix_core.c:293 zephyrproject-rtos#13 0x080f6041 in asan_thread_start(void*) () zephyrproject-rtos#14 0xf788c73c in ?? () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 ``` Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]>
Flush all messages and invoke `abort()` when a k_panic() or k_oops() is hit in native_posix mode. One of the main purposes of `native_posix` is to provide debug convenience. When running in a debugger, `abort()` stops execution which provides a backtrace and the ability to inspect all variables. A good, sample use case is fuzzing failures in SOF, see an example in: thesofproject/sof#8632 In such a case, this commit adds value even before using a debugger. Without this commit, confusingly meaningless stack trace: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb Exiting due to fatal error ==314134== ERROR: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited #0 0x81d9637 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9637) #1 0x80cc42b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc42b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab79e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExitCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab864 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticExitCallback() (zephyr.exe+ zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf783dfe8 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3dfe8) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf783e1e6 in exit (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3e1e6) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x82a5488 in posix_exit boards/posix/native_posix/main.c:51:2 SUMMARY: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited ``` Thanks to this commit the `k_panic()` location is now immediately available in test logs without even running anything locally: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb @ WEST_TOPDIR/sof/src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 ZEPHYR FATAL ERROR: 3 ==315176== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal LLVMSymbolizer: error reading file: No such file or directory #0 0x81d9647 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9647) #1 0x80cc43b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc43b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab6be in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab77b in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf7f3159f (linux-gate.so.1+0x59f) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf7f31578 (linux-gate.so.1+0x578) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0xf788ea16 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x8ea16) zephyrproject-rtos#7 0xf783b316 in raise (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3b316) zephyrproject-rtos#8 0xf7822120 in abort (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x22120) zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x82afbde in ipc_cmd src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623:2 NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers. Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports. SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal ``` The full stack trace is now immediately available when running zephyr.exe in gdb: ``` ./scripts/fuzz.sh -- -DEXTRA_CFLAGS="-O0 -g3" gdb build-fuzz/zephyr/zephyr.exe run backtrace zephyrproject-rtos#2 0xf783b317 in raise () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#3 0xf7822121 in abort () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x082afbdf in ipc_cmd (_hdr=0x8b...) at src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x082fbf4b in ipc_platform_do_cmd (ipc=0x8b161c0) at src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162 zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x082e1e07 in ipc_do_cmd (data=0x8b161c0 <heapmem+1472>) at src/ipc/ipc-common.c:328 zephyrproject-rtos#7 0x083696aa in task_run (task=0x8b161e8 <heapmem+1512>) at zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94 zephyrproject-rtos#8 0x083682dc in edf_work_handler (work=0x8b1621c <heapmem+1564>) at zephyr/edf_schedule.c:32 zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x085245af in work_queue_main (workq_ptr=0x8b15b00 <edf_workq>,...) at zephyr/kernel/work.c:688 zephyrproject-rtos#10 0x0823a6bc in z_thread_entry (entry=0x8523be0 <work_queue_main>,.. at zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:48 zephyrproject-rtos#11 0x0829a6a1 in posix_arch_thread_entry (pa_thread_status=0x8630648 .. at zephyr/arch/posix/core/thread.c:56 zephyrproject-rtos#12 0x0829c043 in posix_thread_starter (arg=0x4) at zephyr/arch/posix/core/posix_core.c:293 zephyrproject-rtos#13 0x080f6041 in asan_thread_start(void*) () zephyrproject-rtos#14 0xf788c73c in ?? () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 ``` Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]>
Flush all messages and invoke `abort()` when a k_panic() or k_oops() is hit in native_posix mode. One of the main purposes of `native_posix` is to provide debug convenience. When running in a debugger, `abort()` stops execution which provides a backtrace and the ability to inspect all variables. A good, sample use case is fuzzing failures in SOF, see an example in: thesofproject/sof#8632 In such a case, this commit adds value even before using a debugger. Without this commit, confusingly meaningless stack trace: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb Exiting due to fatal error ==314134== ERROR: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited #0 0x81d9637 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9637) #1 0x80cc42b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc42b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab79e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExitCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab864 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticExitCallback() (zephyr.exe+ zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf783dfe8 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3dfe8) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf783e1e6 in exit (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3e1e6) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x82a5488 in posix_exit boards/posix/native_posix/main.c:51:2 SUMMARY: libFuzzer: fuzz target exited ``` Thanks to this commit the `k_panic()` location is now immediately available in test logs without even running anything locally: ``` INFO: seed corpus: files: 1097 min: 1b max: 428b total: 90853b rss: 58Mb @ WEST_TOPDIR/sof/src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 ZEPHYR FATAL ERROR: 3 ==315176== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal LLVMSymbolizer: error reading file: No such file or directory #0 0x81d9647 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (zephyr.exe+0x81d9647) #1 0x80cc43b in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (zephyr.exe+0x80cc43b) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x80ab6be in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() FuzzerLoop.cpp.o zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x80ab77b in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() zephyrproject-rtos#4 0xf7f3159f (linux-gate.so.1+0x59f) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0xf7f31578 (linux-gate.so.1+0x578) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0xf788ea16 (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x8ea16) zephyrproject-rtos#7 0xf783b316 in raise (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x3b316) zephyrproject-rtos#8 0xf7822120 in abort (/usr/lib32/libc.so.6+0x22120) zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x82afbde in ipc_cmd src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623:2 NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers. Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports. SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal ``` The full stack trace is now immediately available when running zephyr.exe in gdb: ``` ./scripts/fuzz.sh -- -DEXTRA_CFLAGS="-O0 -g3" gdb build-fuzz/zephyr/zephyr.exe run backtrace zephyrproject-rtos#2 0xf783b317 in raise () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#3 0xf7822121 in abort () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x082afbdf in ipc_cmd (_hdr=0x8b...) at src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1623 zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x082fbf4b in ipc_platform_do_cmd (ipc=0x8b161c0) at src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162 zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x082e1e07 in ipc_do_cmd (data=0x8b161c0 <heapmem+1472>) at src/ipc/ipc-common.c:328 zephyrproject-rtos#7 0x083696aa in task_run (task=0x8b161e8 <heapmem+1512>) at zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94 zephyrproject-rtos#8 0x083682dc in edf_work_handler (work=0x8b1621c <heapmem+1564>) at zephyr/edf_schedule.c:32 zephyrproject-rtos#9 0x085245af in work_queue_main (workq_ptr=0x8b15b00 <edf_workq>,...) at zephyr/kernel/work.c:688 zephyrproject-rtos#10 0x0823a6bc in z_thread_entry (entry=0x8523be0 <work_queue_main>,.. at zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:48 zephyrproject-rtos#11 0x0829a6a1 in posix_arch_thread_entry (pa_thread_status=0x8630648 .. at zephyr/arch/posix/core/thread.c:56 zephyrproject-rtos#12 0x0829c043 in posix_thread_starter (arg=0x4) at zephyr/arch/posix/core/posix_core.c:293 zephyrproject-rtos#13 0x080f6041 in asan_thread_start(void*) () zephyrproject-rtos#14 0xf788c73c in ?? () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 ``` Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <[email protected]>
* services: add RemoteHW-Deploy w/ snapshot of zephyrtest-blue * update target directory
hci_packet_complete(buf, buf_size) should check whether buf_size is enough. For instance, hci_packet_complete can receive buf with buf_size 1, leading to the buffer overflow in cmd->param_len, which is buf[3]. This can happen when rx_thread() receives two frames in over 512 bytes and the first frame size is 511. Then, rx_thread() will call hci_packet_complete() with 1. ==5==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000ad81c2 at pc 0x0000005279b3 bp 0x7fffe74f5b70 sp 0x7fffe74f5b68 READ of size 2 at 0x000000ad81c2 thread T6 #0 0x5279b2 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x4d697d (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4d697d) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x7ffff60e5daa (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x89daa) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) 0x000000ad81c2 is located 2 bytes to the right of global variable 'rx_thread.frame' defined in '/mnt/hdd1/sungwoo/zephyr-afl/zephyr/drivers/bluetooth/hci/userchan.c' (0xad7fc0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) Thread T6 created by T2 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T2 created by T1 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x52f36c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52f36c) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x5371dc (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5371dc) zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x5312a6 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5312a6) zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x52ed7b (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52ed7b) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x52eddd (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52eddd) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x7ffff6083c89 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x27c89) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) ==5==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
hci_packet_complete(buf, buf_size) should check whether buf_size is enough. For instance, hci_packet_complete can receive buf with buf_size 1, leading to the buffer overflow in cmd->param_len, which is buf[3]. This can happen when rx_thread() receives two frames in over 512 bytes and the first frame size is 511. Then, rx_thread() will call hci_packet_complete() with 1. ==5==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000ad81c2 at pc 0x0000005279b3 bp 0x7fffe74f5b70 sp 0x7fffe74f5b68 READ of size 2 at 0x000000ad81c2 thread T6 #0 0x5279b2 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x4d697d (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4d697d) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x7ffff60e5daa (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x89daa) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) 0x000000ad81c2 is located 2 bytes to the right of global variable 'rx_thread.frame' defined in 'zephyr/drivers/bluetooth/hci/userchan.c' (0xad7fc0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) Thread T6 created by T2 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T2 created by T1 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x52f36c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52f36c) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x5371dc (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5371dc) zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x5312a6 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5312a6) zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x52ed7b (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52ed7b) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x52eddd (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52eddd) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x7ffff6083c89 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x27c89) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) ==5==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
hci_packet_complete(buf, buf_size) should check whether buf_size is enough. For instance, hci_packet_complete can receive buf with buf_size 1, leading to the buffer overflow in cmd->param_len, which is buf[3]. This can happen when rx_thread() receives two frames in 512 bytes and the first frame size is 511. Then, rx_thread() will call hci_packet_complete() with 1. ==5==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000ad81c2 at pc 0x0000005279b3 bp 0x7fffe74f5b70 sp 0x7fffe74f5b68 READ of size 2 at 0x000000ad81c2 thread T6 #0 0x5279b2 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x4d697d (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4d697d) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x7ffff60e5daa (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x89daa) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) 0x000000ad81c2 is located 2 bytes to the right of global variable 'rx_thread.frame' defined in 'zephyr/drivers/bluetooth/hci/userchan.c' (0xad7fc0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) Thread T6 created by T2 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T2 created by T1 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x52f36c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52f36c) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x5371dc (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5371dc) zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x5312a6 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5312a6) zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x52ed7b (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52ed7b) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x52eddd (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52eddd) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x7ffff6083c89 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x27c89) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) ==5==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
hci_packet_complete(buf, buf_size) should check whether buf_size is enough. For instance, hci_packet_complete can receive buf with buf_size 1, leading to the buffer overflow in cmd->param_len, which is buf[3]. This can happen when rx_thread() receives two frames in 512 bytes and the first frame size is 511. Then, rx_thread() will call hci_packet_complete() with 1. ==5==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000ad81c2 at pc 0x0000005279b3 bp 0x7fffe74f5b70 sp 0x7fffe74f5b68 READ of size 2 at 0x000000ad81c2 thread T6 #0 0x5279b2 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) #1 0x4d697d (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4d697d) #2 0x7ffff60e5daa (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x89daa) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) 0x000000ad81c2 is located 2 bytes to the right of global variable 'rx_thread.frame' defined in 'zephyr/drivers/bluetooth/hci/userchan.c' (0xad7fc0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) Thread T6 created by T2 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) #1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) #2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T2 created by T1 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) #1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) #2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) #1 0x52f36c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52f36c) #2 0x5371dc (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5371dc) #3 0x5312a6 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5312a6) #4 0x52ed7b (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52ed7b) #5 0x52eddd (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52eddd) #6 0x7ffff6083c89 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x27c89) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) ==5==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
hci_packet_complete(buf, buf_size) should check whether buf_size is enough. For instance, hci_packet_complete can receive buf with buf_size 1, leading to the buffer overflow in cmd->param_len, which is buf[3]. This can happen when rx_thread() receives two frames in 512 bytes and the first frame size is 511. Then, rx_thread() will call hci_packet_complete() with 1. ==5==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x000000ad81c2 at pc 0x0000005279b3 bp 0x7fffe74f5b70 sp 0x7fffe74f5b68 READ of size 2 at 0x000000ad81c2 thread T6 #0 0x5279b2 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x4d697d (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4d697d) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x7ffff60e5daa (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x89daa) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) 0x000000ad81c2 is located 2 bytes to the right of global variable 'rx_thread.frame' defined in 'zephyr/drivers/bluetooth/hci/userchan.c' (0xad7fc0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5279b2) Thread T6 created by T2 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T2 created by T1 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x530192 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x530192) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x4dcc22 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x4dcc22) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x48c17c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x48c17c) zephyrproject-rtos#1 0x52f36c (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52f36c) zephyrproject-rtos#2 0x5371dc (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5371dc) zephyrproject-rtos#3 0x5312a6 (/root/zephyr.exe+0x5312a6) zephyrproject-rtos#4 0x52ed7b (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52ed7b) zephyrproject-rtos#5 0x52eddd (/root/zephyr.exe+0x52eddd) zephyrproject-rtos#6 0x7ffff6083c89 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x27c89) (BuildId: 2e01923fea4ad9f7fa50fe24e0f3385a45a6cd1c) ==5==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
This ensures that an unkown request won't cause ATT to timeout since no
response is currently generated.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz [email protected]
This change is